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ABSTRACT 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF TEACHING IN CHILDREN WITH  
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER 
 
John Douglas Knutsen 
Douglas A. Frye 
 
 Current interventions to improve the social, academic, and behavioral skills in 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) all require teaching activities. A central 
component of being able to engage in and benefit from teaching activities is the ability to 
recognize and understand when and how teaching occurs. The emergence of an 
understanding of teaching as a means by which we acquire knowledge from others is a 
key feature of socio-cognitive development. However, it is not known whether children 
with ASD develop the ability to understand the fundamental concept of teaching. 
Understanding what children with ASD know about the concept of teaching is important 
in order to optimize interventions that incorporate teaching as a method of learning.  
 This dissertation examines the understanding of teaching in children with ASD 
compared to typically developing children. Specifically, we investigate the two defining 
features of an understanding of teaching: 1) that teaching requires a knowledge difference 
between teacher and learner, and 2) that teaching is an intentional activity. We use a 
vi 
 
cross-sectional design to assess whether the understanding of these two components is 
intact or impaired in high functioning children with ASD compared to typical children 
individually matched on verbal ability. This study also investigates the interrelations 
among the understanding of teaching, theory of mind acquisition, and concurrent 
understanding of intention in others in this population.  
 Our results indicate that the understanding of the two core components that 
underlie the concept of teaching is impaired in high functioning children with ASD, 
compared to matched controls. The role that intention and theory of mind play in the 
understanding of teaching in high functioning children with ASD is also discussed. This 
work has broad implications for improving teaching and teaching-based interventions for 
children with ASD. 
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The Understanding of Teaching in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
 The core symptoms of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) include social and 
communication impairments, as well as restricted repertoires of behaviors and interests 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders). These impairments manifest in early childhood and can severely affect social 
integration and learning. Over the past two decades, a wide range of behavioral and 
developmental interventions have been designed and implemented to improve the various 
symptoms associated with ASD. Without appropriate intervention, the resulting deficits 
in social understanding, basic functional communication skills, and appropriate social 
behavior can limit the educational progress of children with ASD (National Research 
Council, 2001).  
 A wide array of ASD treatment approaches exist; however, psycho-educational 
interventions have been and continue to be the gold standard (Filipek, Steinberg-Epstein, 
& Book, 2006; Howlin, 2005). The majority of current comprehensive psycho-
educational intervention programs for children with ASD are based on one of three 
models: the Treatment and Education of Autistic and Communication Handicapped 
Children (TEACCH) program, Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), and The Denver 
Model. TEACCH provides a framework for teaching which emphasizes structure and 
targets characteristic traits of ASD (Schopler, 1997; Schopler & Reichler, 1971). A 
central component of TEACCH includes employing the restricted special interests of a 
child with ASD to engage them in learning (Mesibov & Shea, 2010). In comparison, 
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ABA is designed to target specific impairments identified in an individual’s diagnosis 
(Ferster & DeMyer, 1961; Lovaas & Simmons, 1969). The Denver Model is an 
expansion of ABA that integrates developmental, behavioral, and relationship-based 
interventions (Rogers et al., 2006; Rogers, Hall, Osaki, Reaven, & Herbison, 2001). 
Although there are differences between each model’s primary philosophical orientation 
and relative emphasis on particular strategies, they all place primary importance on some 
form of systematic instruction or structural teaching (Callahan, Shukla-Mehta, Magee, & 
Wie, 2010). 
 These and other interventions use teaching methods to address different 
symptoms of ASD. However, whether children with ASD understand the teaching 
situation itself has not been studied. This raises many testable questions, including: Do 
children with ASD understand that teaching is an intentional activity? Do they recognize 
that the purpose of teaching is to impart knowledge to another? Can they recognize 
teaching as an identifiable activity that is qualitatively distinct from other observable 
behaviors such as imitation? Do specific core impairments of ASD impact a child’s 
understanding of instruction? For example, do social cognitive deficits and delays in 
ASD play a role in autistic children’s ability to recognize the activity of teaching? 
Answers to these questions about whether children with ASD understand teaching are 
important because they may affect ASD intervention outcomes and may shape the design 
of new interventions. 
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 Theoretical claims have been made that link the understanding of teaching with 
theory of mind—the ability to predict and explain human behavior in terms of underlying 
mental states (Kruger & Tomasello, 1996; Olson & Bruner, 1996). To test these 
hypotheses, typically developing preschool-aged children have been evaluated for their 
understanding of teaching. For instance, preschoolers’ theory of mind have been shown 
to be related to their understanding that the teaching process is an intentional activity 
(Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008) and that it depends on a knowledge difference or ‘gap’ 
between teacher and learner (Astington & Pelletier, 1996; Ziv & Frye, 2004). Together, 
these studies suggest that, 1) teaching should be recognized as a general means by which 
we acquire knowledge and that 2) the understanding of teaching can be examined though 
theory of mind. Although mental state understanding in ASD is well studied, and is 
generally regarded to be impaired (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz, & Klin, 2004), the 
understanding of teaching in this population has not been explored. 
 Given the social deficits and delays fundamental to ASD, and the developmental 
link between understanding teaching and theory of mind in typically developing children, 
we hypothesize that the understanding of teaching in high functioning children with ASD 
may be impaired compared to typically developing children. This study seeks to examine 
the understanding of teaching in children with ASD. Specifically, the goal of the 
proposed project is to evaluate whether high functioning children with ASD understand 
teaching as an activity designed to reduce the ‘gap’ in knowledge between teacher and 
learner, and that it is an activity that is performed intentionally. By investigating the 
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understanding of teaching in high functioning children with ASD, we will be better 
prepared to design interventions with approaches to teaching that are tailored to the 
manner in which children with ASD acquire knowledge.  
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
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Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
 Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are a heterogeneous group of 
neurodevelopmental conditions, characterized by impairments in social skills, verbal and 
nonverbal communication, and restricted repetitive stereotyped patterns of behavior 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The term ‘ASDs’ refers to a specific group of 
pervasive developmental disorders (PDD), listed here in order from least common to 
most common: Pervasive Developmental Disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), 
Asperger Syndrome (AS), and Autistic Disorder (AD). For the remainder of this 
dissertation, “Autistic Disorder”, “AD”, and “childhood autism” will be used 
interchangeably. At present these subtypes are differentiated by age and symptom onset, 
severity and comprehensiveness of symptoms, and association (or lack thereof) with 
language delay and intellectual disability (Lord, 2010). However, proposed changes to 
the nosology of having an ASD in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) and the eleventh edition of the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) will impact current subtype classifications (Lord & 
Jones, 2012). The children examined in this study received a putative diagnosis of ASD 
according to DSM-IV-TR classifications. For this reason, it is important to understand the 
distinctions among the ASD subtypes that were used to diagnose children who 
participated in this project. 
 ASDs are found in all socioeconomic, ethnic, and age groups. However, males are 
almost five times more likely to have an ASD than females (NIH Autism Fact Sheet, 
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2012). Prevalence rates based on recent findings by the Autism and Developmental 
Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) indicate that ASDs affects approximately one in 88 children in the 
United States, and one in 54 boys (ADDM, 2012). The majority (62%) of children 
identified as having ASDs do not have intellectual disability (IQ ≤ 70; ADDM, 2012). 
Current estimates predict that the children diagnosed with autism this year will 
outnumber the children diagnosed with diabetes, AIDS, and cancer combined (Autism 
Speaks, 2013).    
 The etiology of ASDs is currently not known, nor does a cure or preventative 
measure exist. While there is growing evidence that autism is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder with a very strong genetic component (Yates, 2012), there is not yet a validated 
biomarker or biological test (Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008). ASDs cannot be detected 
or diagnosed by physiological testing. Therefore, behavioral observation and detection of 
autistic signs and symptoms is the only existing method of diagnosis. The diagnosis of an 
ASD can be made as early as 14 months (Kleinman et al., 2008). However, diagnoses 
typically occur between ages 3 and 5 because those made prior to age 3 are less reliable 
(Charman & Baird, 2002). 
 Criteria set in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and 
ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) for a clinical diagnosis of ASD requires 
significant dysfunction in three domains: social interaction, communication, and 
presentation of restricted repetitive stereotyped behaviors. A diagnosis of ASD also 
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requires onset in at least one domain and presentation of a minimum of six symptoms 
(within or across domains; e.g., failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to 
developmental level, lack of social or emotional reciprocity, or lack of social imitative 
play appropriate to developmental level) by age 3 years (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). There is a marked range of syndrome expression in ASD. The lowest 
functioning children are largely or entirely nonverbal, make few social overtures, and 
remain socially isolated. In contrast, higher functioning children engage in social 
interaction, but cannot initiate or sustain it in a typical manner. Individuals with AD on 
the end of syndrome expression with least dysfunction fall into the normal IQ range (≥ 80) 
and are referred to as having high-functioning autistic disorder (HFA). Current 
prevalence rates indicate that the majority (62%) of children identified as having ASDs 
do not have intellectual disability (IQ ≤ 70; ADDM, 2012). Therefore, over half of all 
children diagnosed with an ASD fall into the HFA category. 
 This dissertation focuses on HFA exclusively for the following reasons: 1) the 
high prevalence rates—HFA affects a majority of children diagnosed with ASD; 2) 
previous developmental literature deals almost exclusively in studies of children with 
HFA; and 3) the socio-cognitive measures used in this study have only been used to 
examine children who have normal verbal abilities (i.e., verbal IQ ≥ 80). 
 The children mentioned in the current study have been diagnosed with HFA and 
not AS. However, at the time of writing, there is in ongoing debate about whether there is 
a symptomatic difference between them, and whether they are simply quantitative 
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manifestations of the same disorder (e.g., see Matson & Wilkins, 2008; but see also 
Sanders, 2009). There is no consensus as to whether these two syndromes represent 
different disorders or are variants of one condition. Asperger Syndrome (AS) like HFA 
also requires IQ within the normal range (≥ 70) and is characterized by qualitative 
impairment in social interaction, communication, and restricted repetitive stereotyped 
behaviors. However, children with AS have no clinically significant delay in language, 
cognitive development, or in the development of age-appropriate self-help skills and 
adaptive behavior (other than social interaction) (Dawson et al., 2010). The diagnostic 
difference between AS and HFA is the absence of clinically significant delays in the three 
domains in AS. Another difference is that the average age of diagnosis for AS is not 
made until 6-11 (CDC, 2008; Schaefer & Mendelsohn, 2008). However, because HFA 
and AS share similar symptoms and both conditions employ the same treatment 
approaches, they are often referred to as the same diagnosis. 
 Unlike autism and AS, Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise 
Specified (PDD-NOS) does not have specific diagnostic criteria (however, see proposed 
changes to the classification of ASD in DSM-V and ICD-11; Lord & Jones, 2012). PDD-
NOS is diagnosed when an individual fails to meet specific criteria for AD or another 
explicitly defined PDD (e.g., AS). Commonly referred to as “atypical Autism”, PDD-
NOS is similar to AD in that it also is characterized by mild to severe impairments in 
social interaction and communication, as well as specialized interests. However, these 
impairments may differ in severity or occur in a distinct pattern (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2000). For example, age of onset for PDD-NOS may occur after age 3 and 
have fewer than six symptoms in total. In general, individuals with PDD-NOS have fewer 
autistic symptoms than individuals with AD or with AS, particularly in the domain of 
repetitive, stereotyped activities. 
 Impaired social interaction, found in essentially all children with an ASD, is the 
most common and fundamental feature of this spectrum of disorders. This core 
characteristic has been of particular interest in developmental research that examines 
social cognitive development in children with ASD.    
 
 
Theory of Mind 
 
 Cognitive Models of ASD. Psychological description of core impairments in 
individuals with ASD plays a critical role in the search for factors involved in the 
etiology and pathogenesis of ASDs. Over the past two decades, various psychological 
models of autism have been developed in the effort to account for the observed early 
onset social deficits or delays (Volkmar et al., 2004). There are three prevailing cognitive 
theoretical models of autism: Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995), Weak Central 
Coherence (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006), and Executive Dysfunction (Hughes, 
Russell, & Robbins, 1994; Russell, 1997) (however, see also social motivation theory; 
Chevallier et al., 2012). These theories are based on the findings that individuals with 
ASD perform differently compared to matched groups of neurotypical (and, in certain 
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cases, non-autistic atypical) individuals on specific psychological tasks. For example, 
theory of mind approaches are known to use false belief and intention understanding 
tasks (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, 1986), executive function approaches 
may employ a ‘Wisconsin Card Sort’ task (e.g., Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), 
and weak central coherence approaches have utilized ‘embedded figures’ tasks (e.g., 
Happé & Frith, 2006). Of these three accounts of ASD, this study adopts a theory of mind 
approach because the aim of this study is to investigate the understanding of the concept 
of teaching in ASD. Measures used here and in the literature to explore the understanding 
of teaching are based on findings that show a relation between children’s developing 
theory of mind and their understanding of teaching (e.g., Ziv & Frye, 2004). Therefore, 
we chose to use a theory of mind approach in this study of the novel population of ASD 
to compare our findings to the established literature on the topic of theory of mind in 
teaching. 
 For the studies presented in this dissertation, we focus on children with HFA who 
consistently demonstrate delays or deficits in mental state attribution tasks compared to 
typically developing (TD) children matched for verbal mental and chronological age (see 
Baron-Cohen, 2001 for a review). Mental state attribution, or ‘theory of mind’, refers to 
the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and to others, and to appreciate that another 
person’s mental state can be different from one’s own. Therefore, having a ‘theory of 
mind’ means being able to: 1) infer others’ mental states such as their beliefs, desires, 
knowledge, intentions, emotions, etc.; and 2) predict their behavior based on those 
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inferences. Recognizing that actions result from beliefs, whether those beliefs are true or 
false, plays a significant role in how we evaluate the actions of others (e.g., Astington, 
2001). TD adults readily employ this ability. Indeed, most social interaction relies upon it 
(e.g., Malle, 1999; Wellman, 1990). Having a ‘theory of mind’ is beneficial for social 
interactions because it allows one to understand the grounds for another’s action. For 
example, understanding the reason why someone shows you how to do something (e.g., 
tie a shoe) depends upon recognizing that s/he thinks that you do not know how to do 
what is being performed (tying a shoe, a perceived knowledge difference), and therefore 
s/he is trying to teach this specific sequence of actions to you (how to tie a shoe, on 
purpose or ‘intentionally’). In this case, recognizing a perceived knowledge difference 
and intention in others allows us to make sense of another person’s action (teaching you 
how to tie a shoe). 
 
 False Belief. Theory of mind understanding undergoes significant changes in TD 
children across the preschool years (e.g., Astington, 1994; Moore & Dunham, 1996; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001, or see Flavell, 2004 for a review). During preschool 
age, false belief understanding is considered by many to be the watershed in theory of 
mind development (Perner, 1991; Repacholi & Slaughter, 2003; Wellman, 1990). 
Understanding false belief means recognizing that a person’s belief can be either true or 
false relative to the current state of affairs. A full understanding of this concept includes 
recognition of false belief in self and in others. A false belief can be betrayed by reality 
14 
 
since beliefs are only a person’s representation of the actual state of affairs. We 
experience betrayal by the current state of affairs anytime our beliefs do not match to 
reality. Examples of this mismatch abound, such as when you wave at someone believing 
to know them, but then discover in reality that it is a stranger, at which point you likely 
blush and walk away in embarrassment of your mistake, in recognition of your own false 
belief. 
 Assessing children’s first-order false belief understanding (i.e., only inferring one 
other person’s mental state) has been traditionally measured with a variety of adaptations 
of two tasks: a change-of-location false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and an 
unexpected contents false belief task—also known as a misleading container task 
(Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). In the change-
of-location task, an object is placed by an Agent in location Α who then leaves the scene. 
While the Agent is absent, the object is moved to another location Β unbeknownst to the 
Agent. The Agent then returns to collect the object. Two questions follow: a memory 
question is asked to ensure that the facts of the story are correctly understood, and then (if 
the memory question is answered accurately) the false belief question asks where the 
Agent will look to retrieve the object. The correct answer is location Α (i.e., Agent’s false 
belief) whereas an incorrect answer is location Β (current state of affairs).  
 In the unexpected contents false belief tasks, a child is shown a familiar container 
whose label indicates its original contents (e.g., M&M’s, Band-Aids, Crayola Crayons, 
etc.) and asked what s/he believes is inside. Then the container is opened to reveal that 
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something other, and usually surprisingly different, than the labeled item is inside (e.g., 
toy animal, pencils, buttons, etc.). The container is then closed and the child is asked to 
report his/her original belief about the contents of the container as well as the belief of 
another absent individual who has seen the closed container for the first time. A correct 
answer is that the initial belief was whatever had been originally said by the child and 
absent individual (almost always it’s the specific or generic name of the labeled item on 
the container, e.g., “chocolate”, or “M&M’s”). An incorrect response is that both child 
and the ignorant other always expected to find what actually had been discovered to be in 
the container (i.e., the surprising content(s)). For the remainder of this discussion, all 
false belief tasks will be considered ‘first-order’ false belief tasks unless stated otherwise. 
 TD children’s success on these first-order false belief tasks undergoes a 
fundamental transition between 3 and 5 years of age. During this period, the probability 
of a child being able to pass a false belief task shifts from statistically below chance at 
about age 3 to statistically above chance from about age 4 onwards. This pattern of 
results has been replicated across numerous studies that varied considerably in task 
format. A meta-analysis of studies utilizing a variety of false-belief paradigms concluded 
that children do not reliably pass false-belief tasks until around the age of four (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). This consistent finding serves as reliable evidence that a major 
conceptual change in theory of mind occurs in TD children during the preschool years 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
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  Performance on false belief tasks in children with ASD is notably different from 
TD children. Children with ASD are consistently observed to be significantly delayed 
compared to TD children in passing false belief tasks. In one of the first demonstrations 
of this delay, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) found that 80% of HFA children 
failed the false belief task, while control groups of either of TD preschoolers or children 
with Down’s syndrome matched for verbal mental age (VMA) passed. This finding has 
been highly influential and, similar to the above pattern of findings for TD preschoolers, 
has been widely replicated across a range of studies using various task formats. In a meta-
analysis of studies employing a variety of false belief paradigms, Happé (1995) 
concluded that HFA children on average do not reliably pass false-belief tasks until they 
have an estimated VMA of at least 11 years. Moreover, the meta-analysis indicated that 
HFA children perform significantly worse on false belief tasks than do children matched 
for verbal mental or chronological age (CA). To date, there have been no reported cases 
of a group of children with ASD whose mental age is equivalent to TD preschoolers that 
pass standard false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 2001; Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2010). 
 
 Steps in Theory of Mind Development. Although false belief may be an important 
milestone in theory of mind development, it is not the only cognitive process that 
determines whether one has a theory of mind. Theory of mind can be viewed as a 
progression of mental state understanding that develops well before age 4 and continues 
to develop well after. Infants, for instance, show signs of recognizing mental state activity 
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by engaging in joint attention and using symbolic gestures to represent emotion concepts 
such as happy and sad (e.g., Vallotton, 2008). At about 2 years of age, children begin to 
participate in pretend play which may also be connected to theory of mind development 
downstream (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Sobel, 2004). Additional theory of mind developmental 
precursors include the employment of mental state terms such as “know”, “think”, and 
“remember” (Astington & Gopnik, 1991), and being able to distinguish such terms from 
non-mental state terms like “throw”, “eat”, and “run” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994). 
Moreover, children at about age 3 are able to understand desires and simple emotions, 
predict action based on true beliefs, distinguish between real and mental experiences 
(e.g., petting a dog versus thinking about petting a dog) (Wellman & Estes, 1986), and 
distinguish between simple intended and unintended actions (e.g., jumping into a pool to 
get wet vs. falling into a pool when not wanting to get wet) (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 
1999; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980).  
 To investigate the developmental progression of children’s understanding of 
mental states, Wellman and Liu (2004) created a theory of mind scale. They conducted a 
meta-analysis of theory of mind research that examined both precursors to, and post-false 
belief changes in, theory of mind development. Tasks were selected across different 
categories of mental states that have been shown to progress developmentally and were 
then only chosen provided that “the formats and demands were similar and parallel” 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004, p. 524). Seven tasks were tested on a theory of mind battery, 
based on mental state category type and the developmental complexity of the task-
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specific components. Confirmed through Rasch (1960) modeling and Guttman scaling 
procedures, the following five tasks were found to form a strict developmental scale: 1. 
diverse desires, 2. diverse beliefs, 3. knowledge access, 4. contents false belief, and 5. 
real-apparent emotion. Specific task descriptions can be found in Chapter 3: Methods; 
actual tasks can be found in Appendix B. 
 1. Diverse desires refers to one’s ability to appreciate that other people’s desires 
may differ from one’s own (e.g., you want a glass of milk to drink, but I want a glass of 
orange juice). Children are thought to develop this understanding in the first few years of 
life (e.g., Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007). For instance, research has shown that 
18-month-olds are able to appreciate that people can have different desires toward 
different objects, even when the desire differs from the child’s own preferences 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Wellman (1991) maintains that as early as 24 months, 
children make sense of other’s behavior by utilizing a "simple desire" psychology (as 
opposed to a belief-desire psychology) wherein they recognize that people have desires 
and that those desires may differ across people. However, children at this age have yet to 
apply this recognition and logic to beliefs (Wellman, 1991). 
 2. Belief understanding is thought to develop after desire understanding. Diverse 
beliefs refers to one’s ability to recognize that other people’s beliefs may differ from 
one’s own. Unlike one’s desires, though, one’s beliefs can be false. The diverse belief 
task in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory of mind scale examines the ability to recognize 
that people can have different beliefs and that these beliefs influence one’s behavior. 
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However, it does not distinguish between true and false beliefs because the ability to 
appreciate true beliefs and the ability to appreciate false beliefs does not develop in 
unison. True beliefs are distinct from false beliefs in that they do not demand reconciling 
the difference between belief and reality when making sense of a belief or a belief-based 
behavior. Understanding a true versus a false belief requires recognizing that a belief 
corresponds with reality and that a person’s behavior is, in part, a reflection of their 
corresponding belief about reality. In the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale, false belief is 
tested in stage number 4 (see below). 
 3. Between when children develop an understanding of diverse beliefs and an 
understanding of false beliefs, they typically develop the ability to appreciate the 
difference between knowledge and the absence of knowledge, or ignorance. Children 
younger than 3 years of age struggle to understand that others may lack knowledge about 
something, especially when they themselves have that particular knowledge (e.g., 
Robinson et al., 2006). Children are competent at identifying ignorance in others before 
they are competent at identifying the false belief in others that results from the other 
person’s ignorance (Hogrefe et al., 1986). The knowledge access task in the Wellman and 
Liu (2004) scale assesses children’s ability to recognize that perceptual access to an 
object or event is thought to be a necessary condition for knowledge concerning it—that 
is, the “seeing leads to knowing” principle (e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990). Specifically, the 
task investigates whether a child who has seen the contents of a box will recognize that a 
character who has not seen inside the box will not know its contents.   
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 4. False belief understanding typically develops after understanding knowledge 
access (i.e., the causal relation between seeing and knowing). On average, children 
become competent on false belief tasks 0.5-1.5 years after the age at which children are 
competent on perceptual access understanding (e.g., Fabricius & Khalil, 2003; Hogrefe et 
al., 1986). The false belief task that Wellman and Liu (2004) utilize in the theory of mind 
scale is a contents false belief task, similar to the contents false belief example described 
above. The task explores children’s ability to judge whether a character’s belief about the 
mistaken contents of a readily identifiable container is false or a character’s belief is in 
accord the current state of affairs (i.e., the actual contents of the container). 
 5. The scale’s fifth and final item is the real-apparent emotions task. The task is 
designed to investigate children’s ability to recognize that people’s displays of emotions 
may not reflect their actual feelings (e.g., a person can smile but still feel sad) as a result 
of interpersonal constraints. During the preschool years, children are able to connect 
basic mental states to emotions, such as recognizing that getting what one wants elicits 
happiness and not getting what wants leads to sadness (e.g., Harter & Whitesell, 1989). 
At this age, children tend to understand emotions in behavioral terms and as a response to 
one’s environment. However, it is not until they are slightly older that they begin to 
connect social rules to emotions and grasp that social and moral constraints influence 
emotions (e.g., Lagattuta, 2005). Emotional display rules are social norms that dictate the 
appropriateness of expressing an emotion in specific situations (e.g., smiling to hide 
disappointment when receiving a gift that fails to meet expectations) (Saarni, 1999). To a 
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certain degree, such display rules are particularly difficult for young children because 
they depend on recognizing that a single external event can be represented internally (i.e., 
mentally) in more than one way (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 2002). It is not until age 5 or 6 
that children begin to grasp the corollary concepts of emotional display rules (producing 
mistaken beliefs in others about one’s feelings) and social deception.    
 
 Universality of Theory of Mind Scale in TD Children. Collectively, these five 
components of theory of mind paint a much broader picture of theory of mind 
development than could any single type of task—such as a false belief type of task—
suggesting that mental state understanding is embodied by a protracted and progressive 
set of conceptual acquisitions. The developmental order this scale represents has since 
been replicated among TD preschoolers not only in the United States (Woodburn, 2008) 
but also across a variety of cultures and in languages other than English (Hofer & 
Aschersleben, 2007; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Wang, 2010; Wellman & Liu, 
2004; Wellman, et al., 2006). The fact that theory of mind seems to develop in the 
particular progression depicted by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale across distinct 
cultures and in different languages highlights the potentially universal nature of this basic 
developmental sequence among TD children. 
 So far, we have seen that across the preschool years, children undergo sweeping 
changes in their theory of mind development. In contrast to TD children, HFA children 
exhibit profound impairments across a range of these socio-cognitive processes. HFA 
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children have delays or deficiencies in aspects of theory of mind development and related 
factors that have not been mentioned here, such as deception (Baron-Cohen, 1992; 
Sodian & Frith, 1992; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi & Shulman, 1996), second-order false 
belief (Baron-Cohen,1989b; Happé 1993; Ozonoff et al., 1991), self–other differentiation 
(Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994), face-processing and emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen et 
al, 2000), and imagination (Low, Goddard, & Mesler, 2009; Scott & Baron-Cohen,1996) 
to name but a few. An exhaustive review of cognitive impairments in ASD that may be 
associated with theory of mind development is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, interested readers may refer to studies of HFA children’s cognitive 
impairments in a review by d’Arc and Mottron (2012) or Happé and Ronald (2009), or 
social cognitive delays or deficiencies by Baron-Cohen (2001). We will now focus our 
attention on the theory of mind scale and precursors to mental state understanding in 
children with HFA. 
 
 Theory of Mind Scale in ASD. Children with ASD represent a group in which the 
theory of mind developmental pattern is not upheld. In one study, three groups of verbal 
ability matched Australian children (TD, deaf, and HFA) were given Wellman and Liu’s 
(2004) five-item theory of mind scale (Peterson et al., 2005). Although the order of 
theory of mind acquisition for deaf children was the same, albeit delayed, as that 
observed in TD preschoolers, the sequence observed for HFA children was different. As 
has been found in previous research, the TD (and deaf) children found the last task (real-
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apparent emotion task) most difficult (i.e., they performed significantly worse on this task 
than they did on the other four tasks). However, the autistic sample found the penultimate 
task (false belief task) most difficult. Given this outcome, Peterson and colleagues (2005) 
also performed Rasch analyses to confirm that the reversal of the last two items on the 
battery formed a new scaled sequence of tasks for the HFA group. The HFA children in 
this study had a mean CA of 9.32 years (range: 6-14) and a mean VMA of 7.86 years, 
and were on average still failing a standard false belief task. This lends further support to 
the above empirical summary by Happé (1995) indicating that HFA are not generally 
successful on false belief tasks until they have reached a VMA of about 11-years-old.  
 In a recent follow-up study Peterson and colleagues presented to a group of TD, 
deaf, HFA, and AS children an augmented five-item scale that included a sixth, sarcasm 
task (Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012). All four groups found the sarcasm task 
most difficult and the pattern of performance on the first five-items was replicated for the 
HFA group. Together with findings from the original study (Peterson et al., 2005), they 
concluded that children with ASD also conform to a scalable pattern of theory of mind 
development, but one that is different and delayed compared to typical preschoolers. 
 
 Developmental Precursors to Theory of Mind in ASD. Prior to the above false 
belief understanding impairments observed in elementary and middle school aged 
children, HFA children also exhibit delays and deficits compared to TD children in early 
emerging abilities that are considered to be developmental precursors to theory of mind. 
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One example of this delayed ability is joint attention (coordinating attention with another 
about an object or event). Theoretical claims have linked joint attention to later theory of 
mind development (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1994; Carpenter et al., 
1998; Hobson, 2002). Substantial evidence indicates that HFA children are impaired in 
both the production and comprehension of joint attention (e.g., Baron–Cohen, 1989a, 
1993; Mundy et al., 1986, 1993, 2009). Impairments in joint attention are among the 
earliest signs of ASD, such that absence of or deficits in joint attention abilities are used 
in the diagnosis of ASD in young children (Osterling & Dawson, 1994). Studies have 
also observed that HFA children show impoverished spontaneous pretend play compared 
to matched control groups. However, difficulty with engaging in pretense is shown to 
decrease by providing substantial structure to the play situation (see Jarrold, 2003 for a 
review). Still, HFA children in general are found to have an impaired competence in their 
capacity for pretense (e.g., Bigham, 2010; Carter et al., 2005). Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that joint attention and symbolic play skills are deficient in the 
majority of young HFA children, and that these abilities may be important predictors of 
later socio-cognitive competencies.  
 Another impairment in the development of theory of mind related skills observed 
in HFA children is the ability to differentiate between mental and physical events. Young 
preschool-aged children appear to have a rudimentary understanding of the ontological 
distinction between mental and physical events. This has been demonstrated in their 
ability to distinguish between thinking about an object and physically interacting with it 
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(e.g., Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Wellman & Estes, 1986). Studies show that 3-5-year-
old children understand that mental phenomena such as dreams or ‘pictures in your head’ 
cannot be acted upon directly in the same way (e.g., touched) as physical objects such as 
a rock or even a photograph of a rock (e.g., Estes, Wellman, & Wooley, 1989). Children 
as young as 3 also appreciate that although perceptual input is necessary for knowledge 
formation, it is not necessary for mental images or representations (e.g., Wooley & 
Wellman, 1993). However, HFA children with an average mental age older than TD 
preschoolers’ (6.9 yrs) are shown to be significantly impaired at making such judgments, 
suggesting that they have difficulty separating a mental phenomenon from its physical 
counterpart (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989a). 
 Another key component in theory of mind development is the ability to determine 
where knowledge comes from so that it becomes possible to determine who knows what, 
and especially, who does not know what. Young preschoolers seem to grasp the basic 
understanding that “seeing leads to knowing” given that they can correctly predict 
between two agents, one of whom looks into a box, and the other of whom merely 
touches a box, that only the agent who has seen what’s inside box knows its contents 
(Pratt & Bryant, 1990). HFA children with an average VMA of 7, though, have been 
found to be just as likely to predict either agent when questioned about which of them 
knows the contents of the box (Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994; Leslie & Frith, 1988).  
 While it is important that young preschoolers begin to show an appreciation for 
how perceptual access to information leads to knowledge in others, it is also important to 
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understand the role that one’s own perceptual access to information plays in knowledge 
acquisition. TD children between 3 and 5 years of age develop the ability to distinguish 
reliably between what something looks like and what it really is (i.e., its appearance vs. 
reality). For example, when TD preschoolers from about age 4 onwards are presented 
with a sponge made to look like a rock, they tend to say that it looks like a rock but is 
really a sponge (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986). But children with HFA presented with 
the same sorts of tests do not appear to appreciate the appearance-reality distinction. 
Rather, they tend to say that the object really is a rock, or really is a sponge. Their 
descriptions tend to refer to just one feature of the object (e.g., the sponge “looks like a 
sponge and really is a sponge”) and thus fail to capture the object’s dual identity (Baron-
Cohen, 1989a). 
 We have seen that HFA children exhibit delays and deficits in theory of mind 
development. This progression also may come about in a pattern distinct from TD 
populations. These delays and differences in mental state understanding in themselves 
and others may have ramifications on their ability to understand the concept of teaching. 
 
 
The Understanding of Teaching 
 
 Mental state understanding impairments in children with HFA may play a critical 
role in their understanding of teaching. Several theoretical arguments claim that the 
understanding of teaching is related to theory of mind (e.g., Astington & Pelletier, 1996, 
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2005; Kruger & Tomasello, 1996; Olson & Bruner, 1996; Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 
1993). For example, Kruger and Tomasello (1996) define teaching in terms of its 
intention (to bring about learning), which suggests that the understanding of teaching is 
linked to theory of mind through the understanding of intention. Specifically, the 
implication is that the understanding of teaching relies on social cognition. Similarly, Ziv 
and Frye (2004) postulate that the ability to understand teaching as a means of knowledge 
acquisition or belief formation may largely be predicated by theory of mind. They define 
teaching as “an intentional activity designed to increase the knowledge (or understanding) 
of another, thereby reducing the knowledge difference between teacher and learner” 
(2004, p.458). Defined in this way, teaching, and more importantly, the understanding of 
teaching, is contingent on the understanding and ascription of mental states to oneself and 
to others. 
 To begin with, teaching cannot occur unless one is able to attribute knowledge 
differences between individuals (Olson & Bruner, 1996). You will only try to teach 
something if you believe that you know something that another person does not know or 
is mistaken about. Teaching involves determining whether the individual is ignorant (lack 
of knowledge), possesses incomplete knowledge, or has a false belief (Olson & Bruner, 
1996; Ziv & Frye, 2004). Appreciating the level or accuracy of an individual’s 
knowledge allows one to estimate whether it is required to impart unknown knowledge to 
the individual, or to try to correct their mistaken belief. Finally, teaching requires 
recognizing that the activity is designed on purpose to change the knowledge difference 
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between oneself and another individual. In other words, the act of teaching is an 
intentional endeavor performed in an attempt to bring about learning in a less 
knowledgeable other (Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv, et al., 2008). At its core, understanding the 
fundamental notion of teaching, as defined above, requires one to understand the two 
pillars on which it rests: 1) the ability to appreciate knowledge differences between 
people, and 2) being able to judge when an action is being performed intentionally (Ziv & 
Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008). 
 
 The Understanding of Teaching in TD Children. Recent research has 
demonstrated a link between theory of mind and the understanding of teaching in typical 
development (e.g., Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008). To test the 
understanding of the first pillar of teaching, 1) understanding of the knowledge difference 
between teacher and learner, Ziv and Frye (2004) presented six teaching tasks to a group 
of 3-to 4-year-old, and a group of 5-to 6-year-old, Israeli preschoolers. The tasks 
examined whether the children could detect knowledge differences per se, whether their 
judgments about teaching were predicated by those knowledge differences instead of 
other aspects of the agents involved (e.g., personal attributes), and whether they 
appreciated the impact of false beliefs on the learner’s and teacher’s own knowledge. 
Specific task descriptions and actual tasks adapted for this study can be found in Chapter 
3: Methods and Appendix A, respectively. They observed that while the 3- to 6-year-olds 
understood that a knowledge difference between two agents is necessary for teaching, 
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only the 5- and 6-year-olds were able to appreciate that an agent’s beliefs about that 
knowledge difference determines whether or not teaching takes place (Ziv & Frye, 2004). 
Additionally, changes in children’s understanding of teaching were found to align with 
changes in their false belief understanding, which suggests that preschooler’s theory of 
mind relates to their understanding of teaching. 
 In a related set of studies, Ziv and colleagues (2008) explored whether 
preschooler’s judgments of intention factor into their understanding of teaching. Over the 
course of two experiments, they presented nine teaching-related stories that varied 
according to the “agent’s intention and the outcome of the agent’s act for another’s 
learning” (2008, p. 1240). Specific task descriptions and actual tasks adapted for this 
study can be found in Chapter 3: Methods and Appendix A, respectively. The agent’s 
action in each story represented either an intention to teach or not. Results indicated that 
3- and 4-year-olds tended to judge whether or not teaching occurred based on outcome 
(e.g., when learning occurred, it must have been brought about by teaching/or the attempt 
to teach; when learning did not occur though, neither did teaching). However, 5-year-
olds’ recognition of intention allowed them to determine when teaching occurred 
regardless of whether or not it was successful. Results in both studies also showed that 3- 
and 5-year-olds’ performance on a false belief task was related to their performance on 
the ‘successful imitation’ teaching task specifically. In the successful imitation story, the 
knowledgeable agent does not have the intention to teach, but learning still occurs in the 
ignorant other through successful imitation. Similar to the above findings (Ziv & Frye, 
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2004), changes in the preschooler’s theory of mind again aligned with changes in their 
understanding of teaching. Specifically, false belief understanding is related to being able 
to differentiate non-intentional teaching (imitation) from intentional teaching.    
 Taken together, results from the above understanding of teaching studies suggest 
a conceptual link between theory of mind and the two conceptual pillars of teaching: 
being able to appreciate 1) awareness of the knowledge difference between teacher and 
learner, and 2) the attempt to change the knowledge difference process that is brought 
about on purpose (intentionally). The ability to appreciate these two components of 
teaching has been consistently reported in typical preschoolers. A battery of tasks used in 
both studies but adapted for a U.S. Head Start population have produced similar findings 
compared to the originals (Woodburn, 2008). However, to date, the understanding of 
teaching has not been investigated in children with ASD. 
 
 The Understanding of Teaching in HFA Children. Children’s understanding of 
knowledge differences and knowledge acquisition depend heavily on theory of mind 
(e.g., Baldwin, 2000; Miller, 2000). Individuals with ASD exhibit fundamental 
impairments in social cognitive abilities that include understanding the absence of 
knowledge or ignorance in others (Perner et al., 1989), and understanding inaccurate 
knowledge or false belief in others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). In particular, HFA 
children on average have a VMA that is slightly more than twice that of TD children 
before reaching a similar probability of success on both types of false belief tasks 
31 
 
(Happé, 1995). Since understanding of the knowledge difference between teacher and 
learner is the first pillar in the development of an understanding of teaching, we predict 
that HFA children who struggle to understand the difference in knowledge states between 
two agents may be limited in their ability to see the reason for one to attempt to teach the 
other. In other words, HFA children may have impaired understanding of teaching in 
concert with their impaired theory of mind. Developing an understanding of teaching in 
typical children is linked with their theory of mind development. Therefore, HFA 
children may be impaired in their understanding of teaching compared to matched typical 
controls. This is a reasonable prediction because if false belief understanding is related to 
appreciating the existence of a knowledge difference between teacher and learner, then 
HFA children’s general deficits and delays in the former might generate similar 
impairments in the latter. Alternatively, it is also possible that HFA children are able to 
recognize particular knowledge differences between teacher and learner despite their 
false belief impairments. Although there may be difficulty with recognizing inaccurate 
knowledge in others, there still could be an understanding of ignorance in another. This 
would allow one to identify slightly easier teaching tasks such as ‘who should be taught’, 
‘who can teach’, and ‘can a teacher be taught’ (Ziv & Frye, 2004).  
 Our alternative prediction is that HFA children grasp the relation between 
knowledge and teaching when there is an explicit difference in knowledge states, but that 
they do not understand that an agent’s appreciation of that knowledge difference is 
required for teaching. The expectation (null hypothesis) here is that HFA children do 
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understand both ignorance and inaccurate knowledge in others in a teaching situation 
between two agents and are competent at reliably determining when teaching will occur 
based on the teacher’s awareness of the knowledge difference between him/herself and 
learner. This would mean that age-matched HFA children recognize, as did the above 5- 
and 6-year-olds, that teaching is an activity designed to impart knowledge from one 
person to another. 
 
 
The Understanding of Intention 
 
 Intention Understanding in TD Children. The second pillar in the development of 
an understanding of teaching is the ability to recognize intentional action. Similarly, 
understanding the relation of intention to behavior and mental states is an essential 
feature of theory of mind development (e.g., Feinfield et al., 1999). Children develop 
different interrelated components in understanding this relation early in life (e.g., Moses, 
2001). A young child’s understanding that actions can only be goal-directed indicates this 
early competence. For instance, infants and toddlers might not understand that an 
intended action can produce a desired result by accident. At this age, intention 
understanding would be based on the observable outcome or actions they may generate 
(e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Scultz & Wells, 1995; however, cf. Olineck 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2005; Brandone & Wellman, 2009).  
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 Children’s developing understanding of intention is likely to be constrained by 
earlier developing mental states such as desires and beliefs (e.g., Moses, 1993, 2001). It 
also may be difficult to understand intentions until we develop an understanding of 
beliefs, because we do not intend to do things that we fail to believe we can do. Beliefs 
can be true or false whereas desires and intentions cannot; they can be fulfilled or 
unfulfilled (Searle, 1984). Consider, for example, my desire for a glass of milk. Wanting 
milk might motivate me to go into the kitchen to get it. However, whether or not my 
belief that there is milk in the refrigerator is in reality true or false plays no role in my 
seeking to get it. An understanding of intention that forms before we have developed an 
understanding of the true/false nature of beliefs would, as a result, be based primarily on 
outcome (i.e., on some component of the current state of affairs). Here, the outcome is 
whether I was able to have a glass of milk, not the accuracy of my belief about whether 
there was milk. 
 Different approaches have been used to investigate young children’s developing 
understanding of the relation between intentions and the actions they generate. For 
example, Baird and Moses (2001) investigated preschooler’s intentionality judgments 
about two characters who performed the same action (e.g., running) but had different 
motivating desires (e.g., to get somewhere fast vs. to get some exercise). Although task 
complexity was reduced across four experiments, 4-year-olds tended to impute the same 
intention to both characters’ identical actions despite the fact that their desires clearly 
differed. However, 5-year-olds were successful at attributing different intentions to two 
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characters performing the same action. These findings suggest that 4-year-olds struggle to 
appreciate that different intentions may be used to conduct an identical action.  
 A similar discrepancy between 4- and 5-year-olds’ judgments of intention was 
observed by Schult (2002). Young children’s ability to distinguish desires and intentions 
was explored by asking them to judge whether the outcome of a single character’s action 
was performed on purpose. Tasks involved characters stating a desire and then forming 
an intention to carry out an action that will bring about their desire. Four possible 
outcomes were tested that combined a desire and an intention being either fulfilled or 
unfulfilled. Four-year-olds were highly successful at correctly identifying both the desire 
and intention on the two outcomes where the desire and intention matched (i.e., both 
fulfilled/both unfulfilled; e.g., wanting a snack, getting a snack, and then eating a snack). 
However, when the outcome resulted from a contrasted desire and intention (one 
fulfilled, the other unfulfilled; e.g., wanting a snack, getting a snack, but then having your 
dog come in and take your snack before you can eat it), 4-year-olds, unlike the 5-year-
olds, were not able to judge correctly whether the action (of getting a snack) was 
intentional (Schult, 2002). The pattern of judgments that emerged from the study was that 
only when the outcome and both mental states matched did the 4-year-olds consistently 
judge correctly whether the action was performed on purpose. The findings suggest that it 
is not until about 5 years of age that children start to recognize that the intention of an 
action is not based on its outcome and that desired outcomes can be brought about by 
either intentional or non-intentional actions (Schult, 2002). 
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 As mentioned in the Understanding of Teaching in TD Children section, 
developing an understanding of intention is central to a full understanding of teaching. If 
teaching is an activity that is performed on purpose, then being able to recognize when an 
intentional activity is being performed is essential to understanding teaching. For 
example, the Ziv et al. (2008) study found that 5.5-year-old’s, but not 3.5-year-old’s, 
appreciation of intention enabled them to distinguish teaching from learning in situations 
that did not involve teaching (e.g., imitation) and in situations in which it was ambiguous 
whether the intention was to teach (e.g., guided discovery). Therefore, children such as 
these that have not developed a full understanding of intention may be missing out on 
important opportunities to be taught. 
 Judgments of intention examined in Ziv et al.’s (2008) understanding of teaching 
tasks can be linked to judgments of intention observed in both Baird and Moses’s (2001) 
and Schult’s (2002) studies. For example, in an embedded teaching task, preschoolers 
were asked to judge the intent of the instructor’s action (Ziv, et al., 2008). Children in this 
condition had to determine whether a given action is brought about by one of two 
intentions (e.g., play a game or teach). In a same action-different intention task, children 
were similarly required to make judgments about a given action being performed based 
on different intention (Baird & Moses, 2001). In both studies, 4-year-old’s responses to 
the teaching and intention question, respectively, were at or below chance and 
significantly worse than the 5-year-olds. The ‘successful imitation’ teaching tasks (Ziv et 
al., 2008) involves a satisfied outcome (learning how to tie a knot) that is brought about 
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by a non-intentional action of the teaching character. This task may be related to Schult’s 
(2002) intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied task as it too involves a satisfied outcome 
brought about by an unintentional action.  
 
 Intention Understanding in HFA Children. Relatively little research has been 
conducted that examines the understanding of intention in HFA children. Moreover, the 
research that has been conducted in this area has produced discordant findings (e.g., 
Colombi, Liebal, Tomasello, Young, Warneken, & Rogers, 2009; Phillips et al., 1998; 
Russell & Hill, 2001; Williams & Happé, 2010; Zalla, Labruyére, Clemént, & Georgieff, 
2010). It is therefore difficult to predict whether, or to what degree, HFA children 
understand that teaching is an intentional activity given that none of the above mentioned 
intention tasks (teaching or otherwise) have been presented to this population. 
 In one of the earliest studies that examined HFA children’s judgments of 
intention, Phillips and colleagues (1998) tested the ability to distinguish between one’s 
own intentional actions from unintentional ones in a target-shooting task. The HFA 
children were matched for verbal ability with a group of TD preschoolers as well as a 
group of non-ASD but developmentally delayed (DD) children and adolescents. Both 
comparison groups were significantly better than the HFA children at recognizing 
accidental outcomes. The game was designed to look at performance on a task when 
there was a discrepancy between the participant’s desire and intention—that is, the child 
accidentally hit a target s/he did not aim at, but claimed after unintentionally hitting it that 
37 
 
that was what s/he originally aimed at. Under these conditions, the HFA children tended 
to report (mistakenly) that they intended to hit the target significantly more than either of 
the other two groups. The authors suggested that the results indicate that HFA children 
have difficulty separating their own intentions from desires (Phillips et al., 1998). 
  In a related set of studies, Russell and Hill (2001) sought to replicate and extend 
Phillips et al.’s (1998) findings by testing HFA children’s judgments of their own 
intentions-in-action as well as testing judgments of others’ intentions-in-action using the 
same target-shooting task. In contrast to Phillips et al., they found no differences between 
HFA children, and the DD and TD children matched on verbal ability on the either first- 
or third-person versions of the target-shooting task. In addition, they tested participants 
on a first- and third-person version of a ‘Transparent Intentions task’ which examines 
judgments of one’s own and other’s prior intentions on an incomplete drawing they are 
asked to complete (e.g., in the first-person version of the task, children were asked to fill 
an incomplete part of a drawing, however, by doing so they unknowingly had actually 
completed a different picture and are shown this after finishing the drawing of the picture 
they thought they were completing; see Russell et al., 2001 for details). On this task about 
half of the HFA participants recognized that they had unintentionally brought about the 
actual outcome, but there were no significant between-group differences on the third-
person version (Russell & Hill, 2001). 
 Citing methodological confounds in Russell and Hill’s (2001) drawing tasks, 
Williams and Happé (2010) presented HFA children, a DD comparison and  TD control 
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group matched on VMA with a revised version of the Transparent Intentions task. The 
revised task incorporated two sets of stimulus pictures that were markedly distinct from 
one another (e.g., teacup with a missing handle and a choir boy with a missing ear), as 
opposed to Russell and Hill’s use of multiple sets of pictures that depicted two similar 
objects (e.g., drawing a face on a boy and drawing a face on a girl). Children were also 
given the traditional unexpected transfer and unexpected contents false belief tasks 
(Perner et al., 1989). In contrast to Russell and Hill’s findings, Williams and Happé  
observed that the HFA children performed significantly worse than either comparison or 
control groups on both first- and third-person tasks. Performance on both false belief 
tasks was related to performance on both self and other intention tasks (Williams and 
Happé , 2010). Based on these results, and in conjunction with the confounding design of 
Russell and Hill (2001), Williams and Happé claimed that their results serve as evidence 
to support the idea that children with ASD are impaired in the understanding of first- and 
third-person judgments of intention in action. 
 Together these sets of findings that show HFA children have and have not 
performed worse than matched controls on tasks that examine judgments of intention-in-
action in themselves and others. Note: conflicting results have also been found in a 
handful of studies that test judgments of non-verbal intention-in-action (see Aldridge et 
al., 2000; Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001; Hornbeck, 2001; but also see Huang, 
Heyes, & Charman, 2002, 2006). However, these simple non-verbal motor acts are not 
reviewed here because the intentional teaching tasks that we will use are verbal story-
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comprehension tasks. These realistic verbal tasks most closely resemble the types of 
judgments of intention represented in teaching conditions. The types of intention 
judgments that this study will investigate are those that test the ability to distinguish 
between intention and desire in others, and those that test the understanding that a given 
action may be motivated by different intentions. 
 
 
Research Questions and Goals 
 
 This review of the literature served to present the following to the reader: 1) an 
introduction to ASD; 2) the role of mental state understanding in ASD; and 3) an 
overview of the understanding of teaching and its relation to theory of mind and intention 
in the context of ASD. Given that socio-cognitive developmental differences define a 
core component of this set of neurodevelopmental disorders, the present project aims to 
examine whether HFA children are delayed or impaired in their understanding of the 
concept of teaching as compared to matched typical controls. This goal will be carried 
out by examining the understanding of teaching, theory of mind, and understanding of 
intention-in-action in others among a sample of HFA children and a sample of typical 
children individually matched on verbal ability. We will also investigate the 
interrelationships between HFA children’s understanding of teaching, theory of mind, 
and intention-in-action in others. The proposed project has five questions upon which the 
research is based:    
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Research Question 1: Is the understanding of teaching intact or impaired in high 
functioning children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as compared to matched 
typical controls? 
 Interventions that target the social, academic, communicative, and behavioral 
skills of children with ASD (see Machalicek et al., 2008; Matson & LoVullo, 2008; and 
Rao, Beidel, & Murray, 2008 for reviews), all involve teaching activities. However, 
research has yet to explore the understanding of teaching in an autistic population. 
Without knowing how teaching is understood by children with ASD it remains difficult 
to make instructional decisions that are developmentally appropriate. For instance, if the 
concept of teaching is impaired in children with ASD, they may not perceive an 
instructional situation when it occurs and then may not be fully benefiting from the 
knowledge that the teaching situation tries to impart. Moreover, difficulty in recognizing 
that the awareness of a knowledge difference between two people is required for teaching 
to occur, may inhibit understanding that when teaching does occur it is done so to convey 
knowledge from one person to another. Consequently, a child may be missing out on the 
knowledge transfer that a teaching moment tries to bring about. Establishing HFA 
children’s level of understanding of teaching is paramount to gain insight on how they 
make sense of the teaching process. 
 Young typically developing (TD) children’s concept of teaching has been found 
to depend on their appreciation of the knowledge and intentional features of teaching 
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(e.g., Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008). Ziv and Frye 
(2004) observed that although 3- to 6-year-olds understood that a knowledge difference 
between two agents is necessary for teaching, only 5- and 6-year-olds were able to 
appreciate that an agent’s beliefs about that knowledge difference determines whether or 
not teaching takes place. A related study (Ziv et al., 2008) showed that 3- and 4-year-olds 
tended to judge whether or not teaching occurred based on outcome (e.g., when learning 
occurred, what was learned was brought about by teaching/or the attempt to teach; when 
learning did not occur, though, neither did teaching). However, 5-year-olds’ recognition 
of intention allowed them to determine when teaching occurred regardless of whether or 
not it was successful. Taken together, the findings suggest that TD preschoolers’ concept 
of teaching reflects their ability to attribute mental states to others.  
 The studies that examined the understanding of these aspects of teaching have 
included TD preschoolers in Israel (Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008) and a Head Start 
population in the US (Woodburn, 2008). However, studies exploring the understanding of 
teaching have not been extended to children with ASD. Considering the mental state 
attribution impairments observed in HFA children (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995) it is 
reasonable to suspect that they also may be impaired in their understanding of certain 
underlying mental state components of teaching. This study will use seven tasks that 
assess the understanding of the knowledge based and intentional elements of teaching in 
HFA children and matched typical controls (Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008). Children 
in the autism group will be individually matched with TD children in the comparison 
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group on verbal mental ability using the Differential Ability Scales-II (DAS-II) (Elliot, 
1990b; 2007). The understanding of the concept of teaching in children with autism is 
unknown; utilizing the teaching understanding tasks in this study will provide data on 
how this population conceptualizes teaching. 
 
Research Question 2: Is the understanding of teaching related concurrently to overall 
theory of mind, or specific mental state attribution understanding in high functioning 
children with ASD and matched controls? 
 TD preschooler’s understanding of teaching has been shown to relate to their 
ability to appreciate false beliefs in others (Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 
2008). Children’s success on tasks which test the understanding that an agent’s beliefs 
about the knowledge difference between teacher and learner determines whether teaching 
takes place paralleled their success on traditional false belief tasks. Given the empirical 
evidence indicating impairments in children with ASD’s ability to recognize false belief 
in others (e.g., Happé, 1995), it is important to verify whether this, or other related mental 
state attributions play a role in their understanding of teaching.  
 In this study a seven-item understanding of teaching battery (Woodburn, 2008; 
Ziv & Frye, 2004) and Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory of mind scale will be used to 
assess the level of teaching understanding and mental state attribution, respectively, in 
HFA children and TD matched controls. It may be the case that HFA children’s ability to 
understand mental states in others is related to their overall understanding of the various 
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conditions for teaching because those components of teaching (i.e., perceptual access, 
knowledge change, intention understanding) rely on mental state attributions. But it also 
may be that an understanding of particular components of teaching is related to an 
understanding of particular components of theory of mind, such as false belief. For 
example, the elements of teaching that entail recognition of knowledge (or ignorance) in 
another may specifically relate to false belief understanding. It is possible then that 
children with ASD impaired in attributing false belief to others would also be impaired in 
their understanding of the awareness of the knowledge difference process in teaching. 
Employing the understanding of teaching tasks and the Wellman and Liu (2004) theory 
of mind battery will allow us to examine whether performance in one is related to 
performance in the other in children with HFA.              
 
Research Question 3: How is the understanding of teaching related to understanding 
particular intentions-in-action in high functioning children with ASD and matched 
controls?  
 Young TD children’s understanding of the intentional component of teaching has 
been found to change across the preschool years. Ziv et al., (2008) observed that 3- and 
4-year-olds tend to ascribe teaching based on outcome (i.e., whether or not learning 
occurred). However, 5-year-olds judged that the activity of teaching was intentionally 
brought about whenever there was a recognized attempt to teach, regardless of outcome 
(i.e., learning was successful or not). Studies that examine the ability to distinguish 
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between intentions and desires (Schult, 2002), and between intentions and actions (Baird 
& Moses, 2001) also show what may be a similar change in preschool aged children’s 
understanding of intentions. These studies observed a tendency in 3- and 4-year-olds to 
judge an action to be intentional based on either outcome (e.g., failure or success, Schult, 
2002) or action (Baird & Moses, 2001), to 5-year-olds’ judgments of intention that take 
into account both an agent’s desire and goal. 
 Children with ASD have demonstrated impairments in the ability to attribute 
intentions to others compared to typical and developmentally delayed matched controls 
(Boria et al., 2009; D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2006; Williams & Happé, 2010; Zalla et al., 
2010). A lack of awareness of other’s intentions may impact the ability to grasp the 
intentional component in teaching. For example, it may be that teaching is assumed to 
take place whenever learning is the outcome despite whether an actual attempt to teach 
did, or did not (i.e., imitation), occur. Likewise, an impaired judgment of other’s 
intentions may influence the ability to determine that an attempt to teach can occur 
despite whether or not learning is achieved (i.e., failed teaching).  
 This study seeks to examine in HFA children and TD controls, the understanding 
of other’s intentions in action using judgment-of-intention tasks adapted from Schult 
(2002), and Baird and Moses (2001). Previous studies investigating intentional action 
understanding in children with ASD have focused on imitation (D’Entremont & Yazbek, 
2006), intentional judgments of non-human objects (Castelli, 2006), awareness of one’s 
own intentions (Phillips et al., 1998; Russell & Hill, 2001), and predicting the outcome in 
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a series of a goal-directed actions (Zalla et al., 2010). However, research has not 
investigated the ability in HFA children to differentiate between desires and intentions in 
others, or to recognize that different intentions can be used to carry out a given action.  
 Tasks adapted from Schult (2002) involve a scenario in which a desired outcome 
occurred even though the intentional action failed, and one in which an intentional action 
was carried out, but because of another event, the desired outcome failed. Performance on 
the former task may relate to performance on a successful imitation teaching task given 
that both conditions involve a successful outcome that is brought about by either a failed 
intentional or a non-intentional act. Performance on the latter task may relate to 
performance on the failed teaching task because both conditions involve an unsatisfied 
desire despite performing the intended action. A task adapted from Baird and Moses 
(2001) involves two agents that have different desires for performing an identical action. 
Performance on this type of task may relate to performance on a teaching embedded in a 
game task because both stories involve carrying out an action for different reasons. 
Assessing knowledge of these judgments of intention understanding in HFA children 
may provide information regarding how they conceptualize the intentional components of 
teaching. In turn, HFA children’s awareness of these features of intention may relate to 
their recognition of the intentional or knowledge based components of teaching.  
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Research Question 4: Is the pattern of theory of mind attainment in high functioning 
children with ASD similar to the developmental pattern observed in high functioning 
children with ASD by Peterson, Wellman, and Liu (2005)? 
 Although a wealth of replicated findings have demonstrated impaired mental state 
understanding in childhood autism (e.g., Frith, 2003; or see Tager-Flusberg, 2007, for a 
review), there remains a paucity of information about the basic progression of theory of 
mind development in HFA children. Theory of mind development has been observed in 
TD preschool-aged children to come about in a sequence. Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
battery of scaled theory of mind tasks has shown that TD 3- to 5-year-old’s attainment of 
mental state understanding follows a systematic progression. The sequential order of the 
tasks is: diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false belief, and real-apparent 
emotion (see Chapter 2: Literature Review for a full description and Appendix B for an 
example of each task). The developmental order this scale represents has been shown to 
replicate among TD preschoolers across a variety of cultures and in languages other than 
English (e.g., Hofer & Aschersleben, 2007; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006; 
Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
 Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale has also been used to investigate the progression 
of mental state understanding in atypical populations. A group of Australian HFA and 
deaf children have been presented with their five-item battery (Peterson et al., 2005) and 
augmented battery that included a sixth, sarcasm task (Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 
2012). Across both studies, although the order of theory of mind acquisition for deaf 
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children was delayed, the sequence was the same as that observed in TD preschoolers. 
However, the sequence that emerged for the HFA group was different. Consistent with 
previous research, the deaf and TD groups both found the real-apparent emotion task 
most difficult, while the HFA sample found the false belief task most difficult (Peterson 
et al., 2005). In the follow-up study (Peterson et al., 2012), even though all three groups 
found the sarcasm task most difficult, the pattern for the first five-items was replicated. 
Based on these data, the authors claimed that “the unique genetic and neurobiological 
features associated with the autism disorder (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 2003) might be 
contributing factors [that explain the alternative sequence]; for example, understanding 
FB [false belief] may constitute a representational ToM [theory of mind] achievement of 
special neurocognitive processing difficulty,” (Peterson et al., 2012, p. 481). 
 The evidence indicating that HFA children’s theory of mind development comes 
about in an order different from typical preschoolers is suggestive but not definitive. 
Because Peterson et al.’s two studies are the only reported cases that have used a theory 
of mind scale to examine the progression of mental state understanding in HFA children, 
it remains unknown whether these data replicate in different populations. Moreover, in 
both studies Peterson et al. (2005; 2012), the age range for both groups of children with 
ASD was dramatic (6-14, and 5-12, respectively) and had a mean age of 9.32 (2005) and 
9.02 (2012). It remains unknown in a more restricted age range of younger children with 
ASD whether the progression observed in both studies would hold. Since no supporting 
research can confirm/disconfirm Peterson et al.’s (2005, 2012) findings—that unlike the 
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typical and late signing deaf children, the false belief task was more difficult for the HFA 
children than the real/apparent emotion task—additional data, regardless of outcome will 
provide evidence about the sequence of mental state attainment in HFA children. 
Knowledge about the developmental order of mental state understanding in HFA children 
might then be expanded to research that examines the interplay between theory of mind 
and other potentially related factors (e.g., executive function, visual perception, peer and 
non-peer relation, etc.).  
 
Research Question 5: Is the understanding of the distinction between desires and 
intentions, or actions and intentions, intact or impaired in high functioning children with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as compared to matched controls? 
 TD children at about age 5 begin to show competence on tasks that contrast 
desires and intentions in others (Schult, 2002). Schult (2002) investigated TD children’s 
understanding of other’s intentions in action by separating the satisfaction of one’s desire 
from the fulfillment of their desire-driven intention. While 4- and 5-year-olds were able 
to separate and identify desires from intentions, only the 5-year-olds were above chance 
when it came to correctly determining when an agent’s intention was fulfilled. This 
suggests that the understanding that an intention can be satisfied only by carrying out the 
intended act begins to manifest at around age 5. Children at this age also begin to 
demonstrate an understanding that intentions and actions are not isomorphic (i.e., actions 
and intentions stand in a “many-to-many” relation to one another (Baird & Moses, 2001; 
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Baldwin & Baird, 1999; Searle, 1984)). Baird and Moses (2001) found that TD children 
younger than about 5 years of age were not above chance on tasks that have two identical 
actions that are brought about by different intentions. Based on the results, the authors 
suggested that “children’s early concept of intention is intimately tied to action” (p. 441). 
Taken together, these studies show that TD children younger than age 5 struggle 
separating fulfilling an intention from satisfying a desire, and understanding that 
intentions are distinct from the actions the bring about.   
 We know that HFA children have been shown to be impaired in the understanding 
of intentions compared to matched controls (e.g., Williams & Happé, 2010). However, 
we do not know whether the ability to distinguish between desires and intentions, or 
actions and intentions in others is intact or impaired in this population. The seven 
intention tasks this study will use, borrowed from Schult (2002) and Baird and Moses 
(2001), are designed to test the understanding of intentional actions in others. It is 
possible that developing an understanding of other’s intentions in actions in HFA 
children is similar to what has been observed in TD children—that initially, actions and 
intentions are conceptually intertwined. But, given the different theory of mind 
developmental pattern Peterson et al., (2005; 2012) found, it remains possible that HFA 
children’s understanding of this particular mental state is also distinct from typical 
children. In either case, looking at whether HFA children’s ability to distinguish desires 
from intentions in others is intact or impaired as compared to matched typical controls, 
will provide important evidence about how this population interprets other people’s 
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actions. For example, knowledge gained from HFA children’s developing awareness of 
the action-intention relation may help to further our understanding in the development of 
their social competence and moral understanding.  
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CHAPTER 3: Methods 
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Research Questions of the Current Study 
 
 The purpose of the present study is to examine the understanding of teaching in 
children with HFA. Specifically, we use the following questions and methods to 
investigate in children with HFA: 1) the understanding of teaching, 2) the understanding 
of teaching and its relation to theory of mind development, 3) the understanding of 
teaching and its relation to the understanding of intentions-in-others, 4) the pattern of 
theory of mind development, and 5) the understanding of particular intentions in action. 
 
Research Question 1: Is the understanding of teaching intact or impaired in high 
functioning children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as compared to matched 
typical controls? 
 Method and analysis: Seven-item understanding of teaching battery. The tasks 
 are drawn from three studies (Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008; 
 Woodburn, 2008). Chi square tests, ANOVAs, and item response theory (IRT) 
 procedures are used for analyses. 
 
Research Question 2: Is the understanding of teaching related concurrently to overall 
theory of mind, or specific mental state attribution understanding in high functioning 
children with ASD and matched controls? 
 Method and analysis: Wellman and Liu's (2004) five-item theory of mind scale 
 and seven-item understanding of teaching battery. Correlations are computed to 
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 look at possible relations between performance overall and at the task level 
 between the theory of mind scale and the teaching battery. 
 
Research Question 3: How is the understanding of teaching related to understanding 
particular intentions-in-action in high functioning children with ASD and matched 
controls?  
 Method and analysis: The intention-desire distinction measure from Schult 
 (2004, Study 1), the same action-two intention measure from Baird and Moses 
 (2001, Study 4), and the seven-item understanding of teaching battery. 
 Correlations are computed to look at possible relations between performance 
 overall and at the task level between the two intention measures and the teaching 
 battery. 
 
Research Question 4: Is the pattern of theory of mind attainment in high functioning 
children with ASD similar to the developmental pattern observed in high functioning 
children with ASD by Peterson, Wellman, and Liu (2005)? 
 Method and analysis: Wellman and Liu's (2004) five-item theory of mind scale. 
 Chi square, ANOVA and Item Response Theory (IRT) procedures are used for 
 analyses. 
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Research Question 5: Is the understanding of the distinction between desires and 
intentions, or actions and intentions, intact or impaired in high functioning children with 
ASD as compared to matched controls? 
 Method and analysis: The intention-desire distinction measure from Schult 
 (2004, Study 1) and the same action-two intention measure from Baird and Moses 
 (2001, Study 4) were used. Chi square tests, t-tests, and ANOVA procedures were 
 used for analyses. 
 
 These behavioral methods will address unanswered questions about the 
understanding of teaching, theory of mind development, the understanding of intentions 
in others, and the interrelations between understanding teaching and theory of mind, and 
intention-in-action understanding. Together, our research will fulfill an unmet need in the 
literature and will have broad implications for improving teaching and learning outcomes 
for children with ASD. 
 
 
Preliminary Work 
 
 In the summer of 2010, a small sample (n = 6) of TD children was recruited to 
pilot the understanding of intentions-in-action tasks and a small sample (n = 4) of HFA 
children was recruited to pilot the understanding of teaching battery and the 
understanding of intention stories. The goal of pilot testing was to help familiarize the 
55 
 
student researcher with the tasks and to determine if they were feasible and appropriate 
for the HFA children in terms of time, general coherence, and attention level. The 
understanding of teaching battery and understanding of intention stories were each 
administered individually to half of the recruited participants given that neither measure 
has been used on HFA children. Question and wording were be based on procedures 
suggested by Woodburn (2008) who adapted story content and format from Ziv and Frye 
(2004) and Frye and Ziv (2005). As a result of the pilot testing outcomes, content and 
format was deemed appropriate for the participants in this study. For example, a child 
with HFA correctly answered memory and control questions for all of the teaching tasks 
(e.g., “Does Erin really know how to write her name or not?”) indicating an 
understanding of story content and salient details. The administration of the tasks allowed 
the researcher to become very familiar with the administration procedures and protocols, 
an important aspect of data collection fidelity for the main project.   
 
 
Participants and Context 
 
 Participants. The total proposed sample size for this study was N = 80 children, 
with 40 HFA children and 40 matched control participants. A total of 45 HFA 
participants who met criteria consented to participate. However, for logistical reasons 
beyond the researchers control 10 participants did not take part in the study. In the end, a 
total of 35 HFA participant’s data was used in the study. A total of 50 TD control 
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participants consented to participate. However, 37 of the 50 consented controls met all 
matching criteria. Two matched TD children did not wish to participate at the day of 
testing. In the end, data from a total of 35 TD children were used in the study. 
 Participants in the current study included 63 children attending elementary 
schools in the Philadelphia School District, and 7 children attending The University of 
Pennsylvania's Child Care Center (PCC). Forty percent of the participating HFA children 
were identified by their parent or caregiver as African American, 32% as Caucasian, 23% 
as Latino/Hispanic, and 5% as Asian. Forty percent of the participating TD matched 
control children were identified by their parent or caregiver as Caucasian, 29% as African 
American, 11% as Latino/Hispanic, 11% as Arab American, and 9% as Asian. Dates of 
birth (DOB) were recorded at the time of testing. HFA children ranged in age from 75 to 
106 months (M = 93.23) and TD children ranged in age from 38 to 92 months (M = 
72.29). 
 Age Groups. Age groups were based on inclusion criteria for the target 
population. Inclusion criteria for the entire population were that each child has a verbal 
IQ in the normal range (≥ 80) and English as their first language. Additional inclusion 
criteria for the target population were that each high-functioning child has a putative 
classification of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and has a VMA ranging from 3.80 to 
8.50 years (as assessed by the DAS-II). Additional inclusion criteria for the TD control 
population are that each child’s chronological age ranged from 3.20 to 7.50 years and 
VMA—also assessed by the DAS-II—ranged from 3.75 to 8.25 years of age. Children 
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were also matched on sex and both groups were primarily drawn from the School District 
of Philadelphia.  
 The two groups were designed to approximate the age ranges found in the Baird 
and Moses (2001), Peterson, Wellman, and Liu (2005), Schult (2002), Woodburn (2008), 
Ziv and Frye (2004), and Ziv, Solomon, and Frye (2008) studies in order to allow for as 
direct of a comparison as possible between children’s performance on the measures in 
these studies and in the current study. 
 Participant Recruitment. Recruitment of HFA participants resulted from 
cooperation by the Center for Autism Research at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 
and the University of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education. Specifically, HFA 
participants were selected from Dr. David Mandell’s Philadelphia Autism Instructional 
Methods Study (AIMS) participant database. The AIMS project represents an academic-
public partnership designed to improve intervention quality for elementary school 
children with autism in the School District of Philadelphia. It also constitutes the largest 
randomized trial to date of a behavioral intervention for children with autism, having 
enrolled 494 children in 73 classrooms. The database allowed us to determine which 
schools HFA participants attend thereby making it possible to match primarily from the 
School District. Participant recruitment occurred in the form of mailing letters of 
invitation to the parents/guardians of potential child participants that have agreed in the 
AIMS original consent form to be approached about additional research. Letters of 
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invitation outlined in lay terminology the aims of the proposed study and included 
compensation information for the parents who consented their child to participate. 
 TD children were recruited through the same elementary schools that the HFA 
participants attended. However, due to an insufficient number of matched consented 
participants across these schools, TD children were also recruited through PCC. A total 
of 7 control participants from PCC matched and were included in the study.  
 Consent Process. The consent process was conducted in the form of mailing 
recruitment letters and informed consent forms to families of children with HFA. As 
above mentioned, parents of TD participants were approached at their respective 
elementary or preschool to receive recruitment letters and consent forms. 
 Incentives. Parents of all participating children that required a home visit were 
given $25 gift cards to a local store to thank them for participating and be respectful of 
their time. The principals of the elementary schools where testing occurred each received 
a check for $150 issued from the University of Pennsylvania to thank them for 
participating and be respectful of their time. 
 Feedback.. At the completion of all data collection, feedback on all measures was 
provided to the parents of participating children. Feedback on children’s performance by 
group was presented to parents as well as a brief description of the findings. Given that 
the participating sample of HFA children represents a clinical subpopulation of children 
with atypical neurodevelopment, recommendations, suggestions, or individual findings 
were not reported to parents. 
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Measures: Individually Administered Assessments 
 
 Theory of mind battery. Five tasks form the Wellman and Liu's (2004) scale. The 
tasks were selected on the basis of a meta-analysis of recent theory-of-mind research and 
then tested with a sample of 75 preschoolers. Guttman scaling (Guttman, 1944) 
procedures were used to determine the scalability of the seven selected items. Guttman 
scaling is a procedure whereby items are hierarchically arranged so that they progress in 
difficulty. That is, if a person fails one item, then s/he should fail all subsequent items; if 
s/he passes an item, then s/he should have passed all previous items. This type of scaling 
allows for the prediction of all item responses once the cumulative score is known. 
Guttman scaling is particularly helpful in measures of abilities that change 
developmentally, as higher scores indicate more advanced development in the particular 
area being measured. Five of the seven tasks have been found to form a Guttman scale 
with high reproducibility (Green's index = .96) and strong correlations with age (r = .64).  
 The five tasks are: 1) Diverse desires—the child judges that the self and another 
have different desires about the same object; 2) Diverse beliefs—the child judges that the 
self and another have different beliefs about the same object, when the veracity of the 
belief is unknown to the child; 3) Knowledge access—the child sees what is in a box and 
judges the knowledge of another who has not seen the contents of the box; 4) Contents 
false-belief—the child judges another's false belief about what is in a distinctive 
container, when the child knows what is in the container; 5) Real-apparent emotion—the 
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child judges that a person can have one emotion internally but can display a different 
emotion externally (see Chapter 2: Literature Review for a full description and Appendix 
B for an example). 
 The same sequence has been shown to replicate exactly for English-speaking 
preschoolers in Australia (Peterson & Wellman, 2009; Peterson et al., 2005) and for 
preschoolers in Germany (Kristen et al., 2006). Current research has also confirmed the 
scale in two different populations of English-speaking children in Australia with HFA 
who pass the same total number of scale steps but in a different order (Peterson, et al., 
2005; 2012). In both studies, Guttman scaling procedures were conducted to analyze task 
performance for the HFA group, indicating a different but consistent scale that showed a 
reversal between the fourth (false belief) task and the fifth (real-apparent emotion) task 
(Peterson et al., 2005; 2012).  
 
 Understanding of teaching stories. Seven tasks form the understanding of 
teaching battery. The tasks are drawn from three studies (Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 
2004; Ziv et al., 2008) that examined both the knowledge and intentional aspects of 
teaching in TD children. From the knowledge stories, the battery includes a simple 
knowledge task (e.g., Who should be taught), a teacher's misestimation of own 
knowledge task, and a teacher misestimation of the learner's knowledge task. From the 
intention stories, the tasks include a successful (intentional) teaching task, a failed 
(intentional) teaching task, a successful (non-intentional by the teacher) imitation task, 
61 
 
and a teaching embedded in a game (guided discovery learning) task. The content of what 
is learned or taught varies across the tasks (see Appendix A for an example).  
 Determinations made about specific question wording, story content and ordering 
procedures were based on the tasks Woodburn (2008) used to examine the understanding 
of teaching in a sample of TD preschool and Kindergarten children. Findings indicated 
that the potential scalability of the tasks was high (based on Green’s (1956) index). More 
importantly for purposes of the current study though, scaling analyses indicated a 
progression in difficulty among the teaching tasks (Woodburn, 2008). Results from the 
proposed battery will be analyzed to determine whether (1) performance by the TD group 
on a selection of the tasks show a progression in difficulty similar to the one observed by 
Woodburn (2008), (2) performance by the HFA  group indicates a progression in 
difficulty among the tasks, and, if so, whether the pattern is similar to the pattern 
identified by Woodburn (2008), and (3) the HFA group or TD group can form a scale 
similar to the one identified by Wellman and Liu (2004) for theory of mind. 
 
 Understanding the distinction between desire and intention measure.  Eight tasks 
comprise the intention-desire distinction measure. The items were drawn from a study 
that examined TD children’s ability to distinguish between intentions and desires (Schult, 
2002, Study 1). Short stories describe four possible outcomes from a situation in which a 
person states a desire and forms an intention to carry out an action to bring about that 
desire. Both the intention and desire in each story are related to the character’s end goal. 
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The four possible outcomes are: 1) the intention is fulfilled and the desire is satisfied; 2) 
the intention is unfulfilled and the desire is unsatisfied; 3) the desire is satisfied but the 
intention is unfulfilled; and 4) the desire is unsatisfied but the intention is fulfilled. Each 
of the four conditions includes two tasks, one involving a boy protagonist and one 
involving a girl protagonist. Story content and theme varies across all eight tasks (see 
Appendix C for an example).  
 The original sample consisted of 51 TD children (eighteen 4-year-olds, fifteen 5-
year-olds, and eighteen 7-year-olds; Schult, 2002). Prior to testing, the eight conditions 
used were pilot tested on 20 adults. They performed at ceiling on three of the four 
conditions and were near ceiling on the intention-unfulfilled, desire-satisfied condition. 
Preliminary analyses revealed no differences across the three age groups for sex, story 
order on the desire question and intention question between story pairs within condition, 
or on condition order between conditions. Four-year-olds’ answers were not above 
chance on the forced choice intention question for the two pairs of stories in which the 
desire and intention outcomes conflicted (the desire was satisfied but the intention was 
unfulfilled and vice versa). The 4-year-olds performed significantly worse than either the 
5- or 7-year-olds (Schult, 2002) on these tasks. Findings suggest that 4- and 5-year-old 
TD children recognize and correctly distinguish between desires and intentions when the 
outcome for both mental states are concordant, but struggle to recognize and correctly 
identify intentions from desires when the outcome for both mental states are discordant. 
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 Two intentions-identical action measure. Six tasks form the two intentions-
identical action measure. The items were drawn from a study that investigated TD 
children’s ability to recognize that different intentions may be used to perform one and 
the same action (Baird & Moses, 2001, Study 4). Vignettes were used to tell two stories 
in which both characters performing the same action have markedly different desires and 
intentions. The six tasks comprise three conditions to satisfy the possible intention-action 
outcome combinations: 1) same intention-same action—both characters perform the same 
action and have the same intention but different desires; 2) same intention-different 
action—both characters perform the same action but have different intentions and 
different desires; and 3) different action-different intention—both characters perform 
different actions and have different desires and intentions. The character’s desires and 
intentions were kept conceptually distinct in each story by having the desire represent an 
outcome and the intention represent an action. For each set of six stories, three stories 
involved girl characters, and three involved boy characters. Six story types were used that 
each contained variations of the story to meet the specifications of the three story 
conditions (see Appendix D for an example).  
 A sample of twenty-four TD 4-year-olds heard six stories, two in each condition 
(Baird & Moses, 2001, Study 4). Preliminary analyses found no differences based on sex, 
story, story order, or condition order. Participants performed worse in the same action-
different intention condition than in the same action-same intention condition and the 
different action-different intention condition. Moreover, preschoolers performed above 
64 
 
chance on the latter two conditions, but did not perform above chance on the same action-
different intention condition. The authors concluded that 4-year-old children who fail to 
ascribe different intentions to characters performing the same action think that that action 
rather than the stated desire determines the character’s intention (Baird & Moses, 2001). 
 
 
Research Design and Procedures 
 
 This project implemented a cross-sectional design for a sample of HFA children 
and TD controls individually matched on verbal ability. HFA children were seen 
individually a total of two times for assessment at their respective places of residence. 
However, TD participants were seen a total of three times in order to match each target 
participant with a control on VMA. To match for verbal ability, TD children were given 
the verbal section of the Developmental Ability Scales-II (DAS-II) which was used in the 
AIMS study to measure cognitive ability.  
 
 Developmental Ability Scales-II (DAS-II). The DAS-II is a clinical instrument 
used to measure intellectual ability and academic achievement (Elliott, 1990a), and has 
been shown to produce reliable and valid indicators of cognitive ability (Aylward, 1992; 
Reinehr, 1992). It consists of a cognitive battery of 20 subtests, covering an age range of 
2 years, 6 months through 17 years, 11 months (2;6 through 17;11). The battery is 
divided into two overlapping age levels: 1) The Early Years battery is normed from age 
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2;6 through 8;11, with a usual age range of 2;6 through 6;11; 2) The School-Age battery 
is normed from age 5;0 through 17;11, and has a usual age range of 7;0 through 17;11. 
Because of those overlaps between the Early Years and the School Age batteries, the 
DAS-II Early Years and School-Age batteries were co-normed for children ages 5;0 
through 8;11 and therefore have a four-year normative overlap. The Early Years battery 
is further divided into two levels, lower and upper. The Lower Early Years level is most 
appropriate for young children ages 2;6 through 3;5 (although it may also been used with 
older children with developmental differences). The Upper Early Years level is suitable 
for children normally in the age range of 3;6-6;11, (although it may also be used with 
children up to age 8;11 if they have difficulty with the materials in the School-Age 
battery).  
 Two subtests form the verbal section of the DAS-II: 1) Naming Vocabulary; and 
2) Verbal Comprehension. The Naming Vocabulary subtest assesses the spoken 
vocabulary of young children. It measures expressive language ability; ability to match; 
general language development; and word retrieval from long-term memory. The Verbal 
Comprehension subtest assesses the child’s understanding of the language through the 
receptive mode. None of the items on this subtest requires an oral response. Items tap a 
child's ability with syntax and prepositional and relational concepts; the ability to 
formulate and test hypotheses; the ability to follow verbal directions; and short-term 
auditory memory. Raw scores on each subtest can be converted into mental age 
equivalents, to gain an estimate of VMA. 
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 For individual matching purposes, a researcher trained on administering the DAS-
II verbal section presented the two verbal subtests to consented TD participants. To 
match, the average of the TD child’s estimated VMA had to be within a 2 month 
approximation of the average of an HFA participant’s reported estimated VMA. Upon 
confirming a match, the control child was then tested on all four cognitive measures 
within 2 months of being given the DAS-II. 
 
 Measure Administration. Each child was individually administered four measures 
across two sessions: the Understanding of Teaching stories, Theory of Mind Scale, the 
Intention-Desire Distinction measure, and the Two Intentions-Same Action stories. Two 
measures were presented at each session. The Theory of Mind Scale and one of the two 
Understanding of Intentions measures were presented during one session. The 
Understanding of Teaching stories and other Intention measure were administered during 
the other session. A 5-10 minute break was given between each measure during each 
session.  
 All 35 HFA children were tested on all four measures at their respective homes. 
Upon entering the family’s residence, the child’s parent/guardian would introduce the 
researcher to their son/daughter and would then tell their child that the researcher has 
come to read stories with him/her. The researcher would then sit in a quiet location of the 
house with the participant and based on the participant’s preference, the parent/guardian 
would either remain in the room, but out of eye sight of the child, or excuse themselves to 
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an adjoining room. Parents were asked not to participate if they remained in the room. 
Most of the target participants’ parents/guardians left the room during testing, but 
remained in sight. None of the participants interacted with his/her parents during testing 
for those who stayed in the room. Each testing session took approximately 30-45 
minutes. At the start of each session (after the parent/guardian had excused him/herself) 
the researcher would ask what the participant was doing before he arrived and then asked 
the participant’s permission to read stores together as a way to further warm up to the 
activity. Most children were immediately comfortable and those that were not spent more 
time talking with the researcher and parent/guardian before being administered the 
assessment. No HFA participants refused to consent to participate or discontinued 
participating before the session had finished. 
 Twenty-five of the 35 TD children were tested at their respective schools, 8 were 
tested at their respective homes, and 2 on the third floor of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education (GSE). When testing occurred at school, 
the child was individually excused from his/her classroom at a time that was convenient 
for the teacher and minimized instructional interruption. Children were tested in a quiet 
room or hallway at their school. When testing occurred at GSE, parents waited either in 
the room (and were asked not to participate or interact during testing) or outside of the 
classroom where testing took place. Home visits followed the same procedure as the 
home visits for HFA participants. At the start of each session, children spent a few 
minutes "helping" the researcher fill out basic information (name, birth date, classroom 
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number, etc.) as a way to warm up to the activity. Each testing session took 
approximately 20-30 minutes. Most children were immediately comfortable and those 
that were not spent more time talking with the researcher before being administered the 
assessment. 
 Assessments were presented to children with props. The two intentions-identical 
action tasks were presented with an 18ʺ x 30ʺ felt board that folded in half forming a 
clear separation of its two sides and the same laminated pictures used in the Baird and 
Moses study (2001, Study 4, personal communication and permission). The intention-
desire distinction stories were presented with colored copies of the exact laminated 
pictures used in the Schult study (2002, personal communication and permission). The 
Theory of Mind Battery and Understanding of Teaching stories were presented with 
small plastic dolls (i.e., the "characters" in the tasks) and laminated pictures (e.g., of the 
stories contents) or other props (e.g., clay in the "teaching to make a bowl" story) in order 
to maintain children's attention and maximize story comprehension. At the end of each 
assessment session, children were given stickers as a "thank you" for helping the 
researcher.  
 
 Order of presentation.  Several steps were taken to control for any possible order 
effects within the measures or across children. To control for fatigue effects, the four 
measures were administered across two sessions with two measures presented at each 
session. The order in which each child received each measure within and across each 
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session was counterbalanced. To control for carryover effects, neither the Theory of Mind 
Scale and the Understanding of Teaching stories, nor the intention measures were 
administered together during the same session. Therefore, each session always contained 
either the Theory of Mind Scale or the Understanding of Teaching stories and one of the 
two intention understanding measures. Order effects of tasks within each measure were 
resolved in the following ways: 
 Understanding of Teaching Stories. The understanding of teaching stories was 
presented in a pseudo-random order, following procedures suggested by Woodburn 
(2008). The “Who will be taught” story was always presented first (as it is considered the 
least difficult story) and the “Overestimate self” (most difficult) story was always 
presented last. The remaining five stories were presented in random order and 
administered in between the “Who will be taught” and “Overestimate self” stories. The 
decision to start and end with these particular stories is based on the work by Ziv and 
Frye (2004), Ziv, Solomon and Frye (2008), and Woodburn (2008) that provided data 
which suggested these were both the easiest and the most difficult stories for children. 
Although, Woodburn (2008) found that both the “Overestimate self” and “Overestimate 
learner” tasks were the two most difficult tasks and that performance on “Overestimate 
learner” was slightly worse than “Overestimate self”, there was not a significant 
difference in performance between the two. Therefore, the decision to keep the original 
order of “Who will be taught” first and “Overestimate self” last was based on: 1) the fact 
that this study being the first of its kind to present the understanding of teaching tasks to a 
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sample of children with autism had no supporting data for this population to justify the 
order of the teaching stories, and 2) the combination of findings from both the pilot work 
Woodburn conducted that found “overestimate self’ to be the most difficult and the above 
mentioned overall findings from the study.  
 Children were asked control and experimental questions after each story (see 
Appendix A for an example of each task). Control questions required children to state the 
story characters' knowledge state and were always asked before the experimental 
question (which asked children if teaching took place). Experimental questions presented 
children with a choice (e.g., Did Nicole try to teach Emma how to tie a knot or did she tie 
a knot for herself?) and the order of this choice (i.e., "try to teach" or "for herself) was 
counterbalanced across the set of stories. 
 Theory of Mind Battery. The theory of mind battery was presented in one of three 
pseudo-random orders following procedures suggested by Peterson, Wellman and Liu 
(2005). Each of the three possible orders of presentation begins with the diverse desires 
task (considered to be the least difficult task) and ends with the real-apparent emotion 
task (considered to be the most difficult task) while randomizing the remaining three 
tasks (diverse beliefs, knowledge access, and false belief). According to procedures used 
by Peterson et al. (2005) the order of questions and content of tasks was not changed. 
 Understanding the Distinction between Desire and Intention Stories. The 
understanding of the intention-desire distinction stories were presented in random order 
following procedures suggested by Schult (2002, personal communication). Children 
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heard eight stories, two in each condition. The order of the two tasks within each 
condition was counterbalanced and the order of each of the four conditions was 
randomized. Children were asked four test questions after each story was presented: 1) 
"What was X's plan?", 2) "Did X do what s/he planned to do?", 3) "What did X want?" 
and 4) "Did X get what s/he wanted?". This order was held constant and the force choice 
yes/no format was maintained as a result of personal communication with the author 
about the original design confirming question order and format, and for comparison 
purposes with the TD control sample in this study. 
 Two Intentions-Identical Action Stories. The two intentions-identical action 
stories were presented in random order following procedures from Baird and Moses 
(2001, personal communication). Children heard six stories, two in each condition. Three 
stories involved boy characters and three stories involved girl characters. Children were 
first asked an action question about both characters in each condition. This followed with 
asking a desire question (e.g., “Which boy wants to be home for dinner in just a few 
minutes?) and an intention question (e.g., “What is Michael trying to do?  Is Michael 
trying to get some exercise or is he trying to get somewhere fast?”) for each story for 
each condition. Condition order followed the Latin Square design used by Baird and 
Moses (2001, Study 4) which ensured that each condition type appeared in each position 
order. Condition order fell into sets of three. Story order within sets were 
counterbalanced (i.e., condition order remains the same but story order is reversed) as 
were order of character presentation and order of intention questions.     
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CHAPTER 4: Results 
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Analytic Methods 
 
 Given the aim of the current study was to investigate the understanding of 
teaching in high functioning children with autism spectrum disorder (HFA children), the 
present project assessed HFA children’s understanding of teaching, theory of mind, and 
others’ intentions. We were also interested in investigating the possible interrelations 
between the understanding of teaching, and theory of mind and the understanding of 
intentions in others. Results were analyzed pursuant to the five research questions this 
study addressed. Analyses used to examine the research questions involve relations and 
variation among the four social cognitive measures examined.  
 Analyses are based on a single test trial per measured item.1 ANOVA procedures 
are used to test for differences within and between groups among the conditions and 
items for all four measures. Correlations were calculated for the entire sample and for the 
two groups separately to determine relations among the four measures overall and by 
item. Descriptive statistics and scoring information are presented first. This follows with 
analyses for each research question in turn. 
                                                 
1 Many matched case-control studies involving children with ASD do not include model parameters for the 
matched pairs of children (e.g., Kaland et al., 2008; Luyster & Lord, 2009; McDuffie, Yoder, & Stone, 
2006). Because the matching process equates the samples overall (in this dissertation study, the 
distributions of VMA are identical), including matched pair parameters (either fixed or random) may 
account for some of the otherwise unexplained variation in outcomes; but in so doing, it can mask 
relationships associated with the variables used to create the pairs. For example, if matched pair parameters 
were included in these analyses, any developmental relationships between predictors and outcomes that are 
related to VMA would be impossible to estimate. Thus, matched pair parameters were not included in the 
models estimated here, and the results should not be interpreted as having the influence of VMA controlled 
in these analyses. Instead, the results reflect developmental relationships and differences between ASD and 
TD children from samples that have identical distributions of VMA. 
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Overall Results 
 
 Descriptive Statistics and Scoring by Measure. Before addressing the specific 
research questions of the current study, descriptive statistics were examined for the data 
set that follows with scoring information about each of the measures. Variables were 
examined for each group separately. Table 1 displays the characteristics of the sample by 
group. These data show the sampling recruitment strategy this study used. The TD 
comparison sample was individually matched with the HFA sample on verbal mental age 
(VMA) (see Chapter 3: Methods for a full description). All of the comparisons made 
below were performed having already matched on VMA.  
 Table 2 displays information about the number of participants with ceiling or 
floor levels of performance on and across the four measures. This table is important 
because it indicates that although a few HFA children performed at floor on two 
measures, the theory of mind scale and understanding of teaching battery, no HFA 
participants performed at floor across all four measures. Moreover, the HFA participant 
who did perform at floor on the theory of mind scale was not one of the two HFA 
children who performed at floor on the understanding of teaching battery. This pattern 
indicates that no child performed at floor on more than one measure. As a result, data 
analyses included all 35 HFA and 35 matched TD participants. Table 3 presents overall 
descriptive statistics for the understanding of teaching battery and theory of mind scale, 
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Table 4 for the intention-desire distinction measure, and Table 5 for the two intentions-
identical action measure. 
 
 
 Scoring. Test questions for each item on all four measures used a dichotomous 
forced-choice question format. For each test question, participants received a “1” if  they 
answered correct and “0” if incorrect.  
 Scoring overall performance on the understanding of teaching measure followed 
procedures suggested by Woodburn (2008). The understanding of teaching battery was 
calculated by summing the total number of correct items (range = 0-7). Similar to the 
understanding of teaching battery and following procedures by Wellman and Liu (2004), 
the theory of mind measure scores were also calculated by summing the total number of 
correct items (range = 0-5).  
 Overall performance for the two intention-in-action measures was calculated by 
summing the total number of correct responses for each condition. In line with 
Table 1.
Characteristics of Children by Group
HFA TD
No. of Children 35 35
Mean age (Mo.) 93.2 72.3
Age range (years;months) 6;3 to 8;10 3;3 to 7;6
Ratio of boys:girls 32:3 32:3
Mean Est. VMA (Mo.) 72.2 73.2
Range Est. VMA (Mo.) 47 to 103 46 to 100
Note.  HFA = High Functioning Children with Autism, TD = Typically Developing 
Children, VMA = Verbal Mental Age.
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procedures set by Schult (2002; and personal communication), overall performance on 
the intention-desire distinction measure was calculated by summing the total number of 
correct items for each of the four conditions (range = 0-4). Performance by condition was 
calculated by summing the total number of correct items for each question type (range = 
0-2). Overall performance on the two intentions-identical actions measure was also 
calculated by summing the total number of correct items for each of the three conditions 
(range = 0-2), as suggested by procedures from Baird and Moses (2001). 
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 Understanding of Teaching Tasks. Research Question 1: Is the understanding of 
teaching intact or impaired in high functioning children with autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) as compared to matched typical controls?  
 The primary goal of this study was to investigate the understanding of teaching 
itself in children with HFA. To examine differences between HFA participants and TD 
controls in overall performance on the understanding of teaching battery and across the 
seven teaching tasks, responses were compared in a (2 (group) X 7 (task)) repeated 
measures ANOVA, modeling group as the between-subjects factor, task question as a 
within-group factor, and the interaction between the two.2 Because the assumption of 
sphericity was not met (Mauchly’s W = .554, p < .005), the degrees of freedom for tests 
of within-subjects effects were conservatively adjusted using the Greenhouse–Geisser F 
test. For all subsequent repeated measures ANOVAs, where the assumption of sphericity 
is not met (Mauchly’s p < .05), the degrees of freedom for tests of within-subjects effects 
will be conservatively adjusted using the Greenhouse–Geisser F test. A main effect of 
group (F(1, 68) = 19.33, p < .001) and task (F(1,68) = 21.55, p <.001) was found (Table 
                                                 
2 In certain cases it might be preferable to use a repeated measures log-linear model to analyze dichotomous 
data. However, using a log-linear model with data for which there are empty cells can result in severe 
estimation problems (Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). Empty cells represent a fundamental 
constraint for log-linear models, because the log of zero is undefined. In the current study, empty cells were 
present due to children’s overwhelmingly high and overwhelming low responses on several teaching tasks 
(see below). Wainryb et al. (2001) note that the standard strategy of deleting empty cells by excluding 
levels of the dependent or independent variable, would compromise the integrity of the data. In contrast, 
empty cells tend not to represent a serious concern for ANOVA models where parameters are estimable 
even with only minimal variance in the data. Other researchers have noted the use and robustness of 
ANOVA with dichotomous data (e.g., Gaito, 1980; Lunney, 1970; Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Yell, 
2003). Therefore, ANOVA models are used in the current study to analyze both the understanding of 
teaching and theory of mind measures. 
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3). This indicates that the HFA children performed worse than the TD children on the 
understanding of teaching battery.  
 Table 6 shows performance on each of the task items by group for the 
understanding of teaching battery. The failed teaching task was the only item in which 
HFA children’s performance was above chance. TD children performed significantly 
above chance on the failed teaching task, the successful teaching task, the who should be 
taught task, and the embedded teaching task. 
 
 McNemar’s chi square tests were conducted to test group differences by item. 
Analyses revealed differences between HFA and TD groups were significant for the 
failed teaching task (χ2(1) = 10.06, p < .001), the successful teaching task  (χ2(1) = 8.10, p 
< .01), the who should be taught task  (χ2(1) = 10.25, p < .001), and the embedded 
teaching task  (χ2(1) = 7.00, p < .01). There were no significant differences between the 
groups on the observational learning task, the overestimate-self task, or the overestimate-
learner task. 
Table 6.
Understanding of Teaching Task Item Performance, Pass Rates by Group
HFA TD Woodburn, 2008
Failed Teaching   .69*   .97*
Successful Teaching .63   .94*
Who Should be Taught .63   .91*
Embedded Teaching .57   .86*
Overestimate Self .51 .60
Observational Learning .34 .43
Overestimate Learner                   .17 .29
Note. Asterisks (*) indicate above-chance (50%) performance.
.25
.19
.86
.89
.99
.74
.65
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 Chi square tests were also conducted to test within group differences by item. For 
the HFA participants, differences were observed between the successful teaching task and 
overestimate-self task (χ2(1) = 6.65, p < .01) as well as failed teaching and observational 
learning (χ2(1) = 4.52, p < .05). Chi square tests were not computed for the following 
comparisons due to below threshold cell count frequencies: ‘successful teaching’ and 
overestimate-learner; ‘who should be taught’ with ‘observational learning’ and both 
overestimate-self/learner; and ‘failed teaching’ and overestimate-learner. Chi square tests 
were also not computed for a majority of the tasks for the TD group because the 
combination of high pass rates on the first four tasks and low pass rates on the last task 
resulted in below threshold cell count frequencies. There were no differences found 
between the few tasks that were analyzed. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the difference between groups on each of the teaching tasks 
when presented in descending order based on pass rates. The x-axis represents the 
teaching tasks and the y-axis represents the mean pass rate. The lack of interaction 
indicates that the group average by task for the HFA children echoes the group average 
by task for the TD children. This suggests that although the HFA group performed worse 
across the tasks than controls, the pattern of performance did not differ from the TD 
group. The findings show that HFA children performed worse than TD children on their 
overall teaching score and on most of the teaching tasks. Taken together, the data suggest 
that compared to TD children, the understanding of the core components that underlie 
teaching are delayed in HFA children.  
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Figure 1. 
 Scaling. Item response theory (IRT) was used to examine scalability. IRT uses 
both item parameters and respondent characteristics to determine the probability of 
passing an item given one’s score on all other items. For the seven-item teaching battery, 
Woodburn (2008) used Guttman procedures and Rasch modeling to determine whether 
the understanding of teaching tasks form a scale. Following procedures from Woodburn 
(2008), Guttman and Rasch analyses were also used in the current study to determine 
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whether the seven-item battery formed a scale similar to the Wellman and Liu (2004) 
theory of mind scale in both HFA and TD children. 
 Guttman scaling is a procedure in which items are arranged hierarchically so that 
they progress in difficulty—a person who fails an item should fail all subsequent items 
and a person who passes an item should have passed all previous items. Scaling of this 
sort allows for the prediction of all item responses once the cumulative score is known. 
Guttman scaling is useful in examining measures of abilities that are thought to change 
developmentally, as higher scores indicate developmental progress in the particular area 
being measured. Calculating the scale produces two statistics: a coefficient of 
reproducibility, which indicates how progressively difficult, or ‘scalable’, items are; and 
an index of consistency, which indicates whether the pattern derived differs significantly 
from one that could be obtained by chance. A scale is determined by a coefficient of 
reproducibility greater than or equal to .90 and an index of consistency greater than or 
equal to .50 (as specified by Green's (1956) method of estimation; Guttman, 1950). 
 After several attempts at different item combinations for the seven-item teaching 
battery, the following task order was found to have the best Guttman fit in our HFA 
sample: 1) failed teaching; 2) successful teaching; 3) who should be taught; 4) embedded 
teaching; 5) overestimate-self; 6) observational-learning; and 7) overestimate-learner. 
Guttman procedures revealed that the seven-item battery had an index of reproducibility 
= .88, but with Green’s (1956) index of consistency = .65. This indicated that the 
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observed response pattern occurred above chance, but that the items fell just below the 
threshold for scalability (.90). Thus, the seven tasks here did not form a reliable scale. 
 Data for the seven items in the HFA group were subsequently analyzed using a 
Rasch model. The Rasch IRT measurement model is a one-parameter logistic model for 
dichotomous items that models the probability of a specified response (e.g., 
correct/incorrect answer) to any given item as a function of item difficulty and person 
ability levels (Rasch, 1960; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979). When item 
difficulty and a person’s ability are equal, the chance of answering the item correctly is 
0.5. As an individual’s ability increases or decreases relative to item-difficulty, so does 
the probability of correct performance, respectively. Rasch models are less conservative 
than the more stringent and deterministic Guttman model because they employ 
probability in determining scale progression rather than demanding exact fit in scale 
progression. 
 In a Rasch model, the degree of agreement between the pattern of observed 
responses and the modeled expectations is described using mean square (MNSQ) infit 
and outfit goodness-of-fit statistics. Infit mean-square statistics are sensitive to irregular 
patterns of response. Outfit mean-square fit statistics (MNSQs) are equivalent to a chi-
square statistic; values greater than 2.0 indicate outliers or unexplained randomness 
throughout the data (Linacre, 2004; Smith, 1996). Values between .75 and 1.33 MNSQ 
are considered acceptable; a value below .75 suggests the item fits too well and above 
1.33 indicates noise (Wilson, 2005). Item fit indicates the extent to which the use of a 
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particular item is consistent with the way the participants have responded to the other 
items. Person fit indicates the extent to which the person’s performance is consistent with 
the way the items are used by the other participants 
 Table 7 shows ordered solutions from least difficult to most difficult for item and 
person for the HFA group. The Rasch model confirmed the Guttman scaling findings that 
the items did not form a reliable scale for this sample of respondents. Fit statistics for 
items all fell within the acceptable range between .75 and 1.33 MNSQ expect for outfit 
MNSQ for the embedded teaching task and the overestimate-learner task. Cronbach’s 
alpha for overall item fit was .89. Cronbach’s alpha for overall person fit was .37. The 
item fit results suggest valid item parameters for only five of the seven items. The poor 
person fit (i.e., coefficient less than .50) indicates the item-score response pattern is 
statistically “improbable” (Meijer & Sitsma, 2001). That is, the HFA children’s response 
patterns did not conform to the model. Therefore, the seven-item understanding of 
teaching battery did not scale for this particular sample of HFA children. 
88 
 
 
 Guttman procedures and Rasch modeling were also used to examine scalability in 
the TD group. Table 8 shows ordered solutions from least difficult to most difficult for 
item and person for the TD group. Guttman procedures revealed that the seven-item 
battery of teaching tasks had an index of reproducibility = .95, but with Green’s (1956) 
index of consistency = .22, which indicates that the observed response pattern did not 
occur above chance. Thus, the seven tasks here did not form a reliable scale. Rasch 
modeling confirmed the Guttman scaling findings that the items did not form a reliable 
scale for our sample of TD respondents. Cronbach’s alpha for overall item fit was .89. 
Person infit and outfit statistics fell between .75 and 1.33 MNSQ for only two tasks: the 
observational learning task and the overestimate-self task. Cronbach’s alpha for overall 
person fit was .25. 
Table 7.
Rasch Analysis Results for Teaching Battery Item and Person in HFA Group
Item Difficulty-Fit Statistics
Meaure Error MNSQ ZSTD MNSQ ZSTD
Failed Teaching -1.02 0.42 0.87 -0.60 0.81 -0.50
Successful Teaching -0.69 0.40 0.94 -0.30 0.85 -0.50
Who Should be Taught -0.69 0.40 0.90 -0.50 0.92 -0.20
Embedded Teaching -0.38 0.39 1.17  1.10 1.40  1.70
Overestimate Self -0.08 0.38 0.94 -0.40 0.86 -0.60
Observational Learning  0.83 0.40 1.00  0.10 1.31  1.00
Overestimate Learner  2.02 0.52 1.00  0.10 2.33  1.80
M  0.00 0.42 0.98 -0.10 1.21  0.40
SD  1.00 0.04 0.09  0.50 0.51  1.00
Person Difficulty-Fit Statistics (33 non-extreme cases)
M -0.02 0.97 0.99 0.00 1.21 0.10
SD  1.33 0.25 0.32 0.80 1.43 0.90
Infit Outfit
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 In Woodburn’s (2008) study, Guttman procedures revealed that the seven-item 
battery of teaching tasks had an index of reproducibility = .94 but an index of consistency 
of only .38. While the potential scalability of the teaching battery was significant (as 
evidenced by the index of reproducibility), the TD participants in Woodburn’s (2008) 
study did not form a reliable scale according to Guttman procedures. In the current study, 
Rasch modeling applied to the seven tasks confirmed our Guttman findings, indicating 
that the items were progressive in difficulty, but that the pattern of responses was not 
reliably greater than chance. Rasch modeling applied to the seven tasks confirmed the 
Guttman findings in Woodburn (2008) as well. However, while the TD participants in 
both studies observed a significant index of reproducibility, the order of the seven-item 
Table 8.
Rasch Analysis Results for Teaching Battery Item and Person in TD Group
Item Difficulty-Fit Statistics
Meaure Error MNSQ ZSTD MNSQ ZSTD
Failed Teaching -2.62 1.03 0.86  0.10 0.26 -0.30
Successful Teaching -1.85 0.75 0.91  0.00 0.49 -0.20
Who Should be Taught -1.37 0.64 1.10  0.40 0.70 -0.10
Embedded Teaching -0.71 0.53 0.94 -0.10 1.88  1.30
Overestimate Self  1.10 0.42 1.06  0.40 1.26  1.10
Observational Learning  2.16 0.44 1.10  0.60 1.22  0.70
Overestimate Learner  3.29 0.53 0.74 -0.80 0.48 -0.80
M  0.00 0.62 0.96  0.10 0.90  0.30
SD  2.05 0.20 0.13  0.40 0.53  0.70
Person Difficulty-Fit Statistics (30 non-extreme cases)
M 1.77 1.26 1.00 -0.10 0.90 0.10
SD 1.60 0.29 0.78  1.20 1.25 0.80
Infit Outfit
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task found to have the best Guttman fit in the current study is distinct from the order 
found to have the best Guttman fit in Woodburn (2008), making comparisons less valid. 
 
 Relation between the Understanding of Teaching and Theory of Mind. Research 
Question 2: Is the understanding of teaching related concurrently to overall theory of 
mind, or specific mental state attribution understanding in high functioning children with 
ASD and matched controls? 
 It was speculated that the understanding of teaching would be related to theory of 
mind in both HFA and TD populations. Bivariate correlations were used to examine the 
relation between the understanding of teaching score and theory of mind score by group. 
Table 9 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations for overall performance on the 
teaching measure and the theory of mind measure. As hypothesized, the teaching and 
theory of mind measures significantly correlated with each other for both HFA and TD 
populations (r(33) = .42, p < .05; r(33) = .56, p < .01, respectively).3 These data are 
important because they represent novel findings that suggest a conceptual relation 
between theory of mind and the understanding of teaching may be present in HFA 
children. For the TD group, these data replicate Woodburn’s (2008) findings of a 
significant correlation between overall performance on the teaching and theory of mind 
measures in a sample of TD children. Replicating these results provides additional data 
                                                 
3  Splitting each group into two subgroups based on whether they fell above or below the mean 
chronological age for that group in order to run age partialled correlations was not performed. Doing so 
would have resulted in comparing groups that did not have enough power to find a statistically significant 
difference. 
91 
 
pointing to the possibility that these two measures are conceptually related in TD 
children. 
 
 To determine which task items in the teaching battery were related to overall 
theory of mind performance, a polyserial correlation was used where the score on each of 
the teaching tasks (a dichotomy) was correlated with the overall theory of mind score (an 
ordinal variable). The procedure was then used in the reverse situation, where each theory 
of mind tasks are correlated with the overall understanding of teaching score. Given the 
novelty of examining the understanding of teaching in HFA children, correlations 
between the teaching battery and theory of mind score, and vice versa, were performed 
for exploratory purposes in the event that certain tasks on one measure in this population 
relate to overall performance on the other. 
 Table 10 shows the correlations for the teaching tasks and theory of mind score. 
Both the failed teaching task and the embedded teaching task significantly correlated with 
overall theory of mind performance for the HFA children (rs(33) = .45 and .37, ps < .01 
Table 9.
HFA Teaching
Theory of Mind  .42*
TD Teaching
Theory of Mind    .56**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Pearson Product Moment Correlations by Group for Overall Theory of Mind and 
Understanding of Teaching Scores
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and .05, respectively). The failed teaching task correlation is interesting as this task was 
the one item in the teaching battery that HFA children’s performance was above chance. 
For the TD children, the embedded teaching task and the overestimate-learner task was 
significantly related to overall theory of mind score (rs(33) = .44 and .39, ps < .01 and 
.05, respectively). 
 
 Table 11 shows the correlations for the theory of mind tasks and overall 
understanding of teaching score. The diverse desire tasks and the knowledge access task 
correlated with teaching for HFA children (rs(33) = .36 and .49, ps < .05). For the TD 
children, the diverse beliefs task, the false belief task and the real-apparent emotions task 
were significantly related to the understanding of teaching score (rs(33) = .44, .36, and 
.40, ps < .01, .05, and .05, respectively). The pattern of correlations differed between 
groups. This difference could simply be a difference in how these two groups solved, or 
did not solve, the tasks. However, a richer interpretation is that the distinct pattern 
Table 10.
Correlations between Teaching Task Items and Theory of Mind
Variables 
Successful Teaching
Who Should be Taught
Failed Teaching
Successful Imitation
Embedded Teaching
Overestimate Learner
Overestimate Self
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
      .45**
-.01
    .37*
  .09
  .10
 .15
 .33
     .44**
   .39*
.20
HFA TD
Theory of Mind
 .07
 .09
Theory of Mind
  .15
  .20
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suggests that there is a difference between HFA children and TD children in the 
understanding of the mental states the theory of mind tasks address and their relation to 
overall performance on the understanding of teaching battery. 
 
 Phi correlation coefficients were used to measure the degree of association 
(correlation) between each task in the understanding of teaching battery and each task in 
the theory of mind scale. Table 12 shows the interrelations among the theory of mind 
variables and teaching variables. For the HFA children, a significant inverse correlation 
was found between the diverse beliefs task and the successful imitation teaching task 
(r(33) = -.47, p < .01).  The failed teaching task significantly correlated with the 
knowledge access task and false belief task (rs(33) = . 53, .43,  ps < .01 and .05, 
respectively). 
  For TD children, performance on the diverse beliefs task significantly correlated 
with the ‘who should be taught’ teaching task, the embedded teaching task, and the 
Table 11.
Correlations between Theory of Mind Tasks and Teaching Score
Variables 
Diverse Desires
Diverse Beliefs
Knowledge Access
False Belief
Real-Apparent Emotion
— Performance on this item 100%
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
HFA TD
Teaching
–
  .44*
Teaching
    .36*
-.16
      .49**
  .23
  .16
.26
  .36*
  .40*
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overestimate-self teaching task (rs(33) = .36, .46 and .38, ps < .05, .01, .05, respectively). 
False belief significantly correlated with the embedded teaching task (r(33) = .39, p < 
.05) and the real-apparent emotion task significantly correlated with the successful 
imitation teaching task (r(33) = .35, p < .05). Children performed at ceiling (100%) on 
the diverse desires task, therefore correlations were not computed.  
 
Table 12.
Correlations between Theory of Mind and Understanding of Teaching by Task
HFA
Variables DD DB KA FB RA
Successful Teaching  0.28   0.15 0.17 -0.04 -0.12
Who Should be Taught  0.12 -0.14 0.17  0.22  0.14
Failed Teaching  0.18 -0.22     0.53**    0.43*  0.19
Successful Imitation -0.15    -0.47** 0.26  0.08  0.16
Embedded Teaching  0.22  0.08 0.30  0.16  0.21
Overestimate Learner  0.21 -0.11 0.09  0.05  0.02
Overestimate Self  0.32  0.15 0.08 -0.15 -0.08
TD
Variables DD DB KA FB RA
Successful Teaching – -0.09 -0.09  0.21  0.04
Who Should be Taught –    0.36* -0.08  0.08 -0.05
Failed Teaching – -0.05 -0.05  0.24  0.14
Successful Imitation –  0.06  0.27  0.14    0.35*
Embedded Teaching –     0.46**  0.17    0.39*  0.17
Overestimate Learner – 0.19  0.19  0.32  0.26
Overestimate Self –   0.38*  0.17 -0.10  0.19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
– Performance on this item 100%.
Note. DD = Diverse Desires, DB = Diverse Beliefs,KA = Knowledge Access, FB = 
Contents False Belief, RA = Real-Apparent Emotion. 
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 The relatively few associations observed for both groups between the teaching 
tasks and theory of mind tasks could be accounted for by the limited variability in each 
group’s high and low performance on several items. For instance, besides TD children’s 
ceiling performance on the diverse desires task (100%), group pass rates on the diverse 
beliefs and knowledge access tasks were also quite high (91%, respectively) (see Table 
15). HFA children performed poorly on the observational learning task (34%), and both 
groups performed poorly on the overestimate-learner task (29% and 17%, respectively, 
see Table 6). 
  For the tasks with greater variability in each group’s performance, the pattern of 
relations between the two groups is important to note. For the handful of correlations 
observed in both groups, none of the associated pairs in the HFA group matched with the 
associated pairs in the TD group. The different correlational patterns suggests that the 
relation between theory of mind and the understanding of teaching in HFA children may 
differ from the relation between theory of mind and the understanding of teaching in TD 
children.    
 
 Relation between the Understanding of Teaching and Intentions-In-Action. 
Research Question 3: How is the understanding of teaching related to understanding 
particular intentions-in-action in high functioning children with ASD and matched 
controls? 
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 It was also speculated that the understanding of teaching may be related to the 
understanding of other’s intentions in both HFA and TD populations. Bivariate 
correlations were used to examine the relation between overall teaching score and 
intention task scores by group. Table 13 shows the interrelations by group among total 
teaching score and each of the intention-in-action task scores. 
 
 
  For the HFA group, two of the four intention-desire distinction tasks (intention-
unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied and intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied) were significantly 
correlated with the total teaching score (r(33) = .53, .41, ps < 01 and .05, respectively). 
The intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task was significantly correlated to the 
teaching score for the TD group (r(33) = .42, p < .05). It was interesting that the same 
intention-in-action task was related to teaching in both groups given that HFA children 
Correlations by Group between Overall Understanding of Teaching Score and Intention Tasks
HFA
Variables I+D+ I-D- I-D+  I+D- SD DD  SS
Teaching 0.21 0.53** 0.41* 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.11
TD
Variables I+D+ I-D- I-D+  I+D- SD DD  SS
Teaching 0.29 0.42* 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.19
Note. I+D+, intention-fulfilled/desire-satisfied; I-D-, intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied; 
 I-D+, intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied; and I+D-, intention-fulfilled/desire unsatisfied;
SD = same action-different intention; DD = different action-different intention;
and SS = same action-same intention.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 13.
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and TD children performed significantly different on the intention-unfulfilled/desire-
unsatisfied task and on teaching. However, due to the difference in task format and 
characteristics between both the teaching items and two intention measures, it could have 
been the case that the intention tasks did not correlate with teaching.  
 It is also possible that the lack of significance for many of the correlations was 
due to the overall lack of variability across several of the intention conditions (e.g., 
overall high performance or low performance). Nevertheless, two intention task scores 
correlated with the total teaching score in the HFA group and one intention task score 
correlated with the total teaching score in the TD group. These findings point to the 
possibility that there is a relation between the intention-in-action tasks and the 
understanding of teaching battery in HFA and TD children. 
 A more detailed examination of whether the understanding of teaching battery is 
related to the understanding of other’s particular intentions-in action tasks requires 
investigating interrelations among the individual teaching tasks and the individual 
intention tasks. Phi correlation coefficients were used to measure the degree of 
association (correlation) between each task in the understanding of teaching battery and 
each of the intention tasks. Table 14 shows the interrelations by group among each of the 
teaching items and each of the intention-in-action task scores. 
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 Several correlations were observed for the HFA children. A significant relation 
was found between the ‘who should be taught’ task and the different action-different 
intention task, the ‘failed teaching’ task and the intention-fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task, 
the ‘overestimate-learner’ task and the same action-different intention task, and the 
‘overestimate-self’ task with both the intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task and the 
same action-same intention task. Correlational analyses at the task level of each measure 
revealed several associations between the teaching items and the Baird and Moses (2001) 
tasks in the HFA group. 
 For the TD children there were also several significant relations between the two 
measures’ items: the successful teaching task correlated with the same action-different 
intention task;  the ‘who should be taught’ task correlated with the different action-
different intention task; the ‘failed teaching’ task perfectly correlated with the intention-
fulfilled/desire-satisfied task; and the ‘embedded teaching’ task correlated with the 
intention-fulfilled/desire-satisfied task, the intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task, 
and the same action-same intention task. The correlations between the Baird and Moses 
(2001) tasks and several teaching task items is interesting given that these intention tasks 
did not correlate with overall teaching. However, the increase in variability among the 
variables simply by comparing teaching tasks to intention tasks rather than overall 
teaching score to intention tasks could certainly account for the increase in observed 
correlations. It is also possible that the resulting correlations indicate that in TD children 
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there is a relation, at the task level, between the teaching battery and the intention-in-
action measures. 
 The pattern of correlations observed between the two groups was also of interest. 
To begin with, there were few similarities. Both groups showed a correlation between 
teaching and the intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task. An increase in associations 
among the variables occurred, for target and controls, when both measures were analyzed 
at the task level. And in both groups, the failed teaching task correlated with the different 
action-different intention task. However, there were several differences between the two 
groups. Six correlations were observed in the teaching tasks and intention-in-action task 
analyses for the HFA group, whereas five correlations were observed for the TD group. 
Of the six correlations reported, only one relation matched between the two groups. The 
other five correlations in the HFA group involved pairs of related variables either for the 
teaching task, the intention-in-action task, or both that were distinct from the correlated 
pairs in the TD group. This pattern suggests that certain teaching tasks are related to 
certain intention-in-action tasks differently for HFA children and TD children.  
 
 Theory of Mind Developmental Sequence. Research Question 4: Is the pattern of 
theory of mind attainment in high functioning children with ASD similar to the 
developmental pattern observed in high functioning children with ASD by Peterson, 
Wellman, and Liu (2005)? 
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 An important question in children with HFA is whether their theory of mind 
development compared to TD children is simply delayed and so follows the same 
sequence but at a later age, or whether their pattern of theory of mind development is 
altogether different and thus forms a distinct sequence. Peterson and colleagues (2005) 
used a five-item theory of mind scale to address this question and found that theory of 
mind development among HFA children produced a scale of theory of mind development 
that was different from TD children. The pattern of theory of mind development that 
Peterson et al. (2005) found in their HFA sample has been replicated only once in a 
follow-up study that examined performance of HFA children and slightly older children 
with Asperger’s Syndrome on an augmented version of the theory of mind scale that 
included the same five-item battery with an additional sixth sarcasm understanding task 
(Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012). 
 Therefore, if the original scale is retained in the HFA participants in this study, it 
would provide evidence supporting Peterson et al.’s (2005) suggestion that theory of 
mind in HFA children not only follows a particular progression, but also a different 
developmental pattern than TD children. Moreover, the five-item scale itself has only 
been examined once in a sample of 36 Australian HFA children. Therefore, it is 
important to determine whether or to what degree this scale replicates in a similar, 
slightly younger population. What’s more the data will provide novel evidence about the 
particular pattern of theory of mind development in younger HFA children. And 
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employing a scale of theory of mind development offers an opportunity to address both 
the question of developmental delay and sequence. 
 Table 15 shows overall performance on the five-item theory of mind scale for our 
sample of HFA and TD children, and Peterson et al.’s (2005, 2012) sample of HFA 
children for comparison purposes. HFA children in our study performed above chance on 
the diverse desires task and diverse beliefs task. TD children performed at ceiling on the 
diverse desires task, were highly successful on the diverse beliefs task and the knowledge 
access task, and were above chance on the false belief task. Overall, HFA children’s pass 
rate on each of the tasks was lower than the corresponding rate for the TD group. This 
pattern was also the case for the HFA group when compared to the pass rates in Peterson 
et al.’s (2005) HFA sample.  
 However, it should be noted that compared to the HFA children in our study, the 
Peterson et al. (2005) sample’s mean chronological age (CA) was approximately 1.5 
years older (M = 7.77 vs. 9.32, respectively), age range was identical on the young end 
but was approximately six full years older on the old end (6;3-8;10 vs. 6;3-14;2, 
respectively), and average verbal mental age (VMA) was approximately 22 months older 
(72.23 vs. 94.31, respectively). The age range and average VMA for the HFA sample in 
Peterson et al. (2012) is not available. However, the mean CA was also more than one 
full year older than the HFA children in this study (approximately 1.25 years older, M = 
9.02 and 7.77, respectively). Therefore, exact comparisons between our study and either 
Peterson et al. (2005, 2012) are not possible. Nevertheless, because this study represents 
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one of only two samples of HFA children to be given the five-item theory of mind scale, 
it remains important to use the original and follow-up studies as an approximate guide for 
comparison purposes. 
 
 
 A 2 (group) X 5 (task) repeated measures ANOVA, modeling group as the 
between-subjects factor, task question as a within-group factor, and the interaction 
between the two yielded a main effect of group (F(1, 68) = 28.02, p < .001) and task (F(1, 
68) =17.65, p < .001). These analyses indicated that the mean scores on three out of the 
five of the theory of mind tasks were lower in the HFA group than their corresponding 
task in the TD group.      
 Chi square analyses were used to test group differences by item to determine 
whether the mean score differences were significant between the HFA and TD groups on 
Table 15.
Theory of Mind Performance by Task
(2005) (2012)
Task % passing % passing
HFA TD (HFA) (HFA)
Diverse Desires  83*  100* 86 93
Diverse Beliefs  77*  91* 86 86
Knowledge Access 57  91* 75 70
False Belief (Contents) 29  66* 47 43
Real-Apparent Emotions 31 40 64 52
Note. * indicates above-chance (50%) performance.
Peterson et al.,
% passing
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each of the five theory of mind tasks. Fisher’s exact test was reported for all cases with 
expected frequencies less than 5 (two-sided). Analyses revealed differences between 
HFA children and TD children were significant for the diverse desires task (χ2(1) = 6.56, 
p < .05), the knowledge access task (χ2(1) = 10.77, p < .01), and the false belief task 
(χ2(1) = 9.69, p < .01). There were no significant differences between groups on the 
diverse beliefs task and the real-apparent emotions task; however, the diverse beliefs task 
was approaching significance (p = .09).  
 Given the chronological and verbal age differences between our HFA sample and 
the HFA samples in Peterson et al. (2005), it is not surprising that the observed pattern of 
performance on the pass rates for several of the tasks in the HFA group did not line up 
with the pass rates in Peterson et al.’s (2005) HFA group. Both groups tended to perform 
well on the first three tasks. However, the Peterson et al. sample performed better on the 
real-apparent emotion task than the false belief task (64% correct and 47% correct, 
respectively). HFA children in the Peterson et al. (2005) sample also performed 
significantly better than the study’s TD controls on the real-apparent emotions task and 
significantly worse on the false belief task. These same patterns between our HFA sample 
and the HFA sample in their follow-up 2012 study were also observed. Moreover, HFA 
children in their follow-up study also performed significantly better than the study’s TD 
controls on the real-apparent emotions task (Peterson et al., 2012).  
 However, the HFA children in our study performed well below chance and 
equally poorly on both the false belief task and the real-apparent emotion task (29% 
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correct and 31% correct, respectively), and did not perform significantly better than TD 
children on the real-apparent emotions task. It entirely possible that the difference 
observed between these two patterns of performance can be accounted for by the 
significantly larger age range (on the older end), older mean CA, and older mean VMA in 
the Peterson et al. (2005) sample, and older mean CA in Peterson et al. (2012). That is, 
our younger sample may not be as far along developmentally as Peterson et al.‘s HFA 
samples, which would explain why our sample’s similar performance on the false belief 
task and the real-apparent emotion task. Although scaling analyses were performed and 
are reported below, the fact that the HFA children in this study’s performance on the false 
belief task and the real-apparent emotions task did not differ indicates that the pattern of 
performance for the theory of mind scale did not entirely match the pattern of 
performance observed in the Peterson et al.’s original (2005) or follow-up (2012) samples 
of HFA children. 
 Scaling. Scaling analysis for the theory of mind battery followed procedures used 
for the Peterson et al. (2005) HFA sample. This was done to determine if the HFA 
children in the current study follow the same developmental pattern as Peterson et al.’s 
(2005) HFA sample. The five tasks that form the theory of mind scale in Peterson et al.’s 
(2005) sample of HFA children in which the order of scaled items had the false belief 
task and the real-apparent emotions task reversed formed a Guttman scale with an index 
of reproducibility of .95 and an index of consistency of .55, both of which were 
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statistically significant (Peterson et al., 2005, p.510). Rasch analyses confirmed Guttman 
scaling structure for the HFA group.  
 Guttman scaling procedures for the HFA children in this study found the five 
items significantly increased in difficulty, with an index of reproducibility = .92. 
However, Green’s (1956) index of consistency = .12, indicating that the observed 
response pattern did not occur above chance. The battery also did not scale when the last 
two items were not reversed and kept in the original Wellman and Liu (2004) order. 
Therefore, the five-item theory of mind scale with the false belief task and the real-
apparent emotions task reversed did not scale for this particular sample of HFA children. 
Data for the five items in HFA group were subsequently analyzed using a Rasch model. 
Table 16 shows ordered solutions from least difficult to most difficult for item and person 
for the HFA group. Following procedures by Peterson et al. (2005), item difficulty and 
person ability measures in the Rasch model were rescaled so that the diverse desires task 
(considered to be the least difficult item; therefore, it was arbitrarily considered to be the 
anchor task)  had an item difficulty score of 0.0. 
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 The Rasch model confirmed the Guttman scaling findings that the items did not 
form a reliable scale for this sample of respondents. Fit statistics for each of the five 
items all fell within the acceptable range, except for outfit MNSQ for the diverse desires 
task; however, this outcome was expected given that this item was arbitrarily anchored as 
the least difficult task. Cronbach’s alpha for overall item fit was .89. The person infit and 
outfit statistics also fell between .75 and 1.33 MNSQ, but Cronbach’s alpha for overall 
person fit was .01. The item fit results suggest valid item parameters. However, both fit 
statistics are important and poor person fit (i.e., coefficient less than .50) indicates the 
item-score response pattern is statistically “improbable” (Meijer & Sitsma, 2001). That is, 
the HFA children’s response patterns did not conform to the model. Therefore, the five-
item theory of mind scale with the false belief task and the real-apparent emotions task 
reversed did not scale for this particular sample of HFA children. 
Table 16.
Rasch Analysis Results for Item and Person in HFA Group
Item Difficulty-Fit Statistics
Meaure Error MNSQ ZSTD MNSQ ZSTD
Diverse Desires 0.00 0.52 0.75 -0.80 0.66 -0.50
Diverse Beliefs 0.32 0.48 1.18  0.70 1.14  0.40
Knowledge Access 1.65 0.41 1.03  0.20 1.12  0.60
Real-Apparent Emotion 3.21 0.45 1.05  0.30 0.81 -0.30
False Belief 3.42 0.47 0.84 -0.60 0.82 -0.20
M 1.72 0.46 0.97  0.00 0.91  0.00
SD 1.42 0.04 0.15  0.60 0.19  0.40
Person Difficulty-Fit Statistics (31 non-extreme cases)
M 1.88 1.15 0.99 -0.10 0.91 0.00
SD 1.15 0.06 0.75  1.20 1.00 1.00
Infit Outfit
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 Guttman procedures and Rasch modeling were also used to examine scalability in 
the TD group. Table 17 shows ordered solutions from least difficult to most difficult for 
item and person for the TD group. Guttman procedures for Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
original five-item scale found the tasks significantly increased in difficulty, with an index 
of reproducibility = .97, but with an index of consistency = .40. Thus, the observed 
response pattern did not occur above chance. Rasch modeling confirmed the Guttman 
scaling findings that the items did not form a reliable scale for this sample of TD 
respondents. Cronbach’s alpha for overall item fit was .89. The person infit and outfit 
statistics also fell between .75 and 1.33 MNSQ; however, Cronbach’s alpha for overall 
person fit was .25. 
 In Wellman and Liu’s (2004) original study, the five tasks formed a Guttman 
scale with an index of reproducibility = .96 and an index of consistency = .56, indicating 
that the five items formed a highly scalable set (see order and descriptions in Chapter 2: 
Literature Review). In our study, the low index of consistency for the TD participants 
indicates a lack of uniformity in response patterns across the group. This result was not 
surprising, though, given that a significant portion of the children (54%) in this sample 
are at least one year older than the oldest group of children (5-year-olds) in the Wellman 
and Liu (2004) sample, making comparisons less valid. 
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 It is important to note here that when the responses in the HFA sample in the 
Peterson et al.’s (2005) original study were ordered as in Wellman and Liu (2004), their 
index reproducibility was .90 and their index of consistency was .29. When the HFA 
children’s responses in the current study were ordered as in Wellman and Liu (2004), 
their index of reproducibility was .92 and their index of consistency was .15. Given the 
HFA children’s similar performance between the false belief task and the real-apparent 
emotions task in this study, it was understandable that their response pattern did not fit 
either the original Wellman or Liu (2004) or Peterson et al. (2005) ordered scale. 
However, the first three tasks did form a pattern similar to the pattern observed in 
Peterson et al. (2005, 2012) raising the possibility that the difference between the two 
samples lies in performance on the false belief task and the real-apparent emotions task. 
Table 17.
Rasch Analysis Results for Item and Person in TD Group
Item Difficulty-Fit Statistics
Meaure Error MNSQ ZSTD MNSQ ZSTD
Diverse Desires* 0.00 1,58 0.23  -0.70 0.03 -1.00
Diverse Beliefs 2.73 0.79 1.34   0.80 0.73  0.30
Knowledge Access 2.73 0.79 0.40 -1.40 0.14 -0.50
False Belief 5.97 0.53 1.06   0.30 0.95  0.10
Real-Apparent Emotion 8.54 0.64 0.96   0.00 0.56  0.10
M 4.00 0.87 0.80  -0.20 0.48 -0.20
SD 2.96 0.37 0.42   0.70 0.35  0.50
Person Difficulty-Fit Statistics (24 non-extreme cases)
M 6.96 1.75 0.94 -0.20 0.48 -0.30
SD 2.30 0.25 1.27  1.00 0.67  0.60
Note. *Performance on this item 100%. 
Infit Outfit
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 Given the age and design differences between the current study and Wellman and 
Liu (2004), it was expected that the TD group here would not fit the original Wellman 
and Liu (2004) scale. The sample in our study performed at ceiling on the diverse desires 
task and 11 or 31% of the TD participants performed at ceiling in their overall scale 
score. This accounts for the 24 non-extreme measures that the Rasch model reported 
above for the overall person difficulty fit statistics. Moreover, the TD children performed 
equally well and near ceiling on both the diverse beliefs task (91%) and the knowledge 
awareness task (91%). Finally, a majority of the children (54%) in our sample were at 
least one year older than the oldest group of children (5-year-olds) in the Wellman and 
Liu (2004) sample. Together, these various factors make comparisons between the 
sample of TD in the current study and Wellman and Liu’s (2004) original sample is less 
valid and meaningful.   
 
 The Understanding of Intentions-In-Action. Research Question 5: Is the 
understanding of the distinction between desires and intentions, and actions and 
intentions intact or impaired in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as 
compared to matched controls? 
 The research that has investigated the ability to understand intentions in others in 
HFA children has yielded dissimilar results (e.g., Phillips et al., 1998; Russell & Hill, 
2001; Williams & Happé, 2010). This study presented a battery of intention tasks that 
provided a novel paradigm to examine HFA children’s judgments of intentions in others. 
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Four tasks adapted from Schult (2002, Study 1) examined the ability to distinguish 
between desires and intentions. Three tasks used in Baird and Moses (2001, Study 4) 
explored the ability to understand that different intentions may be used to carry out one-
and-the-same action.  
 Preliminary analyses were conducted to determine if there were any effects of 
story, story order, or condition order. For the HFA group, there were no effects in either 
intention measure of story, story order, or condition order, with one exception: 
McNemar’s chi-square test found a significant difference for the HFA children between 
the two desire questions for the male/female versions of the intention-unfulfilled, desire-
unsatisfied condition (χ2(1, = 10.75, p < .01) (see Chapter 3: Methods for a full 
description and Appendix C for task examples). However, this difference is not 
meaningful for the questions this study addresses given the following: HFA participants 
performed poorly on both desire questions—Eighteen (51%) HFA participants correctly 
answered the desire question in the female story while 22 (63%) answered the desire 
question correctly in the male story, and neither response proportions were above chance. 
More importantly though, this was the only case for either group in which four out of the 
thirty-five responses differed between the male and female intention questions for any 
one condition and the male and female desire questions for any one condition. That is—
no significant differences were found within the target or control groups, between any of 
the other desire questions or intention questions for any of the male-female stories across 
the other three conditions. Therefore, this factor was not included in the main analyses. 
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For the TD group there were no effects in either intention measure of story, story order, 
or condition order. 
 Intention-Desire Distinction Measure. This study was concerned with two 
overarching questions for the intention-desire distinction measure: 1) whether there was 
variation between groups (a) across the four tasks, (b) between the concordant and 
discordant story types, (c) at the task level within each story type, and (d) at the level of 
question type; and 2) whether there was variation within each group between the two 
question types for each of the story types.  
 To examine overall performance between the groups across the four tasks, a 2 
(group) X 4 (task) repeated measures ANOVA was performed, modeling group as the 
between-subjects factor and task (i.e., combined intention and desire question) as the 
within-group factor, and the interaction between the two (see Table 18 for overall 
performance by group for all four tasks). There was a main effect of group (F(1, 68) = 
16.37, p < .001) and task (F(2.25, 152.85) = 30.43, p < .001), and the interaction of group 
and condition (F(2.25, 152. 85) = 3.07, p < .05). 
 Between group performance on the two concordant (both intention and desire do 
or do not come about) and two discordant (either the intention or the desire comes about 
but not both) story types was also of interest. A 2 (group) X 2 (task: concordant vs. 
discordant) repeated measures ANOVA revealed an effect of group (F(1, 68) = 46.73, p < 
.001), indicating there was a difference between the groups on the concordant and 
discordant story types. One-way ANOVAs for group were then used to analyze collapsed 
113 
 
scores for the intention and desire question across the two concordant tasks and the two 
discordant tasks. The groups were found to significantly differ on the concordant story 
types (F(1, 68) = 10.49, p < .01) and on the discordant story types (F(1, 68) = 9.34, p < 
.01), indicating that HFA children performed worse than on the TD children overall for 
each story type. 
 To determine differences at the task level, group interaction by condition was 
decomposed using independent samples t-tests with a Bonferroni correction at p < .025 
(the Bonferroni-adjusted two-tailed t test significance value was calculated by dividing 
the threshold value of .05 by the number of comparisons (2), resulting in an adjusted 
threshold of significant group differences of p < .025). HFA children’s score for the 
intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition was significantly lower than the TD 
group (t(68) = 3.10, p < .01). There was also significant variation between groups with 
the HFA group being outperformed by TD controls on scores for both the intention-
unfulfilled/desire-satisfied condition (t(68) = 1.99, p < .05, unadjusted) and the intention-
fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition (t(68) = 2.10, p < .05, unadjusted). There were no 
differences for the intention-fulfilled/desire-satisfied condition.  
 Table 18 shows pass rates for the intention question and the desire question by 
group and story type. The number of correct or “yes” responses was summed separately 
for the intention question and for the desire question for each task (range = 0-2). A 2 
(group) x 4 (task) repeated measures ANOVA on the intention question revealed a 
significant main effect of task (F(1.99, 135) =  33.17, p < .001) and group (F(1, 68) = 
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7.02, p = .01). For the desire question, a 2 (group) x 4 (task) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of task (F(2, 137.5) = 27.21, p < .001) and group (F(1, 68) = 
14.18, p < .001).  
 
 
 Thus far, analyses have examined whether there was variation between the two 
groups on overall task performance, as well as performance on the intention question and 
the desire question. These analyses provide information about group response patterns 
across the four conditions for the intention and desire questions separately. However, it is 
also essential to explore the response patterns within each group between the intention 
questions and the desire questions for the concordant and discordant story types.  
 For both groups, one-way ANOVAs with question (plan versus want) as a 
repeated measures factor was computed to determine whether there was variation in 
performance between the number of correct responses to the intention question and to the 
Table 18.
Intention-Desire Distinction Task Performance, Pass Rates by Group and Condition
Condition
Intention Desire Intention Desire Intention Desire
I+D+   .93*  .90*   .97* .97* 1.00 1.00
I-D- .44 .57   .71* .87* .86 .97
I-D+ .21   .93* .31 1.00* .50 .92
I+D- .63 .46 .59 .70* .61 .75
Note. Asterisks (*) indicate above-chance (50%) performance. I+D+, intention-fulfilled/desire-
satisfied; I-D-, intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied; I-D+, intention-unfulfilled/desire-
satisfied, and I+D-, intention-fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied . 
HFA TD
Schult (Study 1, 4-
year-olds, 2002)
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desire question for the concordant stories. Analyses revealed a significant effect for the 
intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied story for the HFA children (F(2, 32) = 7.36, p < 
.01) and TD children (F(2, 32) = 6.70, p < .05). There were no differences in either group 
for the intention-fulfilled/desire-satisfied condition.   
 For the discordant stories, analyses revealed a significant effect for the intention-
unfulfilled/desire-satisfied condition for the HFA children (F(1, 34) = 62.96, p < .001) 
and TD children (F(1, 34) = 111.96, p < .001). There were no differences in either group 
for the intention-fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition. The pattern of performance within 
each group is similar for the concordant and discordant story types. However, it is 
important to recall that the TD group performed significantly above chance on both the 
intention question and desire question in the intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied 
condition. Moreover, the TD group’s performance on the desire question for both the 
intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition and the intention-fulfilled/desire-
unsatisfied story parallels the performance observed in Schult’s (2002) 4-and 5-year-old 
groups who also performed above chance on the desire question for both conditions. 
 Unlike the 4-year-olds observed in Schult’s (2002) study and the TD controls in 
this study, the HFA participants performed poorly (below chance) on the desire question 
for both the concordant and discordant story type in which the desire was not satisfied. 
This response pattern deviates from the similar pattern observed between the TD children 
in this study and Schult’s (2002) 4- and 5-year-old groups in which children performed 
well above chance on the desire question across all four tasks. These findings are 
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interesting given that they provide novel information about HFA children’s 
understanding of the intention-desire distinction in others. The 4- and 5-year-old groups 
in Schult’s (2002) sample, as well as both HFA and TD groups in the current study 
struggled with the intention question in the discordant stories. However, only the HFA 
children also struggled with the desire question for the same type of concordant and 
discordant story—viz., stories in which the desire did not come about. 
 The difference between the two groups in their respective response patterns to the 
intention question and the desire question in the concordant and discordant story types is 
also worth noting. In contrast to Schult’s (2002) findings that 4- and 5-year-old children 
answered the intention question and the desire question differently for both the discordant 
story types, the HFA children in this study did not. And unlike the HFA children, it was 
also the case that the responses to the two questions were not different for the concordant 
stories for the two age groups in Schult’s (2002) sample. 
 Two Intentions-Identical Actions Measure. Performance on the two intentions-
identical actions measure can be seen in Table 19. Pass rates are shown by group and 
condition. Consistent with Baird and Moses (2001, Study 4), participants correctly 
answering the first intention question of each story was ensured because if they answered 
it incorrectly they were reminded of the character’s intention and desire for that story and 
then the intention question was asked again (see Appendix D for an example of this task). 
Therefore, a child scored one point for each correct answer on the second intention 
question of each story. Scores ranged from 0 to 2 in each condition. 
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 The two questions that are of primary interest to this measure are whether there 
was variation between the groups across the three conditions and how each group 
performed on the intention questions for each condition. Between-group performance 
across the conditions was examined in a 2 (group) X 2 (story: story 1 vs. story 2) X 3 
(condition: Same-Different vs. Different-Different vs. Same-Same) repeated measures 
ANOVA modeling group as the between-subjects factor, story and condition as the 
within-group factors, and the interaction between the two. Analyses revealed main effects 
of group (F(1, 68) = 12.98, p < .001) and condition (F(2, 67) = 7.98, p < .001). HFA 
children performed significantly worse than TD children in the same action–different 
intention condition (t(68) = 2.50, p =.01, Bonferroni-adjusted) and in the different action–
Table 19.
Two Intentions-Identical Actions Task Performance, Pass Rates by Group and Condition
Condition HFA TD
Same Action- 0.73* 0.89*
Different Intention
Different Action- 0.87* 0.97*
Different Intention                  
Same Action- 0.70* 0.83*
Same Intention                        
Note. Asterisks (*) indicate above-chance (50%) performance
Baird & Moses 
(Study 4, 2001)
0.63
0.92
0.81
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different intention condition (t(68) = 2.12, p < .05, unadjusted), but not significantly 
different in the same action–same intention condition p > .10.  
 Within group performance on this measure was also examined. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed that the HFA participants performed significantly worse in the same 
action-same intention condition than in the different action-different intention condition 
(F(1, 34) = 4.39, p < .05), but not in the same action-different intention condition. The 
HFA group also performed significantly worse in the same action-different condition 
than in the different action- different condition (F(1, 34) = 6.42, p < .05). For the TD 
group, a one-way ANOVA revealed that children performed significantly worse in the 
same action-same intention condition than in the different action-different intention 
condition (F(1, 34) = 5.67, p < .05), but not in the same action-different intention (p < 
.40). As well, they performed significantly worse in the same action-different condition 
than in the different action- different condition (F(1, 34) = 3.90, p < .05). Although there 
was variation within each group across the conditions, both groups performed 
significantly above chance on all three conditions. This suggests that HFA children and 
TD children were able to distinguish between the intentions in these stories and the 
actions they brought about. 
 The findings for our group of TD children are inconsistent from the results 
observed by Baird and Moses (2001, Study 4) who found that 4-year-olds performed 
significantly better on both the same action-same intention condition and the different 
action-different intention condition than the same action-different intention condition. 
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The sample in Baird and Moses (2001) also did not perform above chance on the latter 
condition, but did perform above chance on the two former conditions. Compared to the 
performance from their sample of 4-year-olds, the performance of the TD children in the 
current study was both expected and unexpected. It was not surprising that the TD 
children with a mean age of 72 months performed better than a sample of TD children 
with a mean age of 53 months (Baird & Moses, Study 4). However, it was somewhat 
surprising that despite the 1.5 year difference between the mean age of these two groups, 
and that this study’s population was the older sample, the TD children’s performance in 
our study on the same action-same intention condition and the same action-different 
intention condition was approximately the same. Further, the children’s performance in 
the original study on the same action-same intention condition and the TD children’s 
performance in this study were strikingly similar (81% versus 83% correct, respectively). 
 The HFA children’s performance on this measure, though, was of central interest. 
The findings indicate that the HFA children in this sample were able to differentiate 
successfully between actions and intentions across all possible combinations of two 
stories in which two actions that are brought about by two intentions are the same or 
different (see Chapter 5: Discussion for a detailed treatment of these results). 
 
 Exploratory Data. Exploratory data was collected on the last ten participants in 
the HFA group and on all TD controls. The reason exploratory work was conducted 
partway through data collection for the HFA children was based on the observation that 
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about 80% of the first 16 HFA children tested responded correctly to the embedded 
teaching task test question. Preliminary analyses indicated that the proportion of correct 
answers on this task was significantly above chance (p < .05). The correct answer was 
“teach”; the incorrect answer was “play”. Given the near chance performance on other 
tasks that have been found to be easier in TD populations, such as the successful teaching 
task and the ‘who should be taught’ task, the pattern of performance seemed rather 
peculiar and worth investigating.  
 We speculated that this performance could have been attributed to a ‘Teach bias’ 
(i.e., the children were simply saying “teach” as form of ‘yes bias’ rather than to indicate 
an understanding of the intentions of the teacher in the context of a game). In light of this 
observation, an embedded teaching control task was constructed and tested on the 
remaining final 15 HFA children and on all 35 TD controls (see Appendix E for an 
example of all exploratory tasks). The control task required the correct answer to be 
“play”. It was hypothesized that if HFA children were falsely getting the embedded 
teaching task question correct, then good/poor performance on this task might provide 
some evidence to the claim that they were either exhibiting a “Teach bias” (poor 
performance) or that they were not exhibiting a “Teach bias” (good performance). What’s 
more, if the remaining 15 HFA children performed well on the embedded teaching 
control task, and the trend in the results remained in a larger sample, then it would lend 
supportive evidence that they did in fact appreciate the intention in an ambiguous 
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situation. Performance on the task by the TD group was also thought to provide 
additional support for or against the use of this task as a control.    
 In addition to the embedded teaching control task, exploratory controls for the 
overestimate-learner and overestimate-self were also designed and tested. We decided to 
include these two tasks as a matter of convenience (i.e., since we were already testing one 
task at the end, we thought to as well test a few others) and for pure exploratory purposes. 
Similar to the embedded teaching task control, these two control items presented the 
opposite outcome to the original task as the correct answer, (e.g., in the underestimate-
learner task, the correct answer is “Not try to teach”). All three measures were 
randomized and question order was counterbalanced. Both groups were given the 
exploratory set after all four measures had been tested (i.e., at the end of the second visit). 
Table 20 shows performance by group on each of the understanding of teaching 
exploratory control tasks. Both HFA and TD children performed well on the 
underestimate-learner control task (67% and 74%, respectively). The HFA group, though, 
performed at floor on the underestimate-self task and poorly on the embedded teaching 
control task (13%). TD children also performed poorly and below chance on these tasks 
(14% and 40%, respectively). 
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 HFA children did not perform above chance levels (57%) on the embedded 
teaching task (see Table 15) and the HFA group also performed poorly on the embedded 
teaching control task (13%). Should the trend observed here hold in a larger sample of 
HFA children that uses a balanced design, then the implications of these results suggest 
that HFA children found the embedded teaching task slightly easier than its control and 
that this may have been due to the fact that “Teach” was not the correct answer in latter 
task. 
 The HFA children’s poor performance on the other two tasks is also of note. The 
floor performance on the underestimate-self exploratory task stands in stark contrast to 
the group’s overall performance on the original overestimate-self task (51%, see Table 6). 
However, there were differences between the over-and underestimate-self tasks which 
could have accounted for the at floor performance. The underestimate-self task involved 
an additional character and additional content. This difference could have overwhelmed 
participants and simply been too complex of a story to follow to solve the task. It also 
Table 20.
Exploratory Understanding of Teaching Items Pass Rates by Group 
HFA TD
Underestimate-Self (Control) 0.00 0.14
Underestimate-Learner (Control) 0.67   0.74*
Embedded Teaching (Control) 0.13 0.40
Note. N (HFA ) = 10; N (TD) = 35
Asterisks (*) indicate above-chance (50%) performance. 
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could have been more difficult to conceptualize someone underestimating their own 
knowledge (i.e., thinking they do not know something that they in fact do know). It is 
also worth highlighting that the  HFA group’s pass rate on the underestimate-learner 
(67%) was greater than the entire sample’s pass rate on the overestimate-learner (17%). 
Should these trends be upheld with the same caveats described above, then these findings 
would lend evidence to the idea that HFA children struggle with teaching tasks that 
require an appreciation of an awareness of the knowledge difference between teacher and 
learner. 
 The TD group’s performance across the three tasks was of interest as well. As a 
result of the poor performance on the embedded teaching task, the underestimate-self 
task, and the overestimate-learner task, expected frequencies were not sufficient for chi 
square analyses to examine within group differences for each of these tasks and the 
embedded teaching control task, the overestimate-self task, and the underestimate-learner 
task, respectively. However, the pass rates between each of the three sets of task 
comparisons show several stark differences. TD children performed well above chance 
on the embedded teaching task (86%) and the underestimate-learner (74%) task whereas 
they performed below chance on the embedded teaching control task (40%) and the 
overestimate-learner (29%) task. Although TDs performed below chance on both of the 
over/underestimate-self task, there was a qualitatively large difference between 
performance on the two tasks—the group performed slightly below above chance on the 
overestimate-self task (60%) whereas they performed near floor on the underestimate-self 
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task (14%). Similar to the reasoning for the HFA group on this task, the complexity of the 
underestimate-self task could be the reason the TD group also performed more poorly on 
this task compared to their performance on the overestimate-self task.   
 The descriptive differences seen in these data between the TD group’s 
performance on the original versus control embedded teaching tasks, the over- versus 
underestimate-learner tasks and the over- versus underestimate-self tasks is interesting. 
The observed patterns very well may be informative and provide further insight to young 
TD children’s understanding of teaching. However, the age range, and design confounds 
would all have to be controlled for in order to infer meaningful outcomes from the data.  
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CHAPTER 5: Discussion 
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 This study investigated the understanding of teaching in high functioning children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFA). Specifically, the aim of the study was to examine 
whether HFA children were delayed or impaired in their understanding of the concept of 
teaching compared to typically developing (TD) children individually matched on verbal 
ability. Our results indicate that HFA children are delayed in their understanding of the 
concept of teaching. Compared to TD children, HFA children are also delayed in theory 
of mind understanding and the understanding of particular intentions-in-action in others. 
Our results also suggest that HFA children’s understanding of particular intentions-in-
action is not only delayed, but also differs from TD children’s understanding of 
intentions-in-action.  
 In the following chapter, we discuss key findings and implications for each of the 
socio-cognitive measures. This follows with a discussion of the limitations of our study 
and future directions. The chapter concludes with the implications the current project has 
for studying and improving the ability of a child with HFA to learn from others. 
 
 
Understanding of Teaching in HFA Children 
 
 The current study is unique as it is the first of its kind to examine the 
understanding of teaching in HFA children. Our results confirmed our expectations for 
Research Question 1 that the understanding of teaching is delayed in children with HFA. 
Specifically, our data indicate that HFA children are delayed in understanding the two 
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pillars that support the concept of teaching: 1) the awareness of a knowledge difference 
between teaching and learner; and 2) that teaching is an intentional activity. 
 For our study, HFA children were given a seven-item understanding of teaching 
battery of tasks. They responded at or below chance on six out of the seven tasks (see 
Table 6). The one item they performed reasonably well on (i.e., significantly above 
chance) was the failed teaching task, with a pass rate of 69%. In contrast, the TD matched 
controls outperformed their HFA counterparts and were well above chance on four out of 
the seven tasks. The three tasks that TD children performed poorly on are the same three 
tasks that previous studies have found to be the most difficult for similarly aged TD 
children (e.g., Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv, Solomon, & Frye, 2008). Taken 
together, this overall finding suggests that HFA children with an average VMA of 6 
years, 0 months (6;0) and CA of 7 years, 9 months (7;9) are delayed in the understanding 
of the concept of teaching compared to TD children with the same average VMA (6;0) 
and younger CA (6;1). 
 
 Pillar I. Knowledge Difference. The first major conclusion of our study is that 
HFA children do not appreciate that teaching requires a knowledge difference between 
teacher and learner. In other words,  this aspect in the understanding of teaching is 
developmentally delayed in HFA children compared to younger TD children with the 
same verbal ability. Previous research has not directly investigated the understanding of 
teaching in HFA children. Therefore, direct comparisons between our sample of HFA 
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children and the literature are not possible. However, previous research has provided 
evidence that lends indirect support to our findings on the knowledge-difference based 
teaching tasks. A wide range of studies using various false belief paradigms have 
demonstrated that HFA children are not above chance at passing false belief tasks until 
they have an average estimated VMA of 9;2 (Happé, 1995). Consistent with this general 
finding, we also observed a group of HFA children with an average estimated VMA 
younger than 9;2 whose performance fell below chance at passing a standard false belief 
task (29% pass). 
 Performance on false belief tasks in TD children has been found to relate to 
performance on the overestimate-self and overestimate-learner teaching tasks (Ziv & 
Frye, 2004). Success on the overestimate-self and the overestimate-learner tasks in the 
teaching battery requires an appreciation of the awareness by the teacher, whether true or 
false, of a knowledge difference between him/her and learner. Success on these tasks in 
the teaching battery requires recognizing the teacher’s false belief about either his/her 
own knowledge (overestimate-self) or the learner’s knowledge (overestimate-learner) as 
what determines whether teaching will occur. The HFA children in the current study 
performed poorly on the overestimate-self task (51% pass) and the overestimate-learner 
task (17% pass). Poor performance is not likely attributable to confusion about the basic 
story contents as children were near ceiling on the memory checks for each task. 
Although these tasks were not correlated with the false belief task, HFA children’s 
overall performance on the teaching battery did significantly correlate with overall 
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performance on the theory of mind scale. Given the poor performance on the false belief 
task, the overestimate-self task and the overestimate-learner task, as well as the overall 
relation between performance on the teaching battery and theory of mind scale, it is still 
reasonable to suspect that the HFA children’s poor performance on the false belief task, 
plays a role in their lack of success (i.e., below chance) at solving these tasks.  
 Interestingly, the HFA group also performed poorly on the ‘who should be taught’ 
task, a teaching task in which success does not demand an understanding of false belief. 
The ‘who should be taught’ task is designed to test whether children understand that a 
person who has a particular skill (e.g., how to read) will teach a person who does not 
have that skill (does not know how to read) rather than a person who does have that skill 
(knows how to read), when determining whom to teach (Ziv & Frye, 2004). In the 
teaching battery, the story involves an adult teacher who has the option of teaching two 
children how to read, one of whom does not know how read and the other who does 
know how to read. The participant is asked which child knows how to read as a memory 
check and then asked which of the two children will the teacher teach how to read. 
Although nearly all of HFA participants answered the memory question correctly, they 
still failed to respond above chance on the test question (63% pass), which is in contrast 
to the TD controls who performed quite well (91% pass) on the task. A previous cohort 
of TD 3-and 4-year-olds also performed over 90% on a similar version of the task (Ziv & 
Frye, 2004). The HFA children’s poor performance cannot be attributed to the possibility 
of a simple confusion between the two characters’ abilities in the story given the 
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overwhelming majority of correct responses to the memory question. Rather, it may be 
the case that the HFA children’s understanding of teaching relied only on the knowledge 
of the teacher and did not consider the knowledge of the learner. If this was the case, then 
it might explain why they were not above chance in selecting who the teacher will teach. 
This is interesting because HFA children’s inability to recognize that teaching is 
specifically designed to convey knowledge to another who lacks knowledge or possesses 
mistaken information suggests that they may not recognize teaching as a distinct means 
of knowledge acquisition.  
 The previous findings in younger TD children, together with the results observed 
in the current study, suggest that HFA children struggle to appreciate that having a 
knowledge difference between teacher and learner is required for teaching to occur. This 
finding has implications not only for the understanding of the knowledge difference 
aspect of teaching in HFA children, but also for teaching itself in HFA children with a 
VMA of 6;1 or below. If HFA children have not grasped the teacher-learner knowledge 
difference, then this omission may play a role in their understanding of when, and 
possibly how, knowledge is transmitted between people. This lack of understanding 
could impair HFA children’s ability to learn from others. For example, if I do not 
understand that the teacher, who knows the alphabet, is going to teach me because I do 
not know the alphabet, why would I expect him/her to teach me the alphabet? Or I might 
be confused and get bored or even frustrated because I know the alphabet, but I do not 
understand that the teacher who knows the alphabet is going to teach others in my class 
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because they do not know the alphabet, and so I stop attending to the teachers instruction. 
A child with this perspective could be missing out on situations in which learning skills 
develop. The result also warrants future research to be conducted with a larger sample of 
two groups of HFA children—one with the approximate age of the children in the current 
study and another, slightly older group, to determine whether children with HFA are 
delayed and have not arrived developmentally at being able to solve this task, or whether 
there is a deeper lasting impairment in their understanding of this component of teaching. 
 HFA children struggle to appreciate the basic teacher-learner knowledge 
difference. Therefore, it is unsurprising that compared to the ‘who should be taught’ task, 
pass rates were lower on the knowledge-based teaching tasks that not only required an 
understanding of this knowledge difference but also that it is the awareness of the 
difference that determines whether teaching will occur. This result is also important 
because it further supports the conclusion that HFA children do not recognize teaching as 
a specific means of knowledge acquisition. Given the poor performance on these two 
teaching tasks, additional studies should be conducted with a sample of HFA children 
whose VMA approximates the age at which they tend to pass false belief tasks (i.e., 9;2, 
see above). Since HFA children at this verbal age are known to pass false belief tasks, 
then they also might appreciate that the awareness of a knowledge difference matters 
when determining whether teaching will occur. 
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 Relation between the Understanding of Teaching and Theory of Mind in HFA 
Children. Our study is the first to examine the relation between the understanding of 
teaching and theory of mind in HFA children. Our results confirmed our prediction for 
Research Question 2 that the understanding of teaching is related to theory of mind in 
children with HFA. We were interested in learning whether the understanding of teaching 
is related concurrently to overall theory of mind, or to specific mental state attribution 
understanding in HFA children. Our data established that HFA children’s understanding 
of teaching is concurrently related to their theory of mind understanding. Specifically, 
HFA children’s overall performance on the teaching tasks significantly correlated with 
their overall performance on the theory of mind tasks. There were few relations between 
performance on the individual teaching tasks and each of the theory of mind tasks. 
However, the relatively few associations observed for the HFA children between the 
teaching tasks and theory of mind tasks can be accounted for by the limited variability in 
the group’s high and low performance on the majority of items.  
 Our interest, though, is that overall performance on the understanding of teaching 
battery is associated with the overall performance on the theory of mind scale in HFA 
children. Although we cannot determine the direction of effects between these two 
measures, we now have evidence indicating that they are related in this population as 
they are in typically developing children. Moreover, the relation suggests that there is a 
conceptual overlap between the understanding of teaching and theory of mind in HFA 
children. This connection has broad implications for the understanding of teaching in 
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HFA children given that theory of mind impairments are a core characteristic of autism. 
Future work should examine the relation we observed between the understanding of 
teaching and theory of mind. Additional testing of each measure in an experimental 
design would allow us to examine further the role that theory of mind development plays 
in understanding the role of knowledge attribution in teaching understanding in HFA 
children. 
 
 Pillar II. Intention. Our results indicate that HFA children struggle to understand 
that teaching is an intentional activity. Specifically, HFA children did not perform above 
chance on three of the four intention-based teaching tasks when TD controls did perform 
above chance on three of the four intention-based teaching tasks. Interestingly, the HFA 
children did respond at above chance levels to one of the intention based teaching items, 
the failed teaching task (69%, see above). 
 A dearth of evidence exists in the literature for drawing comparisons to our 
observation that HFA children’s understanding of the intentional component of teaching 
is impaired. And as reviewed in Chapter 2, findings from the existing research on 
intention understanding in HFA children are inconsistent (e.g., Phillips et al., 1998; 
Russell & Hill, 2001; Williams & Happé, 2010). However, previous studies have 
examined TD children’s understanding that teaching is an intentional activity (Frye & 
Ziv, 2005; Woodburn, 2008; Ziv et al., 2008). Therefore, the only comparisons available 
to the current study derive either from conflicting findings with HFA children, or from 
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consistent findings with typical children. Although neither of these comparisons is ideal, 
we have chosen to focus our discussion on the previous work on the intention based 
component of teaching in TD children because it is free from methodological confounds 
and can be directly related to our findings in HFA children. 
 Our results are based on four intention-in-teaching tasks also used by Ziv et al., 
(2008). In our study, HFA children’s pass rate was slightly lower on the successful 
teaching task (63%) than the failed teaching task (69%) and was below chance on the 
embedded teaching task (57%) and the observational learning task (34%). In contrast, Ziv 
et al. (2008) found that TD 5-year-olds significantly outperformed their younger 
counterparts (3- and 4-year-olds) on a failed teaching task, an embedded teaching task, 
and an observational learning task. However, all three age groups performed quite well 
(i.e., near ceiling) on a successful teaching task (Ziv et al., 2008). 
 The failed teaching task is designed to investigate children’s understanding of 
intention when the outcome in an attempt to teach is that the learner fails to acquire new 
knowledge/skill (Frye & Ziv, 2005; Ziv et al., 2008). In the task, a teacher tries to teach a 
student how to perform a new skill (e.g., tie a shoe). However, after several attempts the 
learner still does not know how to perform the new skill (tie a shoe). If children recognize 
that the attempt to teach is an intentional action, regardless of the outcome (i.e., whether 
or not the learner successfully learns to tie a shoe), then they will correctly state that the 
teacher tried to teach. In our study, 69% of the HFA children correctly answered this test 
question, a pass rate that is significantly above chance. Taken out of context from the rest 
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of the battery of tasks, this finding suggests that HFA children appreciate that the 
intentionality of teaching is based on the attempt to teach, rather than the success of the 
outcome in teaching. However, since HFA children failed to perform above chance on 
the three other intention-based teaching tasks it is worth giving pause to such a 
conclusion. 
 HFA children’s performance on the successful teaching task (63%) was trending 
towards responding significantly above chance (p = .06). However, they did perform at 
chance on this task, suggesting that they may not have arrived developmentally at being 
able to solve this task. This is interesting because 3- and 4-year-old TD children have 
been found to perform quite well on this task (Woodburn, 2008; Ziv et al., 2008). 
Developmentally, this task represents one of the initial tasks children comprehend (i.e., 
one that is reliably passed before most others) within the seven-item understanding of 
teaching battery as evidenced by TD children’s high level of performance as early as age 
3 (Ziv et al., 2008). In our study, the difference between the failed teaching task and the 
successful teaching task was not significant and pass rates were approximately the same. 
The close proximity in pass rates between these two tasks amounts to a difference of two 
or three respondents answering correctly for the failed teaching task and incorrectly for 
the successful teaching task. One interpretation of these data is that chance alone could 
account for the observed pattern. 
 However, there is an alternative and possibly richer account for this difference. 
Looking at individual differences, we see that two HFA children performed at floor on 
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the teaching battery (see Table 2). If these two children are eliminated as outliers when 
examining pass rates on the teaching tasks, then the HFA group’s overall pass rate not 
only increases for failed teaching, but also, and more importantly, for the successful 
teaching task. The increase drives performance to a level that is significantly above 
chance, which suggests that these two children alone may be negatively skewing the HFA 
groups’ overall level of performance on the successful teaching task. Further bolstering 
this claim is the fact that the HFA group’s pass rate on the ‘who should be taught’ task is 
equal to the successful teaching task. ‘Who should be taught’ rounds out the trio of tasks 
that TD children developmentally are able to solve reliably at an earlier age (3 years) than 
the other four tasks, indicating that these items represent the least difficult tasks in the 
teaching battery (Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2008). The same pattern 
for the ‘who should be taught’ task occurs when discarding the two floor performances 
on the teaching battery, which also brings the HFA group’s overall performance on this 
task to above chance levels.  
 Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that the HFA sample’s above chance 
performance on the failed teaching task is a valid indicator of their ability to solve this 
task. This heterogeneity is also interesting because the two HFA children did not perform 
at floor on any of the other measures indicating that they were not outliers for the entire 
study. To determine whether the variability we observed here is something particular 1) 
to the actual teaching tasks, 2) to a diagnostic subset of HFA children we have not 
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identified, or 3) simply random variation, requires additional research with a larger 
sample of HFA children of similar verbal ability. 
 In contrast, all HFA participants struggled with the embedded teaching task and 
the observational learning task, the other two intention-based teaching tasks. In the 
embedded teaching task, the instructor has the intention to teach, but the instructional 
activity is embedded in a game. The intention to teach is ambiguous because in the task, 
the teacher does not explicitly state what s/he is trying to do. Participants are asked 
whether the teacher is using the activity to play or to teach. Our HFA sample did not 
perform above chance on this task (57%). Poor performance could be attributed to 
excessive task demands because this item is the only task in the teaching battery that 
involves more than three characters and teaching to more than one person. For example, 
if the HFA children failed to appreciate that one can teach more than one person at any 
given time,  then this may have confounded their ability to recognize embedded teaching 
in a game. 
 Additional evidence supporting HFA children’s poor performance on the 
embedded teaching task is found in their performance on the embedded teaching control 
task, one of exploratory data items tested. Only 15 HFA participants were tested, but 
nearly all of them failed to answer the test question correctly (13%). Recall that the 
correct answer to this task is “Play” as opposed to “Teach” in the original task. The aim 
was to explore whether HFA children were erroneously getting the embedded teaching 
task question correct as a result of the fact that “Teach” may have been thought to be the 
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correct answer regardless of story content. If these results hold in an independent sample 
of HFA children that uses a balanced design and if there is a difference found between 
performance on the two tasks, then the implications of their poor performance would 
suggest that the HFA children found the original embedded teaching task easier than its 
control. This, then, may have been due to the fact that “Teach’ was not the correct answer 
in latter task. It is unlikely that the poor performance was due to confusion about the task, 
because, similar to the embedded teaching task, nearly all of the participants answered 
the memory question correctly in the embedded teaching control task. However, poor 
performance certainly could have been due to characteristics of the story itself. This is 
also possible given the poor performance by the TD children on this task and the fact that 
they performed well above chance on the original task (87%) and below chance on the 
control task (40%). The design confounds, though, would have to be controlled for in 
order to infer valid outcomes from the data. 
 However, our HFA group also performed poorly on the observational learning 
task, which involves only two characters, with a pass rate that was lower than the 
embedded teaching task (57% vs. 34%, respectively, see Table 6). In the observational 
learning task, a novice imitates an expert performing a skill that s/he does not know how 
to do (e.g., tie a knot). The expert does not see the novice observing him/her. By 
observation, and without the expert’s knowledge, the novice learns the new skill (e.g., 
ties a knot). Therefore, there is no intention to teach by the expert. This task is asking 
children to understand that it is intention that distinguishes teaching from imitation as 
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distinct forms of knowledge acquisition. If children appreciate the distinction, then they 
should recognize that teaching occurs only when someone performs a task with the goal 
of bringing about a knowledge change in another. Our HFA sample failed to understand 
that imitation and teaching are distinct forms of knowledge acquisition.  
 The embedded teaching task and observational learner task examine the 
understanding of intention in teaching in situations where teaching itself is enigmatic. 
The intention to teach is ambiguous in embedded teaching and absent in observational 
learning. HFA children may struggle on the embedded teaching task because they fail to 
recognize that teaching is intentional even when the teaching act is opaque. Taken 
together, our major finding for the intention-in-teaching tasks is that HFA children seem 
to recognize, albeit tenuously, intention in teaching when teaching is evident 
(successful/failed teaching), but do not appreciate the importance of intention when 
teaching is veiled (embedded in a game) or nonexistent (observational learning). 
 This conclusion has broad implications for HFA children’s ability to engage in 
and understand intentional teaching activities, particularly in situations where the activity 
of teaching is hidden in a game. If children with HFA struggle to appreciate that a teacher 
is engaging in an activity with them in order to teach them something, then those children 
may be missing out on valuable teaching experiences. Future research should delve more 
deeply into HFA children’s understanding of intention in teaching to determine whether 
the overall pattern we observed here is upheld. Performance on successful and failed 
teaching tasks also warrants additional work that looks at the basic understanding in HFA 
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children between an agent’s intention and the outcome of the agent’s action for learning 
in another. This could be done by presenting intention-based teaching tasks to different 
age groups. Studies should incorporate tasks similar to embedded teaching, but that 
involve a single learner, and teaching tasks such as failed and successful teaching that 
involve more than one learner. This might help to determine whether HFA children 
understand that teaching does not necessarily require a one-to-one ratio between teacher 
and learner. A fundamental approach to teaching toddlers is to use games to make 
teaching more fun, interactive, and engaging. This may do a disservice to HFA children 
because they selectively lose the ability to understand teaching when it is embedded in a 
game. Our study shows that we need to reconsider how we teach HFA children so that 
they can most benefit from those intentional teaching activities. 
 
 Understanding of Teaching in TD Children. So far we have discussed the 
understanding of teaching in our sample of HFA children. It is also important to highlight 
the TD children’s performance on the teaching battery  in our study with respect to 
previous research as a means of verifying that our control population outcomes are 
consistent with the literature.   
 The patterns of performance between the TD group in our study  and Woodburn 
(2008) who presented the same seven-item teaching battery to a group of TD children 
were extremely similar. Overall, the similarities between the two samples suggest that the 
pattern of performance for the TD group in our study replicated a majority of the patterns 
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observed in Woodburn (2008, time two) considering the following corresponding 
findings: 1) a significant correlation between overall performance on the understanding 
of teaching and theory of mind measures was found in both our sample of TD children 
and Woodburn’s sample; 2) our TD participants and the participants in Woodburn’s study 
both performed above chance on the same four teaching tasks (see Table 6); 3) both 
samples found the overestimate-learner task to be the most difficult (i.e., both samples’ 
pass rates were lowest for this task); and 4) TD children in both studies were not above 
chance on the overestimate-self task. On this last similarity, 60% percent of our TD 
sample passed this task compared to 25% of the children in the Woodburn (2008) study. 
Based on previous findings, this task is considered to be one of the most difficult tasks in 
the battery (Woodburn, 2008; Ziv & Frye, 2008). However, although neither sample’s 
pass rate for this item was above chance, our TD group pass rate is considerable higher 
than Woodburn (2008). The differences in pass rates warrant additional investigation to 
determine what may be accounting for the possibility of a distinct outcome. 
 On only one of the seven tasks did our results differ from those found by 
Woodburn (2008). The Woodburn sample performed above chance on the observational 
learning task (65% pass) whereas our TD sample did not (43% pass). However, there is a 
major difference in the study designs that may have implications for comparing the 
findings: the TD participants in our study were individually matched based on their VMA 
with the HFA children. As a result, our TD sample consists of a different age range than 
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Woodburn (3;3 to 7;6 vs. 4;4 to 8;0). We predict that the full year difference on the 
young end is likely to account for the differences seen in the observational learner task.  
 However, it should also be noted that a similar version of the observational 
learning task was presented to a group of TD 5 year-olds with an 80% pass rate (Ziv & 
Frye, 2004). One should be cautious, though, about comparing this finding to our study 
because the group of TD children we tested varied in age from 3;3 to 7;6 as opposed to 
Ziv and Frye who tested children that were approximately the same age within each 
group. This age discrepancy also likely accounts for the differences between the TD 
children in our study and the 5- and 6-year-olds in Ziv et al. (2008) who were given 
similar versions of the overestimate-self task. Additional studies need to be conducted 
that examine the effects that false beliefs about the teacher’s and learner’s own 
knowledge have on teaching to resolve this discrepancy in the literature. 
 
 Relation between the Understanding of Teaching and Intentions-in-Action in TD 
Children. It should also be mentioned that the overall understanding of teaching score 
correlated with one intention-in-action task for our sample of TD children (see Table 13). 
These findings, which provide an answer to Research Question 3, were not surprising 
given the control population’s characteristics. One should be cautious about interpreting 
the lack of associations here to indicate that the understanding of teaching and intentions-
in-actions are not developmentally related in TD children. The overwhelmingly high 
performance on the majority of the teaching tasks, low performance on one of the 
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teaching tasks, and overall good performance on the majority of the intention-in-action 
tasks (see below) could explain the low variability between the tasks and likely accounts 
for the lack of correlations found in TD children. It is also important to remember that 
our sample of TD children was selected as matched individual controls for our HFA 
sample. 
 
 
Theory of Mind 
 
 Theory of Mind in HFA Children. Our sample of HFA children’s theory of mind 
development is delayed compared to matched TD controls. This finding supports 
previous research demonstrating theory of mind delays in children with HFA (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Frith, 1989; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012; 
for reviews, see Baron-Cohen, 2000; Happé, 1995; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & 
Solomonica-Levi, 1998). The group of HFA children in our study performed below 
chance on three of the five mental state understanding tasks in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) 
five-item theory of mind scale. Specifically, HFA participants were successful at solving 
the first two of the scale’s five tasks with response rates at above chance levels (diverse 
desires, 83% and diverse beliefs, 77%, see Table 15). However the group did not perform 
above chance on the remaining three tasks (knowledge access, 57%, false belief, 29% and 
real-apparent emotion, 31%). 
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 Our results confirmed our expectations for Research Question 4 that the pattern 
of theory of mind performance in our HFA participants differed from the pattern of 
theory of mind performance observed in a sample of HFA children by Peterson, 
Wellman, and Liu (2005). The scale used in the current study has been presented to one 
other group of HFA children (Peterson et al., 2005). However, the five tasks have been 
used in conjunction with additional social cognitive tasks (Ames & White, 2011; 
Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007, 2009) and recently, an augmented version of the 
original five-item scale that included a sixth understanding of sarcasm task was also 
presented to a group of HFA children (Peterson et al., 2012).  
 Performance in our sample of HFA children correspond with three of the tasks 
that Peterson and colleagues (2005) found in their original study and with four tasks in 
the follow-up six-item (2012) scale. Across all three studies, HFA participants succeeded 
at solving the diverse desires task and the diverse beliefs task, and did not succeed (below 
chance) on the false belief task. However, the HFA group in our study was also not above 
chance on the knowledge access task or real-apparent, or ‘hidden’, emotions task. This 
contrasts with the HFA group in Peterson et al. (2005) who performed above chance on 
the knowledge access task, and the HFA group in Peterson et al. (2012) who were also 
above chance on this task, but not on the hidden emotions task. 
 Looking at the three studies, a general pattern appears for the five items: 
successful performance on the first two tasks and unsuccessful performance on the last 
two tasks. Peterson and colleagues (2005, 2012) do have slightly contrasting pass rates 
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for HFA children’s performance on the hidden emotions tasks between their two studies, 
(64% and 52%, respectively). However, the follow-up study involves a larger sample 
size, resulting in a lower overall pass rate which hints at a trend towards HFA children 
performing at, rather than above, chance on this task (Peterson et al., 2012). Additional 
research is required to determine whether HFA children of a similar age with similar 
verbal abilities are performing at or above chance on the hidden emotions task.  
 The divergence in findings is informative because the average VMA of the HFA 
children was 94 months in Peterson and colleagues’ two studies (2005, 2012). This 
average verbal age is nearly two full years older than the average VMA of the HFA 
children in the current study (72 months). The age difference is significant given research 
that shows that HFA children with an average VMA of 88 months (Leslie & Frith, 1998) 
and 81 months (Lind & Bowler, 2010) are not above chance on passing ‘limited 
knowledge’ tasks. These tasks have been used to test HFA children’s understanding of 
the “seeing-leads-to-knowing” principle (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994). 
Consistent with the seeing-leads-to-knowing literature, our finding further supports the 
suggestion that HFA children with a VMA of 72 months are not developmentally far 
enough along to appreciate this principle, and therefore are unable to reliably solve the 
knowledge access task. Moreover, our result, together with the results from Peterson et 
al. (2005, 2012) suggests that the period in which HFA children transition from failing to 
passing this type of task may occur between developing a verbal ability of approximately 
72 and 94 months. 
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 Additional evidence for a lack of understanding this principle in our HFA sample 
may be their poor performance on the observational learning task. As discussed above, 
HFA children may struggle to distinguish between teaching and imitation as a means of 
acquiring knowledge when the intention to teach does not occur. However, if these 
children also have not developed an understanding that “seeing leads to knowing”, then 
this may affect their understanding that an expert is nevertheless “trying to teach” a 
novice how to perform a skill, despite the fact that the expert does not see the novice or 
know that the novice is imitating them. It is important to note that our results from the 
observational learning task did not correlate with the knowledge access task, which could 
simply have been due to the low variability in the HFA group’s performance on the 
observational learner task. Either way, poor performance by the HFA children on the 
knowledge access task and observational learning task warrants further investigation to 
determine whether an understanding of one plays a role in the understanding of the other 
in HFA children. 
 Based on these data, we would hypothesize that the VMA range of 70-90 months 
marks the verbal ability age range at which HFA children develop an understanding of 
the seeing-leads-to-knowing principle. Establishing whether this verbal age range does in 
fact mark the ‘seeing leads to knowing’ transition in HFA children should be pursued in 
future longitudinal studies. Confirming this prediction with future studies could provide 
important information to educators about how to select appropriate teaching 
methodologies for HFA children who fall below or are within this ability range.  
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 The aim of Peterson et al.’s (2005) study was to see whether HFA children’s 
sequence of theory of mind development was delayed compared to TD children, and 
whether the sequence followed a similar pattern to TD children. As discussed above, they 
found that HFA children were delayed compared to matched TD controls and the 
response patterns formed a distinct scale from the original Wellman and Liu (2004) five-
item theory of mind scale. In a follow-up study, Peterson and colleagues (2012) 
replicated their findings in HFA children and added an additional sixth item to the scale. 
The pattern of pass rates for the first three tasks (diverse desires, diverse beliefs, and 
knowledge access) across all three studies is similar. All three groups had pass rates for 
the first two tasks that were higher than each group’s respective rate for the third task. In 
our study, the similar response pattern up through the knowledge access task suggests 
that our sample was also following a similar developmental sequence.  
 However, in contrast to the findings in both Peterson et al.’s (2005, 2012) studies 
for HFA children’s response patterns on the five-item scale, the HFA children in our 
study presented a different response pattern to the last two tasks by performing equally 
poorly on both the false belief task and the hidden emotion task. As a result, the overall 
response pattern we found did not form a reliable scale. As noted above, HFA children’s 
performance on the hidden emotions task in the current study deviates from both samples 
of HFA children in Peterson et al. (2005, 2012). Given that our HFA groups’ pass rate on 
this task and the false belief task is approximately the same (31% and 29%, respectively), 
it is understandable that the sample does not form a reliable scale of the five-item battery.  
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 It is likely that the significant difference between our sample of HFA children and 
the two groups used in Peterson et al. (2005, 2012) is the age difference between our 
study population and theirs. As noted above, the average VMA in both of Peterson et al.’s 
two samples is nearly two full years older than the average VMA in our sample of HFA 
children. Moreover, the age range in Peterson et al. (2005) is significantly larger than our 
sample (see Table 15) (age ranges are not available in Peterson et al., 2012). Therefore, it 
is possible that verbal ability and age differences account for the discrepancy between our 
findings and Peterson et al. (2005; 2012). Given our younger sample of HFA children, it 
is also possible that the reason they did not show a difference between the false belief 
task and the hidden emotions task is that they have not developmentally arrived at being 
able to solve these tasks. 
 We claimed that our HFA sample struggled with the knowledge access task on 
account of their overall VMA. If these children perform at chance on a task that has been 
found to be developmentally easier than false belief and hidden emotion understanding in 
both TD and HFA children (e.g., Peterson et al., 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004), then it is 
developmentally reasonable that our sample of HFA children performed worse on these 
two latter tasks than the knowledge access task. Further evidence supporting this 
conclusion is the statistically significant difference between the knowledge access task 
and both the false belief task and the hidden emotions task for our HFA participants. The 
wide age range and small sample size for the HFA group in Peterson et al. (2005), their 
slightly discrepant findings on the hidden emotion task when compared to Peterson et al. 
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(2012), coupled with the poor performance on the false belief and hidden emotion task 
and unreliable scaling in our younger HFA sample, calls for additional research to 
investigate the developmental sequence in HFA children’s theory of mind. Presenting the 
five-item scale to two groups of HFA children, 1) with a restricted age range similar to or 
less than our study, and 2) a VMA slightly older than the children in our sample would 
provide us with a better understanding of the sequence of HFA children’s developing 
theory of mind. The finding from our study that theory of mind abilities, including false 
belief understanding, are delayed in HFA children replicates previous studies and 
supports the well-established literature showing theory of mind delays in children with 
HFA.  
 
 Theory of Mind in TD Children. We now turn to performance on the theory of 
mind scale in our study’s TD control population. Our results are discussed in terms of 
previous research as a means of verifying that our control population outcomes are 
consistent with the literature. Doing so supports our data collection and adds credence to 
our HFA results.           
 The overall response pattern on the theory of mind scale for the TD children in 
our study is consistent with prior research findings that suggest typical preschooler’s 
social cognitive development follows a certain sequence of conceptual achievements 
(Peterson et al, 2005, 2012; Wellman & Liu, 2004, see also Chapter 2: Literature Review 
for a thorough description). TD controls across the five tasks, (1.diverse desires, 2. 
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diverse beliefs, 3. knowledge access, 4. false belief, and 5. hidden emotion) performed at 
ceiling on task 1 (100%), equally well and near ceiling on tasks 2 and 3 (91%), above 
chance on task 4 (66%) but worse than tasks 1-3, and finally below chance on task 5 
(40%) and worse than all four previous tasks (see Table 15). Woodburn (2008, time 2) 
also shows a similar overall response pattern in TD children, although pass rates for tasks 
3 and 4 are slightly different and the children in Woodburn’s sample are not above 
chance on the false belief task. However, these discrepancies do not change the fact that 
the overall response patterns between the two groups is highly similar and that this 
pattern fits the general pattern observed elsewhere in the literature.  
 There is a difference, though, between the theory of mind results in our TD 
sample and previous research. Due to the overall high performance on the first three 
tasks, the five items did not form a reliable scale. This deviation from the literature is 
understandable, however, because our selection of TD controls was based on VMA as 
they were individually matched with our HFA population. For this reason, the TDs 
overall verbal ability (which is approximately equivalent to their CA, see Table 1) 
exceeds the typical age range of children tested in previous studies that find the five-item 
battery forms a reliable scale (Peterson et al, 2005, 2012; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
However, for the purposes of the current study, it was critical that our TD population 
obtained a response pattern similar to previous work that has found the same response 
pattern across these five tasks. Our results indicate that this was the case for our TD 
controls which provides additional support for our HFA results. 
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Understanding Intentions-in-Others 
 
 Confirming our predictions to Research Question 5, HFA children in our study 
are delayed in the understanding of intentions in others compared to TD controls matched 
on verbal ability. Specifically, HFA participants performed the same or worse than their 
TD counterparts on tasks that measure the ability to distinguish desires from intentions, 
and on tasks that measure the ability to recognize that identical actions may be motivated 
by different intentions. 
 Available data are contradictory with regard to HFA children’s understanding of 
intentions in others (e.g., Colombi et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 1998; Russell & Hill, 2001; 
Williams & Happé, 2010; Zalla, et al., 2010). However, these studies investigated HFA 
children’s understanding of failed intentions (Colombi et al., 2009), the ability to predict 
the outcome of a sequence of goal-directed actions (Zalla et al., 2010), or the ability to 
distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions (Phillips et al., 1998; Russell & 
Hill, 2001; Williams & Happé, 2010). Therefore, our study is the first to investigate HFA 
children’s understanding of the following two features that underlie the concept of 
intention: 1) the intention-desire distinction; and 2) that different intentions can be used 
to generate identical (intentional) actions. Results from our study for these two aspects of 
intention-in-action understanding are discussed in turn. 
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 Intention-Desire Distinction Understanding in HFA Children. These response 
patterns in our study suggest that the HFA children do not reliably distinguish between 
desires and intentions. The patterns also suggest that their judgments of desire are 
outcome-based as evidenced by the fact that HFA children can only correctly identify a 
desire when that desire is fulfilled. HFA children’s response pattern to the intention-
desire distinction measure differs from TD controls. For the concordant tasks (i.e., 
controls), HFA participants performed quite well and no different than the TD children 
on either the intention question or the desire question on the intention-fulfilled/desire-
satisfied control task. However, they performed poorly on and significantly worse than 
TD controls on both questions for the intention-unfulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition 
(see Table 18). For the discordant tasks, there were no differences on either question 
between groups for the intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied condition, but the HFA 
children performed differently and worse than TD controls on the intention-
fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition. The HFA children, as did the TD children (see 
below), struggled to recognize an intention when it contrasts with a desire. Both groups 
also appeared to answer the desire question correctly in the two stories when it was 
brought about, but only the HFA children struggled with the desire question when the 
desire was not brought about. 
 We believe that our results suggest that HFA’s judgments about the success of an 
intention or a desire question are based solely on the desire’s outcome. HFA children’s 
use of a “satisfied desire equals satisfied intention and desire” strategy accounts for the 
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response pattern across all four tasks. HFA children responded well above chance on the 
desire question to the two tasks in which the desire was brought about. On one of these 
tasks (intention-fulfilled/desire-satisfied), the intention was also brought about, and on 
the other task (intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied) the intention was not brought about. 
If responses to the intention question and the desire question for these two tasks are based 
on the success of the desire (i.e., if the desire came about then so did the intention), then 
the response pattern would look exactly as was found—overall correct responses to the 
intention question in the control task and incorrect responses to the intention question in 
the target task. This response pattern suggests that the HFA children do not understand 
the distinction between intentions and desires. 
 It is also possible that HFA children are exhibiting a “yes” bias, which might 
affect their overall pattern of performance. The desire and intention questions were 
presented in our study in a forced choice “yes/no” format, in keeping with the original 
study’s procedures. This might account for the difference in performance by HFA 
participants between the two control tasks and their performance on the intention-
unfulfilled/desire-satisfied task. However, if this was the case, then we also should have 
expected them to answer above chance on the intention question in the intention-
fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied condition (which they did not). Of course it remains possible 
that HFA children indeed are displaying a “yes” bias and the poor performance on the 
intention-fulfilled target task question results from random guessing for this one 
particular question. To determine whether HFA children exhibit a “yes” bias on these 
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types of tasks, additional research is required. This could include using a dichotomous 
forced choice answer format that involves acknowledging the fulfillment/unfulfillment of 
the mental state in question instead of a “yes/no” format.  
 The ability to distinguish intentions from desires is an important development in 
young children’s social cognitive growth. If HFA children are not able to recognize the 
difference between intentions and desires, then this could have a dramatic effect on their 
ability to understand and interact with others. Everyday accidents, for example, might be 
misconstrued as intentional sleights if you conflate intentions with desires. Such a 
conflation could ruin an everyday social interaction. Consider the following scenario as 
an example. Sue tells Mark that she intends to bring him a wrapped birthday present even 
though she wants to unwrap it herself.  However, when Sue arrives at the birthday party 
she drops the present by accident and it comes out of its wrapping. Mark, who conflates 
intentions and desires, then gets angry at Sue because he believes that Sue acted on her 
desire to unwrap Mark’s present. This type of conflation could affect HFA children’s 
ability to recognize accidents and may play a role in their ability to develop relationships 
with others. It could also affect their ability to understand and follow classroom 
instruction, considering that a desire to learn a new skill is different from forming the 
intention to learn a skill.  
 A strength of our study is that it represents the first instance in which the 
intention-desire distinction has been examined in HFA children. Therefore, whether HFA 
children develop an understanding of the distinction between intentions and desires at a 
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later (verbal ability-based) age still needs to be explored. An immediate next step might 
be to investigate the same four intention desire outcome combinations but controlling for 
a possible “yes” bias (see above) and as well incorporating different story types for each 
task. This approach would further control for the possibility of a story type bias. 
Additional work should also investigate HFA children’s understanding of this distinction 
not just for others, but also for self. 
 
 Intention-Desire Distinction Understanding in TD Children. TD children begin to 
distinguish between intentions and desires between the ages of 4 and 5 years (Schult, 
2002). Across a group of TD 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds, only the 7-year-olds successfully 
differentiated between intentions and desires in situations that had either the outcome of 
the intention or the outcome of the desire occur, but not both. Our results for the TD 
children for the same intention-desire distinction measure as in Schult (2002) are highly 
consistent with the original study’s findings for the 4-and 5-year-olds. The findings 
suggest that young TD children recognize both desires and intentions when their 
outcomes are concordant (both desire/intention do or do not come about). However, our 
results also suggest that young TD children may recognize desires in discordant tasks 
(either desire/intention comes about but not both), but that they struggle to understand 
intentions when they contrast with desires. 
 In our study, four tasks tested children’s ability to understand the intention-desire 
distinction. Our sample of TD children performed near ceiling on the intention-
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fulfilled/desire-satisfied task and well above chance on the intention-unfulfilled/desire-
unsatisfied task (see Table 18). But for the intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied task, TDs 
struggled to separate intentions and desires by performing poorly (31% pass) on the 
intention question. They also performed poorly (59% pass) on the intention question for 
the intention-fulfilled/desire-unsatisfied task. The results suggest that TD children 
struggle to separate intentions and desires when the outcome of one’s intention and the 
outcome of one’s corresponding desire are discordant as evidenced by the above chance 
performance on the desire question in both conditions. 
 One difference between our results and the original study is that 5-year-olds in the 
original study performed well above chance (83%) on the intention question in the 
intention-unfulfilled/desire-satisfied task (Schult, 2002). The difference between groups 
on this question may be attributable to a story bias. The two story types involved 1) a 
character getting a doll she wanted but not by buying it as she intended to do, and 2) a 
character getting lunch that he wanted but not by making himself as he intended to do. It 
could be the case that these two specific events used to separate the intention and desire 
in these two stories are not entirely clear to our TD sample and therefore the tasks may 
not have be as stable as we had thought. Although Schult pilot-tested each of these stories 
with adults and got rid of any perceived complex intention interpretations, the specific 
type of story used in this particular task may still have been confusing to our TD children.  
 Another possibility is that the two stories involved what the character intended to 
do in the immediate future, not what the character was intentionally doing. The fact that 
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the intention question asks about a future action that was thwarted even though the desire 
underlying that action was still fulfilled (e.g., getting the doll and getting lunch) may 
have perplexed our participants. Performance on the other task that involved a contrasting 
intention-desire outcome in our TD group was similar compared to Schult’s 4-and 5-year-
olds. Thus, it is also possible that random or natural variation in these two data sets 
explains the discrepancy. 
 Independent of this one discrepancy, though, our control population’s response 
pattern supports Schult’s (2002) findings that children younger than 7 years struggle to 
consistently separate intentions from desires. Because this is only the second instance in 
which these stories have been tested, the age at which young TD children develop the 
ability to appreciate the difference between intentions and desires remains to be tested. 
Future research should investigate the developing understanding of the intention-desire 
distinction in TD children and investigate this understanding both for others and self. 
Similar story types across contrasting conditions should also be used to control for the 
possibility of a story bias 
 
 Two Intentions-Identical Actions Understanding in HFA Children. Participants in 
the current study were presented with the same two intentions-identical action measure 
found in Baird and Moses (2001, Study 4). Our HFA children were delayed, but not 
impaired, in their understanding that more than one intention can be used to generate a 
given action, compared to TD controls. The overall performance by the HFA children 
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suggests that they recognize, in others, that two different intentions can be used to carry 
out one and the same action. 
 We used three tasks to measure this understanding (see Chapter 3: Methods for a 
full description and Appendix D for an example). Both the HFA group and the TD 
controls (see below), performed above chance across all three conditions. Although both 
groups performed well on all tasks, there was a slight difference in the overall passing 
scores, with the HFA group performing worse on two of the three tasks than TD children. 
Specifically, HFA children did not perform as well as TD children on the same action–
different intention task and on the different action–different intention task. No difference 
was observed between groups on the same action-same intention task. Within the HFA 
group, participants performed better on the different intentions-different action task than 
the same-same ask and same-different task. 
 One interpretation of our results is that HFA children performed well on the same 
action-different intention task not because they understood the core concepts being tested 
but because they used low-level associative cues to figure out the correct answer. If 
participants answered the first intention question in the task wrong, then they were retold 
what that character wants and what s/he is doing in an attempt to fulfill that desire, and 
the intention question was asked again. This procedure ensures that the participant gets 
the first intention question correct (of course a child could answer incorrectly again, but 
this did not happen for any participant in the current study). Questions were presented in 
a forced-choice dichotomous format that asked about each character’s intention. The 
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HFA children who answered the first intention question (A) incorrectly on the first pass 
meant that they chose the intention for the other character and by default the correct 
answer to the test question—that is, the second intention question (B). Therefore, they 
could have considered the correct answer to (B) to be “not intention A” or “B because I 
was corrected.” However, we do not believe this interpretation is correct because then 
they would have performed poorly in the same intention-same action condition in which 
case the “not intention A” strategy would have resulted in answering (B) incorrectly. This 
factor lends support to the conclusion that our sample of HFA children recognized that an 
identical action may be motivated by different intentions. 
 These results are the first of their kind to provide information about HFA 
children’s basic understanding of the relation between a person’s intention and the action 
it engenders. HFA children’s understanding of this relation between internal mental states 
and external behavior is a hotly debated topic. Recent research has shown that compared 
to typical and atypical controls, children with HFA struggle to predict the outcome of a 
sequence of familiar and non-familiar goal-directed actions in others (Zalla et al., 2010). 
The authors suggest that HFA children have an impaired “means-end analysis” 
processing system which affects the ability to predict behavioral outcomes in others 
(Zalla et al., 2010). 
 Results from our study suggest that HFA children may have some basic 
understanding that intentions and the resulting actions are not isomorphic—that is, they 
share a “many-to-many” relation (term borrowed from Baird & Moses, 2001). HFA 
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children may develop an understanding of this basic idea—that one and the same 
intention may beget any number of actions, and likewise, an identical action may be 
motivated by different intentions. However, they may nevertheless struggle to understand 
what intentions are, other than something that seems to be related to actions, but are 
themselves not actions.  
 Evidence from our study suggests that HFA children do not appreciate the 
difference between intentions and desires in others (see above). This weakness could be 
because they take descriptions of desires and intentions to be the same thing. If HFA 
children struggle to disentangle desires from intentions, then this problem could play a 
role in predicting the intentional (i.e., goal-directed) outcome of an incomplete action 
(e.g., Zalla et al., 2010). Consider the following scenario as an example. Sue and Mark 
are playing together at Mark’s house. Mark just got a new toy fire truck and Sue wants to 
play with it. However, Mark does not want anyone to play with his new toy and tells Sue 
this. So Sue knows that playing with the fire truck will upset Mark and even though she 
still wants to, she decides not to play with the fire truck. Instead, Sue walks to get a 
different toy, which is behind the fire truck. Now imagine that someone who does not 
recognize the difference between desires and intentions sees this event unfold. If we were 
to ask whether they predict that Sue will pick up the fire truck to play with it (desire) or 
pick up the fire truck to move it (intention) to get at a different toy to play with, they may 
expect that Sue picks up the fire truck to play with it simply because she wants to, despite 
having formed the intention not to play with it. In this case, the ensuing action and 
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formed intention would be incorrectly related due to the observer’s inability to separate 
desires from intentions.  
 Further research is needed to explore the understanding of the intention-action 
relation in HFA children. Although we found that HFA children were successful at 
solving the same action-different intention task, additional studies should investigate the 
understanding of the many-to-many relation between intentions and actions in children 
with HFA.  In addition to a replication study to confirm/disconfirm our findings, an 
immediate next step might be to investigate the role that belief understanding plays in 
appreciating that multiple intentions can be used to motivate an identical action. It would 
also be interesting to explore whether a morally valenced intentional action may affect 
HFA children’s ability to separate intentions from the actions they engender, based on 
whether the action deserves praise or blame. 
 
 Two Intentions-Identical Actions Understanding in TD Children. In our study, TD 
children performed uniformly well across all three of the two intentions-identical actions 
tasks. In the different action-different intention task, TD children’s response rates were 
approaching ceiling levels (97%, see Table 19). They also performed rather well in the 
same action-same intention (83%) and same action-different intention (89%) tasks. 
Although differences were found within the group between the different action-different 
intention task and the other two tasks, controls nevertheless demonstrated a high level of 
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competence across all three conditions. Therefore, we did not think these differences 
were meaningful for purposes of our study.  
 Results from the TD children in our study support previous findings that typical 
children can differentiate between two different intentions that are being performed by an 
identical action by the age 5 (Baird & Moses, 2001). There was a small methodological 
difference between the measure used in our study and the measure used in the original 
study for the group of 5-year-olds. The measure we used was taken from Study 4, a 
simplification in the task design that was presented to 5-year-olds (Baird & Moses, 
2001). We chose the method from Study 4 because of this simplification, as our goal was 
to assess the understanding of the ‘two intention-same action’ concept to a novel group of 
atypically developing children. Therefore, findings for our TD participants are from tasks 
that were only used on a group of 4-year-olds (Baird & Moses, 2001). Our results differ 
from those for Study 4 in that the TD children in the current study performed well across 
all three conditions and the preschoolers in Study 4 were not above chance in the same 
action-different intention condition. This difference notwithstanding, our results for the 
TD children suggest that our sample also understood that different intentions may be used 
to motivate an identical action. These findings are not surprising given the average age of 
our TD sample was a full year older than the 5-year-olds in Baird and Moses (2001). 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 A virtue of our study is that it provided initial data regarding HFA children’s 
understanding of 1) teaching, 2) the distinction between intentions and desires, and 3) the 
relation between intentions and the actions they engender. However, an unavoidable cost 
of this is that the measures we used were originally designed for TD children. Alternative 
methods for testing many of the tasks measured in our study should be incorporated in 
future research. For example, given the chance that a “teach” bias could have affected our 
HFA sample’s performance on the teaching measure, it would be worthwhile adjusting 
the tasks’ test questions to a forced-choice dichotomous format that did not use the word 
“teach” akin to the format highlighted above to alleviate the potential for a “yes” bias in 
the intention-desire distinction measure. 
 Since this is a novel area of study, it is important that future studies have 
increased sample sizes. Despite the current ASD incidence, autism is still a relatively rare 
disorder from a population standpoint. Therefore it is not as easy to obtain large sample 
sizes as done in studies with TD children. Nevertheless, larger sample sizes should be 
used. Although relatively small sample sizes in ASD research are standard, the number is 
increasing (Hall, Chung, & Navidi, 2010). A priori statistical estimates of power 
conducted to test for the minimum detectable effect size for matched pairs suggested that 
the current study’s sample size (N = 70) was adequate to detect moderate effects 
(Cohen’s d = .54-.59). Our sample was deemed adequate to protect against the probability 
of committing a Type II error. However, optimizing sample size, which in our case would 
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mean an increase in N, decreases the probability of committing a Type I or Type II error 
and increases the ability to detect important effects or associations. 
 Moreover, because our study used a cross-sectional design, future longitudinal 
studies should be conducted to track development of these socio-cognitive measures in 
HFA children. Understanding when developmental changes occur is critical to research 
that examines cognitive growth. Therefore, it is also important to restrict age/ability range 
in studies that examine children with ASD. The age range in the current study was rather 
narrow relative to comparison studies in the literature (e.g., Happé, 1995; Peterson et al., 
2005; Russell & Hill, 2001). However, further restricting the verbal ability age range 
would increase the precision of findings in terms of the verbal ability age of HFA 
children and their performance.  
 As was discussed previously, a possible interpretation of our results is that HFA 
children used alternative cognitive strategies to solve the tasks that they performed well 
on (e.g., two intentions-same actions measure). Similarly, alternative cognitive strategies 
could have accounted for poor performance on other measures that HFA children did not 
perform well on (e.g., intention-desire distinction, understanding of teaching). Non-verbal 
mental abilities (NVMA) were not examined in our experimental measures and were not 
used as part of the matching design. The current study followed standard practices of 
matching on overall verbal ability because our tasks were verbal in design (e.g., Happé, 
1995; Pexman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that NVMA in the same way 
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as executive function could have been related to task performance in the target 
population.  
 Executive function includes abilities such as planning, working memory, mental 
flexibility, response initiation, response inhibition, impulse control and monitoring of 
action (Stuss & Knight, 2002). These abilities are known to be impaired in children with 
ASD (e.g., Jones, Webb, Estes, & Dawson, 2013) and have been shown to relate to 
theory of mind abilities in HFA children (e.g., Pellicano, 2010). However, numerous 
studies have shown that theory of mind task performance is related to verbal ability (e.g, 
Bowler, 1992; Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, & Frith, 1994; 
Happé, 1995; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990; Yirmiya et al., 1998) and that verbal 
ability is not related to executive function in children with HFA (e.g., Bennetto, 
Pennington, & Rogers 1996; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 
2005). Moreover, research investigating performance on tasks that require verbal 
mediation such as emotion sorting, matching, and naming tasks that did not match on 
verbal ability found group differences between HFA children and TD controls (e.g., 
Hobson, 1986; MacDonald et al., 1995; Weeks & Hobson, 1987). But in follow-up 
replication studies, group differences disappeared when HFA and non-HFA groups were 
matched on verbal ability (e.g., Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988, 1989a; Loveland et al., 
1997).  
 To circumvent these concerns, matching can be done individually (Harms, 
Martin, & Wallace, 2010), which was the method employed in the current study. 
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Additional studies that investigate the social cognitive measures used in our study should 
match on verbal ability but also should include tasks that test NMVA. Moreover, future 
work that investigates the understanding of teaching in HFA children should match using 
TD children and control populations of non-autistic but developmentally delayed 
children.  
 In studying the understanding of teaching in HFA children, there are numerous 
avenues to pursue next, given the novelty of this research. Therefore, the following 
research questions are meant only as a list of examples that might follow directly from 
the current project: 1) How do children with HFA learn from teaching in relation to their 
understanding of it? 2) How does the understanding of teaching change (develop) in early 
childhood and how does this relate to how children with HFA learn? 3) How do HFA 
children teach others, and how do their teaching skills relate to their understanding of the 
concept of teaching? 4) What role do executive functions play in HFA children’s 
understanding of teaching? 5) How do HFA children understand their own intentions? 6) 
What are the educational implications of HFA children’s understanding of teaching for 
school readiness? 
 
 
Implications for Learning from Others in Children with ASD 
 
 The findings from our study of the understanding of teaching in HFA and TD 
children have practical implications for practitioners, teachers, and families of children 
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with HFA. A wide variety of diverse and intricate treatments have been designed to 
improve the quality of lives of individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (e.g., 
Ascroft, Argiro, & Keohane, 2010; Mesibov & Shea, 2010; Sancho et al., 2010, or see 
Dawson & Burner, 2011 for a review). Teaching in some capacity is integral to each of 
the interventions currently used to help children with HFA learn everything from 
everyday skills (such as brushing one’s teeth), to social skills (such as how to make and 
maintain friendships), to cognitive skills (such as how to read). Many of the more well-
known and widely used interventions like ABA, the Denver Model, or TEACCH (see 
Chapter 1: Introduction for a full description) use teaching strategies with the goal of 
targeting the strengths and abilities of children with an ASD and then using those 
strengths to help them learn and develop.  
 Fortunately, some of the evidence-based interventions have shown to be effective 
in reducing diagnostic severity in young children with an ASD (e.g., Dawson et al., 2010) 
and improve learning outcomes (e.g., Mesibov & Shea, 2010). However, even the most 
effective models have yet to determine whether gains made are temporal or permanent 
(Dawson et al., 2010). Therefore, interventions for children with an ASD can and should 
be improved. A method of making interventions more effective might involve adjusting 
how the teaching activity is performed based on how children with HFA understanding 
the concept of teaching. 
 The TEACCH program, for example, is based on the notion of “structured 
teaching” (Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 2004) which use visual supports in a controlled, 
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structured setting to help teach children with HFA. Part of the TEACCH philosophy is 
that “teaching activities are most successful when they are matched to a child's current 
developmental level”(TEACCH Autism Program, 2013). However, the method and 
philosophy do not take in account the HFA child’s understanding of teaching when using 
visual aids or matching an activity to a child’s ability. So while the use of structured 
settings and visual supports in TEACCH have been found to be helpful, these methods 
may be better served if the way in which information is actually presented and taught is 
based on HFA children’s understanding of teaching. 
 The understanding of teaching in HFA children may also play a role in how they 
are taught in family and peer settings. Learning occurs just as frequently, if not more 
frequently outside of the classroom setting as it does inside the classroom. We learn from 
our relatives and from our friends. A teaching moment arises any time someone else 
recognizes a knowledge difference between you and them, and that person decides to try 
to reduce that knowledge gap. Knowing what children with HFA understand about the 
concept of teaching may help to create or make more effective a teaching moment in 
every one of these instances. This dissertation provides the first step towards translating 
evidence into practice regarding HFA children’s understanding of teaching. 
  
169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: Examples of Task Items by Measure 
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A: Understanding of Teaching Measure 
 
Successful Teaching: 
 
Need: Trevor 
 Bill 
 Play Dough 
 
Here are Trevor and Bill. (introduce toy figures) 
Bill does not know how to make a bowl from clay. (show clay) 
Trevor knows how to make a bowl from clay.   
Every day Trevor shows Bill how to make a bowl from clay, so that he learns how to do 
it. 'Look (demonstrate making the bowl), first you role the clay to a ball, then you stick 
your thumb into the ball, there, you have a bowl.'  
 
Now Bill also knows how to make a bowl.  (Bill makes bowl) 
 
Knowledge Question: Does Bill know how to make a bowl? Yes   No 
 
Teach Question:  
Did Trevor try to teach Bill how to make a bowl from clay or did he try to make a bowl 
for himself? 
 
 Yes, try to teach  Bowl for himself 
 
 
Correct = Yes to knowledge question; Yes to teach question 
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Who should be taught? 
 
Need:  Sarah 
 Dana 
 Karen 
 Mini-book for reading 
 
Here are Sarah and Dana. (introduce toy figures) 
Sarah knows how to read. (show mini-book) 
Dana does not know how to read. (no book) 
This is Karen. (Show toy figure) 
Karen is a teacher who teaches children how to read. (use same mini-book) 
 
Knowledge question:   Who knows how to read, Sarah or Dana (point at each) 
     
Sarah   Dana 
 
 
Teach question:  Who will Karen teach to read, will Karen teach Sarah or Dana? 
     
Sarah   Dana 
 
 
 
 
 
Correct = Sarah to knowledge question, Dana to teach question 
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Failed Teaching 
 
Need: Sam 
 Jackson 
 Animal Dominos ? pictures… 
 
Here are Sam and Jackson.  
Sam does not know how to play Animal Dominos.   
Jackson knows how to play Animal Dominos.   
Every day Jackson shows Sam how to play Animal Dominos, so that he will know how 
to play.   
 
'See, (enact Jackson demonstrating), first you look for the same picture as here, and then 
you put the picture right next to this one. There, now you have two pictures that are the 
same right next to each other'.   
 
Sam tried and tried to play, but he still does not know how to play.  
(Experimenter enacts Sam putting pictures next to the wrong target picture.)   
 
 
Knowledge question:   Does Sam know how to play?    Yes          No 
 
 
Teach question:    
Did Jackson try to teach Sam how to play Animal Dominos or didn't he try to teach him? 
  
Yes, try to teach                No, didn't try to teach 
 
 
 
Correct = No to knowledge question; Yes to teach question 
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Successful Imitation/observation 
 
Need:  Emma 
 Nicole 
 string 
 Table 
 
Here are Emma and Nicole. (introduce two toy figures) 
Emma does not know how to tie a knot.   
Nicole knows how to tie a knot.  
Every day Emma watches Nicole when she ties a knot.  
(enact Emma hiding behind the table)    
See, she sits here, behind the table, watches Nicole, (enact Nicole tying knot) 
and tries to do just what she does.  
Nicole does not see Emma.   
Nicole does not know that Emma is watching her.   
Look, now Emma knows how to tie a knot.  (enact Emma tying knot) 
 
 
Knowledge question:   Does Emma know how to tie a knot?     
Yes  No 
 
 
Teach question:   
 
Did Nicole try to teach Emma how to tie a knot or did she tie a knot for herself?  
  
Teach  Not Teach 
 
 
Correct = Yes to knowledge question, Not Teach to teach question 
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Embedded Teaching 
 
Need: Karen 
Several toy figures (to be children in the class) 
Spinner with numbers 
  
 
Here is Karen. (introduce toy figures) 
Karen is a teacher.  
Every day Karen, the teacher, teaches the children in her class how to read numbers. 
Today Karen brings a game to class. (show game) 
Karen says to the children: ‘we are going to play a number game now.  In this game, 
every child spins the spinner and has to say the name of the number that it lands on.  A 
child who reads the number correctly gets a sticker and gets to play again. 
(enact spinning the spinner)   
 
 
Knowledge Question: Does Karen, the teacher, know how to read numbers? 
Yes                 No 
 
 
Teach Question: When the teacher plays the game, what does the teacher really want - 
does the teacher really want to play with the children or does the teacher really want to 
teach numbers?                            Play  Teach 
 
 
 
 
 Correct = Yes to knowledge question, Teach to teach question 
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Overestimate Learner  
 
Need: Erin 
           Ada 
           Cards to write on 
 
Here are Erin and Ada (introduce figures) 
Ada is a teacher who teaches children how to write their names.  
Erin does not know how to write her name, but Ada, the teacher,  
thinks that Erin knows how to write her name.  
 
Knowledge Question: Does Erin really know how to write her name or not? 
 
          Yes             No 
 
(Right, Erin doesn't know how to write her name but Ada, the teacher,  
thinks that she knows.)  
 
 
Teach Question: So, what will the teacher do? Will the teacher try to teach Erin  
to write her name or not?" 
 
  Teach   Not Teach 
 
 
Correct=No to knowledge question; Not teach to teach question 
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Overestimate Self 
 
Need: Jake 
 Jake's little sister 
 Toy Cow 
 
Here is Jake.  (introduce toy figure) 
Jake thinks this is a dog (show cow). 
Control Question: Is this really a dog?  No, it’s a cow. 
But Jake thinks this is a dog.   
Here is Jake’s little sister.  (introduce toy figure) 
Jake’s little sister doesn’t know what this animal is. 
She says to Jake, ‘Please, teach me the name of this animal.’  (enact) 
 
Knowledge Question:  Does Jake really know what this animal is called?  Yes     No 
 
 
Teach Question:  Will Jake try to teach his little sister the name of this animal? 
     
  Try to teach      Not try to teach 
 
 
Correct = No to knowledge question; Yes try to teach to teach question 
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 B: Theory of Mind Scale    
 
Wellman & Liu, University of Michigan 
 
 
ANY USE OF THIS SCALE OR TRANSLATIONS OF IT SHOULD CITE 
WELLMAN & LIU (2004) AND PERMISSION FROM WELLMAN & LIU  (H.M. 
Wellman & D. Liu, 2004, Scaling of theory of mind tasks. Child Development, 75, 523-
541)  
 
These tasks are presented in order of least to most difficult (for preschoolers). They 
should NOT be presented in exactly this order, BUT Not-Own Desire should come first 
(so children begin with an easy task to understand) and Appearance-Reality Emotion 
should come last. We suggest the order: Diverse- Desire, Knowledge-Access, Contents 
False Belief, Diverse Belief, Explicit False Belief, Real-Apparent Emotion. If two orders 
are needed then we recommend the following for a second order: Diverse- Desire, , 
Explicit False Belief, Diverse Belief, Contents False Belief, Knowledge-Access, Real-
Apparent Emotion 
 
Note: Explicit False Belief is NOT an item in the “official” 5-item scale. So it is often 
omitted. (It is included here just for those who want to include two false-belief tasks, one 
within the scale itself and one additional in a format comparable to the rest of the scale. 
See Wellman & Liu 2004 for details.) 
 
All tasks use small toy figurines and pictures, to present the contents. 
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Task 1: Understanding Diverse Desires 
 
Not-Own Desire (X) 
Props: Small figurine. 8.5x11 piece paper (laminated) with colored realistic drawing of 
carrot on one half and cookie on the other. 
 
 
Story: Here’s Mr. Jones (place figure next to picture, midway between two items).  It is 
his snack time.  So, Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat.  Here are two different snacks: a 
carrot (point) and a cookie (point). 
 
Own Desire: Which snack would YOU like best?  Would you like a carrot (point) or…a 
cookie (point) best? 
 
___ If carrot: Well, that’s a good choice, BUT…Mr. Jones REALLY LIKES cookies 
(don’t point).  He doesn’t like carrots.  What he likes best are cookies. 
 
___ If cookie: Well, that’s a good choice, BUT…Mr. Jones REALLY LIKES carrots 
(don’t point).  He doesn’t like cookies.  What he likes best are carrots. 
 
 
Question: So, now it’s time to eat.  Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one.  
Which snack will Mr. Jones (point to Mr. Jones) choose?…A carrot or…a cookie? 
 
___ carrot ___ cookie 
 
SCORING: To be scored as correct, or to “pass” this task, the child must answer the 
target question opposite from his/her answer to the own-desire question. 
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Task 2: Understanding Diverse Beliefs 
Not-Own Belief (X) 
Props: Small figurine of girl. Plus 8.5x11 piece paper (laminated) with colored realistic 
drawing of bushes on one half and garage on the other. 
 
Story: Here’s Linda (place figure on table next to picture midway between two items).  
Linda wants to find her cat.  Her cat might be hiding in the bushes (point) or…it might be 
hiding in the garage (point). 
 
Own Belief: Where do YOU think the cat is?  In the bushes (point) or…in the garage 
(point)? 
 
___ If bushes: Well, that’s a good idea, BUT…Linda THINKS her cat is in the garage 
(don’t point).  She thinks her cat is in the garage. 
 
___ If garage: Well, that’s a good idea, BUT…Linda THINKS her cat is in the bushes 
(don’t point).  She thinks her cat is in the bushes. 
 
 
Question: So…where will Linda (point to Linda) look for her cat?…In the bushes 
or…in the garage? 
 
___ bushes ___ garage 
 
SCORING:  To be scored correct the child must answer the target question opposite from 
his/her answer to the own-belief question. 
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Task 3: Understanding knowledge requires perceptual access: 
Knowledge Access (X) 
Props: Small nondescript rectangular container with a single drawer. Toy dog to fit in 
drawer. Small figurine of girl. 
 
 
Experimenter: Here’s a drawer (keep finger over drawer). 
 
Question to child: What do you think is inside the drawer (point to drawer)?   
(If child gives an answer): _______________ 
 
Experimenter:  (With drama) Let’s see…it’s really a DOG inside! 
(Pull out drawer to show dog) 
(Close the drawer to restrict view again after a pause) 
 
Post-view Question: Okay…what is in the drawer? _______________ 
(If child makes an error here, show contents inside again until child gets this question 
correct) 
 
Experimenter: Polly has never ever seen inside this drawer.  (Take Polly out) Now here 
comes Polly. 
 
Question: So…does Polly KNOW what is in the drawer? 
 
  ___ yes ___ no  
 
  Did Polly see inside this drawer? 
 
  ___ yes ___ no  
 
SCORING: To be scored correct the child must answer the target question “no” and 
answer the memory control question (the last question about seeing) “no.” 
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Task 4: Standard FB task 
Contents False-Belief (X) 
Props: standard Band-aid box with picture of band-aid prominently on front. Toy pig to 
fit in box. Small figure of a boy. 
 
 
Experimenter: Here is a Band-Aid box. 
 
Question to child: What do you think is inside the Band-Aid box?  _______________ 
(Prompt child to say Band-Aids if necessary: for example,  
first prompt, “Does it look like there would be Band-Aids inside?”  
second prompt, “What kind of box is this?  What should be in here?”  
third prompt, “Should there be Band-Aids in here or books in here?”) 
 
Experimenter:  (With drama) Let’s see…it’s really a PIG inside! 
(Pour pig out) 
(Close the lid to restrict view again after a pause) 
 
Post-view Question: Okay…what is in the box? _______________ 
(If child makes an error here, show contents inside again until child gets this question 
correct) 
 
Experimenter: Peter has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box.  (Take Peter out) Now 
here comes Peter. 
 
Question: So…what does Peter THINK is in the box?  Band-Aids or a Pig? 
(Reiterate choice again if child still does not answer) 
 
  ___ Band-Aids ___ Pig 
 
  Did Peter see inside this box? 
 
  ___ yes ___ no 
 
SCORING: To be scored correct the child must answer the target question “Band-Aids” 
and answer the memory question (the last question about seeing) “no.” 
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Task 5: Understanding Display Emotions 
Appearance-Reality Emotion Scale Pre-training (X) 
Props: Picture (about 3x3) showing drawing of back of a boy’s head (not face or 
expression). Emotion scale: a strip (about 3x10) of three simple “faces” (bare-bones 
“smiley”-type black-and-white faces of just circular outline plus simple eyes and line-like 
mouths): one happy, one sad, and (in middle of strip) one neutral. 
 
 
Experimenter: Now, I’m going to tell you a story about a boy.  (Take out emotion scale) 
In this story, the boy might feel happy (point).  He might feel sad (point).  Or He might 
be not feel happy or sad, just OK (point). 
 
Can you point to the face that is: 
  ___ Sad? 
  ___ OK? 
  ___ Happy? 
 
(Train child again if child makes a mistake) 
 
Experimenter: Okay, now about the story: After I’ve finished the story, I’m going to ask 
you about how the boy really feels, inside (pat own chest), AND how he looks on his face 
(pat own cheek).  How he really feels inside (pat own chest) may be the same as how he 
looks on his face (pat own cheek), or they may be different. 
 
(At this point the emotion scale is pushed to one side.  The child does not have to answer 
the target questions by pointing at the scale.  The scale remains in sight but out of the 
way just to provide a visual reminder of the warm up, unless child is unusually 
nonverbal.) 
  
183 
 
Appearance-Reality Emotion Task 
 
Experimenter: This story is about Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling 
jokes. One of the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone 
laughed. Everyone thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt didn’t want the 
other children to see how he felt about the joke, because they would call him a baby. So, 
Matt tried to hide how he felt. 
 
 
Memory Check: What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about 
Matt? 
   ______________________________ 
(Correct answer: laughed or thought it was funny… if the child gets the answer wrong, 
tell the story again) 
 
In the story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt felt? 
______________________________ 
(Correct answer: Call Matt a baby or tease him …if the child gets the answer wrong, tell 
the story again) 
 
 
Question: So, how did Matt really feel, when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, 
sad, or okay? 
 
 ___ Happy ___ Sad ___ Okay 
 
How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? Did he look Happy, Sad, 
or Okay?  (Note: the examiner should not show any feelings) 
(Reiterate choice again if child still does not answer) 
 
  ___ Happy ___ Sad ___ Okay 
   
SCORING: Scoring rests on answers to the last two questions. To be scored correct the 
child’s answer to the really-feel question must be more negative than his/her answer to 
the look question (i.e., sad for really-feel and happy or OK for look, or OK for really-feel 
and happy for look). 
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C: Intention-Desire Distinction Measure 
Schult (2002) 
 
 
Intention-Fulfilled/Desire-Satisfied 
 
 
Alison is at the pool and she's getting ready to swim. She wants to get wet all at once, not 
little by little. Alison makes a plan. She decides she's going to jump off the diving board 
into the pool. Alison walks out to the end of the diving board, and jumps into the water. 
Now she's all wet. 
 
(1) What was Alison’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Alison do what she planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Alison want?  
 
 
(4) Did Alison get what she wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
 
Brian has a puppy and he takes care of it very well. His parents let him feed the puppy by 
himself sometimes. Brian wants to feed the puppy now. He makes a plan. He's going to 
get the food out of the cupboard and put it in the puppy's bowl. Brian goes over to the 
cupboard and gets out the puppy food. He puts it in the bowl, and the puppy eats the 
food. 
 
(1) What was Brian’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Brian do what he planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Brian want?  
 
 
(4) Did Brian get what he wanted?                                                                  Yes      No  
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Intention-Unfulfilled/Desire-Unsatisfied 
 
 
Carrie has a big kite. She really likes flying kites, and she wants to fly this one right 
away. She can't fly her kite in her backyard, because there are too many trees. Carrie 
makes a plan. She decides she's going to go to the park and fly her kite. Just then, it 
started to rain, and Carrie had to stay inside. 
 
 
(1) What was Carrie’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Carrie do what she planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Carrie want?  
 
 
(4) Did Carrie get what she wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
 
When Marty wakes up, there's snow outside on the ground. Marty wants to build a 
snowman. He really likes building things with snow. Marty makes a plan. He decides he's 
going to roll up all the snow in the backyard so he can make a big snowman. Marty puts 
on his snowsuit and boots and goes outside. The sun has melted all the snow. 
 
 
(1) What was Marty’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Marty do what he planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Marty want?  
 
 
(4) Did Marty get what he wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
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Intention-Unfulfilled/Desire-Satisfied  
 
 
Becky really likes playing with dolls. She would like a new doll to play with. There's a 
doll at the toy store that Becky wants. Becky's been saving up her money, and she has 
just enough to buy the doll. Becky makes a plan. She decides she's going to go to the toy 
store and buy the doll. That day, before she went to the store, her mother gave her the 
doll. Now Becky has the doll.  
 
(1) What was Becky’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Becky do what she planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Becky want?  
 
 
(4) Did Becky get what she wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
 
Andrew is playing outside, and he's getting hungry. He wants to have soup for lunch. 
Soup is Andrew's favorite lunch. It warms him up when it's cold outside. Andrew makes 
a plan. He decides he's going to make some soup in the microwave. When Andrew comes 
inside for lunch, his mother has already made lunch. Andrew's mother gives him a warm 
bowl of soup. 
 
 
(1) What was Andrew’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Andrew do what he planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Andrew want?  
 
 
(4) Did Andrew get what he wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
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Intention-Fulfilled/Desire-Unsatisfied 
 
Sarah is hungry and she wants a snack. She wants to have graham crackers and a glass of 
milk for snack. That's her favorite. Sarah makes a plan. She decides she's going to get out 
the crackers first, then pour herself a glass of milk. When Sarah is putting the milk away, 
her dad comes in and eats all the crackers.  
 
(1) What was Sarah’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Sarah do what she planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Sarah want?  
 
 
(4) Did Sarah get what she wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
 
It's a rainy day, and Mark has to walk home from school. He wants his shoes to stay dry, 
because he doesn't like having wet shoes. Mark makes a plan. He decides he's going to 
walk around all the puddles. Mark walks very carefully, and doesn't step into a single 
puddle. When he gets home, his shoes are still dry. Just then, his little brother spills water 
on his shoes. 
 
 
(1) What was Mark’s plan? 
  
 
(2) Did Mark do what he planned to do?                                                        Yes      No  
 
 
(3) What did Mark want?  
 
 
(4) Did Mark get what he wanted?                                                                  Yes      No 
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D: Same Action-Different Intention Story Example (Order 1) 
Baird and Moses (2001) 
 
Running Story:  Order 1 EXERCISE (Same/Diff) 
This is Michael.  Michael wants to be home for dinner in just a few minutes, so he is 
running.   
                                                            
This is Christopher.  Christopher wants to be healthy and strong when he grows up, so he 
is running. 
                                                         
Action:  Is Michael running, is Christopher running, or are they both running?  That's 
right.  Michael and Christopher are both running.  They are both doing the same thing. 
 
Desire 1:  Which boy wants to be home for dinner in just a few minutes? (Michael)  
That's right.  Michael wants to be home for dinner in just a few minutes, so he is running.                                                                                                             
Intention 1:  What is Michael trying to do?  Is Michael trying to get some exercise or is 
he trying to get somewhere fast? 
(Fast) That’s right. Michael is trying to get somewhere fast b/c he wants to be home for 
dinner in just a few minutes. 
(Exercise) Actually, Michael is trying to get somewhere fast b/c he wants to be home for 
dinner in just a few minutes. So what is he trying to do?  Is he trying to get some exercise 
or is he trying to get somewhere fast? 
 
Desire 2:  Which boy wants to be healthy and strong when he grows up? (Christopher)  
That's right.  Christopher wants to be healthy and strong when he grows up, so he is 
running.                                                                               Intention 2:  What is 
Christopher trying to do?  Is Christopher trying to get some exercise or is he trying to get 
somewhere fast? 
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Hose Story:  Order 1 GARDEN (Same/Diff) 
This is Susan.  Susan wants her dog to look pretty, so she is filling up a bucket. 
                                                             
This is Jessica.  Jessica wants to have a beautiful backyard, so she is filling up a bucket. 
                                                           
Action:  Is Jessica filling up the bucket, is Susan filling up the bucket, or are they both 
filling up the bucket?  That's right.  Jessica and Susan are both filling up the bucket.  
They are both doing the same thing. 
 
Desire 1:  Which girl wants to have a beautiful backyard? (Jessica)  That's right.  Jessica 
wants to have a beautiful backyard, so she is filling up the bucket.                              
 Intention 1:  What is Jessica trying to do?  Is Jessica trying to water the garden or is she 
trying to prepare a bath? 
 (Water) That’s right. Jessica is trying to water the garden b/c she wants to have a 
beautiful backyard. 
(Bath) Actually, Jessica is trying to water the garden b/c she wants to have a beautiful 
backyard. So what is she trying to do? Is she trying to trying to water the garden or is she 
trying to prepare a bath? 
 
Desire 2:  Which girl wants her dog to look pretty? (Susan)  That's right.  Susan wants her 
dog to look pretty, so she is filling up the bucket.                                                         
Intention 2:  What is Susan trying to do?  Is Susan trying to water the garden or is she 
trying to prepare a bath? 
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Closet Story:  Order 1 VACUUM (Same/Same) 
This is John.  John wants a hole in his backyard, so he is opening the closet. 
                                                           This 
is Max.  Max wants a sandcastle at the beach, so he is opening the closet. 
                                                      Action:  
Is John opening the closet, is Max opening the closet, or are they both opening the closet?  
That's right.  John and Max are both opening the closet.  They are both doing the same 
thing. 
 
Desire 1:  Which boy wants a hole in his backyard? (John)  That's right.  John wants a 
hole in his backyard, so he is opening the closet.                                                                      
Intention 1:  What is John trying to do?  Is John trying to find the vacuum or is he trying 
to find a shovel? 
 
 (Shovel) That’s right. John is trying to find a shovel b/c he wants a hole in the backyard.  
(Vacuum) Actually, John is trying to find a shovel b/c he wants a hole in the backyard. So 
what is he trying to do? Is he trying to find the vacuum or is he trying to find a shovel? 
 
Desire 2:  Which boy wants a sandcastle at the beach? (Max)  That's right.  Max wants a 
sandcastle at the beach, so he is opening the closet.                                                            
Intention 2:  What is Max trying to do?  Is Max trying to find the vacuum or is he trying 
to find a shovel? 
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Toy Story:  Order 1 CLEAN UP (Same/Same) 
This is Jenny.  Jenny wants her friend in California to have these toys, so she is putting 
the toys in a box. 
                                                           This 
is Sally.  Sally wants to have these toys when she's away on vacation, so she is putting 
the toys in a box. 
                                                      Action:  
Is Sally putting toys in the box, is Jenny putting toys in the box, or are they both putting 
toys in the box?  That's right.  Sally and Jenny are both putting toys in the box.  They are 
both doing the same thing. 
 
Desire 1:  Which girl wants to have these toys when she's away on vacation? (Sally)  
That's right.  Sally wants to have these toys when she's away on vacation, so she is 
putting the toys in the box.                                                                                                                      
Intention 1:  What is Sally trying to do?  Is Sally trying to clean up the toys or is she 
trying to pack the toys? 
 
(Pack) That’s right. Sally is trying to pack the toys b/c she wants to have them when 
she’s away on vacation.  
(Clean up) Actually, Sally is trying to pack the toys b/c she wants to have them when 
she’s away on vacation.  So what is she trying to do?  Is she trying to clean up the toys or 
is she trying to pack the toys? 
 
Desire 2:  Which girl wants her friend in California to have these toys? (Jenny)  That's 
right.  Jenny wants her friend in California to have these toys, so she is putting the toys in 
the box.                                                                                            Intention 2:  What is 
Jenny trying to do?  Is Jenny trying to clean up the toys or is she trying to pack the toys? 
 
 
 
 
  
192 
 
Wood/Cake Story:  Order 1 FIRE (Diff/Diff) 
This is Jeffrey.  Jeffrey wants his house to be warm tonight, so he is chopping wood. 
                                                           This 
is Tom.  Tom wants to have a birthday party, so he is mixing chocolate in a bowl. 
                                                           
Action:  Is Jeffrey chopping wood, is Tom chopping wood, or are they both chopping 
wood?  That's right.  Jeffrey is chopping wood and Tom is mixing chocolate.  They are 
doing different things. 
 
Desire 1:  Which boy wants his house to be warm tonight? (Jeffrey)  That's right.  Jeffrey 
wants his house to be warm tonight, so he is chopping wood.                                      
Intention 1:  What is Jeffrey trying to do?  Is Jeffrey trying to make a fire or is he trying 
to make a cake? 
(Fire) That’s right, Jeffrey is trying to make a fire b/c he wants his house to be warm 
tonight. 
(Cake) Actually, Jeffrey is chopping wood b/c he wants his house to be warm tonight. So, 
what is he trying to do? Is he trying to make a fire or is he trying to make a cake? 
 
Desire 2:  Which boy wants to have a birthday party? (Tom)  That's right.  Tom wants to 
have a birthday party, so he is mixing chocolate in a bowl.                                          
Intention 2:  What is Tom trying to do?  Is Tom trying to make a fire or is he trying to 
make a cake? 
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Music/Hat Story:  Order 1 WARM (Diff/Diff) 
This is Anne.  Anne wants to be a good dancer, so she is pressing a button on the stereo. 
                                                           This 
is Sarah.  Sarah wants to be outside playing in the snow, so she is putting a hat on. 
                                                      Action:  
Is Sarah pressing a button, is Anne pressing a button, or are they both pressing a button?  
That's right.  Sarah is putting a hat on and Anne is pressing a button.  They are doing 
different things. 
 
Desire 1:  Which girl wants to be outside playing in the snow? (Sarah)  That's right.  
Sarah wants to be outside playing in the snow, so she is putting a hat on.                              
Intention 1:  What is Sarah trying to do?  Is Sarah trying to stay warm or is she trying to 
turn the music on? 
 
(Warm) That’s right, Sarah is trying to stay warm b/c she wants to be outside playing in 
the snow. 
(Music) Actually, Sarah is trying to stay warm b/c she wants to be outside playing in the 
snow. So what is she trying to do? Is she trying to stay warm or is she trying to turn the 
music on? 
 
Desire 2:  Which girl wants to be a good dancer? (Anne)  That's right.  Anne wants to be 
a good dancer, so she is pressing a button on the stereo.                                                 
Intention 2:  What is Anne trying to do?  Is Anne trying to stay warm or is she trying to 
turn the music on? 
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E: Understanding of Teaching Stories (Controls) 
 
Underestimate Self 
 
Need: Lisa 
           Mom 
           Danielle 
           M&Ms 
 
Here is Lisa. (introduce toy figure) 
Lisa doesn’t think she knows how to count 
But when Lisa’s mom asks her to split these M&Ms in half so they can have the same 
amount now and the same amount later, Lisa gives her mom two M&Ms, which means 
she knows how to count. (enact)  
Control Question 1: Does Lisa know how to count?     Yes     No                                                   
(Right/Remember that), she does know how to count. 
Control Question 2: Does Lisa think she knows how to count?     Yes      No 
(Right, but/Remember that) Lisa doesn’t think she knows how to count. 
Here is Lisa’s friend Danielle. (introduce toy figure) 
Danielle doesn’t know how to count. 
She says to Lisa ‘Please teach me how to count.’ (enact) 
 
 
 
Knowledge Question:  Does Lisa really know how to count?      Yes     No 
 
 
Teach Question:  Will Lisa try to teach her friend how to count? 
     
  Try to teach      Not try to teach 
 
 
Correct = Yes to knowledge question; Not teach to teach question 
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Underestimate Learner 
 
Need: Daniel 
           Richard 
           Card to write on 
 
Here are Daniel and Richard. (introduce figures) 
Richard knows how to draw a happy face,  
and he teaches other children how to draw a happy face.  
Daniel knows how to draw a happy face,  
but Richard thinks that Daniel doesn’t know how to draw a happy face. 
 
 
  
Knowledge Question: Does Daniel know how to draw a happy face or not?     Yes       No 
 
(Right, Daniel knows how to draw a happy face, but Richard thinks that Daniel doesn’t 
know how to draw a happy face.) 
 
  
Teach Question: So, what will Richard do? Will Richard try to teach Daniel to draw a 
happy face or not? 
 
  Teach   Not Teach 
 
 
 
Correct = Yes to Knowledge question; Yes teach to Teach question  
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Embedded teaching Control 
 
 
Need:  Marty 
Several toy figures (to be children in the classroom) 
Dinosaur soccer and map 
 
Here is Marty. (introduce toy figure) 
Marty is a teacher.  
Every day Marty, the teacher, teaches the children in his class how to read a map. 
Today Marty brings a game to class. (show game) 
Marty says to the children: ‘we are going to play the dinosaur soccer game now.  In this 
game, every child uses a dinosaur to put the ball in the goal. A child who uses a dinosaur 
to put the ball in the goal gets a sticker and gets to play again. 
(enact dinosaur soccer game)   
 
 
Knowledge Question A: Does Marty, the teacher, know how to read a map? 
Yes                 No 
 
 
Knowledge Question B: Does Marty, the teacher, know how to play dinosaur soccer? 
   Yes  No 
 
 
Teach Question: When the teacher plays the game, what does the teacher really want - 
does the teacher really want to play with the children or does the teacher really want to 
teach the children how to read a map?                            Play Teach 
 
 
Correct = Yes to knowledge question, Play to teach question 
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